CHAPTER 4 WHEN IS A CLAIM COGNIZABLE?

• Jurisdiction: United States

Chapter 4 When Is a Claim Cognizable?

The very essence of the words habeas corpus—"that you have the body"—signifies that when filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus, a person asserts he is in custody. Given the essence of the Great Writ, it comes as no surprise that one of the jurisdictional requirements for habeas review is that the petitioner be "in custody."

Section 2254(a) specifically states:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

Although the issue of "custody" may seem simple to resolve, it is more complex than it first appears.

In Carafas v. LaVallee, the Court examined whether federal jurisdiction exists when a person who is in custody when he applies for a writ of habeas corpus is discharged before the Court issues its writ of certiorari. In deciding that such a person can pursue his claim, the Court pointed to amendments to the habeas corpus statute that specifically contemplate the possibility of relief other than immediate release from physical custody. A few days after Carafas, the Court stated in Sibron v. New York that a person who has completed his six-month sentence can continue to pursue a habeas petition he filed before completing his sentence. In so deciding, the Court relied on its holding in Carafas. The Court also explained that important constitutional problems sometimes occur in the context of minor offenses that carry short sentences and collateral consequences, and that people should be able to avail themselves of constitutional protections and remedies, even if they have completed their sentences before their petitions wind their way through the court process. The final case in this chapter, Lane v. Williams, also discusses collateral consequences of a conviction, but it does so in the context of a petitioner challenging his sentence, rather than the conviction itself. The Court found that when a person only challenges his sentence, expiration of that sentence renders the habeas petition moot.

Carafas v. LaVallee 391 U.S. 234 (1968)

JUSTICE FORTAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case has a lengthy procedural history. In 1960, petitioner was convicted of burglary and grand larceny in New York state court proceedings and was sentenced to concurrent terms of three to five years. On direct appeal (following Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)), petitioner claimed that illegally obtained evidence had been introduced against him at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction without opinion, as did the New York Court of Appeals. This Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari.

Thereafter, complex proceedings took place in which petitioner sought in both federal and state courts to obtain relief by writ of habeas corpus, based on his claim that illegally seized evidence was used against him. On November 5, 1965, the United States District Court, as directed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, heard petitioner's claim on the merits. It dismissed his petition on the ground that he had failed to show a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Petitioner appealed in circumstances hereinafter related. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed the appeal. * * * We granted the petition [for a writ of certiorari.] * * * [F]irst we must consider the State's contention that this case is now moot because petitioner has been unconditionally released from custody.

Petitioner applied to the United States District Court for a writ of habeas corpus in June 1963. He was in custody at that time. On March 6, 1967, petitioner's sentence expired, and he was discharged from the parole status in which he had been since October 4, 1964. We issued our writ of certiorari on October 16, 1967.

The issue presented, then, is whether the expiration of petitioner's sentence, before his application was finally adjudicated and while it was awaiting appellate review, terminates federal jurisdiction with respect to the application. Respondent relies upon Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 (1960), and unless this case is overruled, it stands as an insuperable barrier to our further consideration of petitioner's cause or to the grant of relief upon his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Parker v. Ellis held that when a prisoner was released from state prison after having served his full sentence, this Court could not proceed to adjudicate the merits of the claim for relief on his petition for habeas corpus which he had filed with the Federal District Court. This Court held that upon petitioner's unconditional release the case became "moot." Parker was announced in a per curiam decision.

It is clear that petitioner's cause is not moot. In consequence of his conviction, he cannot engage in certain businesses; he cannot serve as an official of a labor union for a specified period of time; he cannot vote in any election held in New York State; he cannot serve as a juror. Because of these "disabilities or burdens (which) may flow from" petitioner's conviction, he has "a substantial stake in the judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence imposed on him." Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 222 (1946). On account of these "collateral consequences," the case is not moot. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 633-634 n.2 (1968); Fiswick v. United States, supra, 329 U.S. at 222, n. 10; United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 512-513 (1954).

The substantial issue, however, which is posed by Parker v. Ellis, is not mootness in the technical or constitutional sense, but whether the statute defining the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal judiciary in respect of persons in state custody is available here. In Parker v. Ellis, as in the present case, petitioner's application was filed in the Federal District Court when he was in state custody, and in both the petitioner was unconditionally released from state custody before his case could be heard in this Court. For the reasons which we here summarize and which are stated at length in the dissenting opinions in Parker v. Ellis, we conclude that under the statutory scheme, once the federal jurisdiction has attached in the District Court, it is not defeated by the release of the petitioner prior to completion of proceedings on such application.

The federal habeas corpus statute requires that the applicant must be "in custody" when the application for habeas corpus is filed. This is required not only by the repeated references in the statute, but also by the history of the great writ. Its province, shaped to guarantee the most fundamental of all rights, is to provide an effective and speedy instrument by which judicial inquiry may be had into the legality of the detention of a person. See Peyton v. Rowe, [391 U.S. 54 (1968)].

But the statute does not limit the relief that may be granted to discharge of the applicant from physical custody. Its mandate is broad with respect to the relief that may be granted. It provides that "[t]he court shall... dispose of the matter as law and justice require." 28 U.S.C. § 2243. The 1966 amendments to the habeas corpus statute seem specifically to contemplate the possibility of relief other than immediate release from physical custody. At one point, the new §2244(b) (1964 ed., Supp. II), speaks in terms of "release from custody or other remedy." See Peyton v. Rowe, supra; Walker v. Wainwright, 390 U.S. 335 (1968). Cf. Ex Parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941).

In the present case, petitioner filed his application shortly after June 20, 1963, while he was in custody. He was not released from custody until March 6, 1967, two weeks before he filed his petition for certiorari here. During the intervening period his application was under consideration in various courts. Petitioner is entitled to consideration of his application for relief on its merits. He is suffering, and will continue to suffer, serious disabilities because of the law's complexities and not because of his fault, if his claim that he has been illegally convicted is meritorious. There is no need in the statute, the Constitution, or sound jurisprudence for denying to petitioner his ultimate day in court. [The Court goes on to hold that because the district court had issued a certificate of probable cause to appeal and waived the filing fee, it was error for the appeals court to deny him the right to appeal in forma pauperis. In so doing, the Court also overrules Parker v. Ellis.]

* * *

Accordingly, the judgment below is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Judgment vacated and case remanded.

[JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. JUSTICE HARLAN and JUSTICE STEWART concurred.]

Notes

1. Adverse effects of convictions

In order for a habeas petitioner to be successful if he is no longer in custody he must have filed the petition prior to being released and be able to show that he has an actual, legal interest in the result of the habeas proceeding. Broughton v. North Carolina, 717 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1983), is an example of the necessity of this second requirement. Because of an outburst during a civil trial, the petitioner in Broughton was sentenced to thirty days of jail for criminal contempt of court. She ultimately sought a writ of habeas corpus from federal district court. The court dismissed her claim, however, because she had procedurally defaulted at the state level. She was released five days after the dismissal but nonetheless sought an appeal. The Fourth Circuit did not reach the procedural default issue and instead called her claim moot and remanded with...