CHAPTER 5.II. Sample Motions
| Jurisdiction | United States |
II. Sample Motions
A. Motion to Exclude Evidence of Statistical Analysis
__________
v.
__________
IN THE DISTRICT COURT
__________ JUDICIAL COURT
__________ COUNTY, TEXAS
Comes now___, Plaintiff in this cause, and files this, his Motion to Exclude Statistical Evidence, and in support thereof, Plaintiff would show the Court the following:
This is a products liability action arising from a failed "seatback" on the Plaintiff's 2012 Ranchster automobile. The underlying accident occurred on February 2, 2019, when Plaintiff's vehicle, which was stopped at a red light, was rear-ended by a mid-sized sedan at a speed of approximately 35 miles per hour. As a result of the accident, the Plaintiff's driver-side seatback failed and threw the Plaintiff head-first into the rear seat, breaking the Plaintiff's C-2 vertebrae.
The issue raised by this motion relates to an internal report prepared by the Defendant automobile manufacturer entitled "Low-Speed Seatback Failure: A Statistical Report" ("Report"). This Report is a compilation of repair records for the 2013 and 2014 model years of the Ranchster vehicle, analyzing seatback failure in rear-end accidents at speeds from 1 to 15 miles per hour. Not surprisingly, this self-serving document, prepared in anticipation of this litigation, shows no seatback failure at such low speeds.
By this motion, the Plaintiff seeks to exclude this Report as irrelevant, confusing, and prejudicial.
Texas Rule of Evidence 402 states that "evidence which is not relevant is inadmissible." Relevant evidence is defined by Texas Rule of Evidence 401 as "having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." See Torrington v. Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d 829, 845 (Tex. 2000). Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Morale v. State, 557 S.W.3d 569, 573 (Tex. 2018); Diamond Offshore Services Ltd. v. Williams, 542 S.W.3d 539, 549 (Tex. 2018).
Evidence may be properly excluded where not relevant to matters at issue. See Morale v. State, 557 S.W.3d 569, 573 (Tex. 2018). Plaintiff's immigration or residence status is not relevant to the issues in the case. See TXI Transp. Co. v. Hughes, 306 S.W.3d 230, 234 (Tex. 2010); Zamarron v. Adame, 864 S.W.2d 173, 175 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1993, reh'g overruled, writ denied) (plaintiff's immigration status irrelevant).
In the present case, Defendant's Report is clearly irrelevant and should be excluded. The Report is a compilation of repair records relating to seatback failure for the 2013 and 2014 model years of the Ranchster vehicle. The Plaintiff's vehicle is a 2012 model—manufactured prior to the adoption of a more rigid seatback design which was added beginning with the 2013 models. Furthermore, the Report focuses on seatback failure in accidents of 1 to 15 miles per hour. The Plaintiff's accident occurred at rate of 35 miles per hour, a much greater rate of speed.
Because the Report has no rational bearing on the facts of this case, it is clearly irrelevant and should be excluded. Further, as is discussed below, because of this clear lack of relevance, there is a great danger that the jurors will be confused, to the detriment of the Plaintiff.
Texas Rule of Evidence 403 states: "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Brookshire Bros., Ltd. v. Aldridge, 438 S.W.3d 9, 26 (Tex. 2014) (evidence that raises a risk of prejudice and confusion of the jury should be excluded); Farmers Texas County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Pagan, 453 S.W.3d 454, (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (evidence should have been excluded where its probative value was outweighed by danger of confusion of issues and misleading jury).
The Court may exclude irrelevant, unreliable or potentially confusing statistical evidence. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) (no error excluding evidence of study related to exposure to carcinogens where study did not demonstrate statistically significant link between exposure to carcinogen and increase in cancer); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 716 (Tex. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1119 (1998) (setting out statistical-significance requirements for determining the reliability and admissibility of causation evidence); Austin v. Kerr-McGee Ref. Corp., 25 S.W.3d 280, 287 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, no writ) (exclusion of statistical evidence that did not meet statistical-significance requirements).
In the present case, the Defendant's Report contains the type of misleading and confusing "pseudoscientific speculations" that should be excluded.
The Report contains an internal analysis of seatback failure at rates of speed significantly lower than the speed of the subject accident. In addition, the Report analyzes accidents with newer Ranchster models, manufactured after important safety features were added to prevent exactly the type of failure that occurred in this case. Because of key differences between the analyzed data and the facts of this case, there is a very real danger that the jurors will be confused by the Report's findings, which shows no seatback failure in newer Ranchster vehicles.
The Report, which was prepared in anticipation of this litigation, excludes key data regarding the rate of speed and the model year involved in the subject accident. To allow this evidence would create undue prejudice to the plaintiff based upon the danger of jury confusion, while adding absolutely nothing of material value for the jury's consideration.
As such, it is...
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