Chapter 3 - §17. Exception—Spontaneous statement

• Jurisdiction: United States

§17. Exception—Spontaneous statement

A declarant's spontaneous statement is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule regardless of whether the declarant is available to testify at trial. See Evid. C. §1240.

§17.1. Overview. A spontaneous statement is one that purports to explain or describe some event "perceived by the declarant," made spontaneously while the declarant was still "under the stress of excitement" due to her perception of the event. Evid. C. §1240. Such a statement is generally viewed as being sufficiently reliable, despite its hearsay nature, under the rationale that the spontaneity of the utterance by an excited declarant will prevent reflection or deliberate fabrication, thus providing some degree of trustworthiness. People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693, 751; 7 Cal. Law Revision Comm'n Rep. (1965) p. 1233.

Note One judge has commented that the spontaneous-statement exception to the hearsay rule has encountered a significant degree of academic criticism on the ground that excitement, while it suspends fabrication, may also weaken the ability to perceive and describe the event accurately. People v. Smith (1st Dist.2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 297, 311 n.10 (Simons, J., concurring).

§17.2. Requirements for exception. For a spontaneous statement to be admissible as a hearsay exception, the following criteria must be met:

1. Declarant perceived startling occurrence. The declarant must have personally perceived "some occurrence startling enough to produce [some] nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting." People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 925; see People v. Phillips (2000) 22 Cal.4th 226, 235 (declarant must have "personally perceived" occurrence); People v. Roberts (6th Dist.2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 469, 477 (event must be "perceived by the declarant").

2. Statement made during period of excitement. The purportedly spontaneous statement must have been made before there has been "time to contrive and misrepresent"—that is, "while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate." People v. Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1162-63, disapproved on other grounds, People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363; Clark, 52 Cal.4th at 925; People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693, 751; People v. Ramirez (4th Dist.2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1512, 1522. This element depends heavily on the particular facts of the individual case. See People v. Sanchez (2019) 7 Cal.5th 14, 39-40. Thus, the crucial element of this exception is not the nature of the statement but...