Chapter 26 Determining Validity of Classification—trial of a Zoning Case

• Library: The Zoning and Land Use Handbook (ABA) (2016 Ed.)

Chapter 26 Determining Validity of Classification—Trial of a Zoning Case

A. Reasonable Relationship to Public Health, Safety, and Welfare

The general rule of law is that a zoning classification must have a reasonable relationship to public health, safety, welfare, or morals, and the regulations and division into districts must be reasonable and must have a fair tendency to accomplish some legitimate legislative purpose.¹

In Frost v. Village of Glen Ellyn, the court stated:

Zoning regulations must have a real and substantial relation to the public health, safety, welfare or morals . . . and, as was observed in City of Richmond Heights v. Richmond Heights Memorial Post Benevolent Ass'n:² ". . . the regulation and restriction into districts must be reasonable, uniform or universal and nondiscriminatory, the restrictions having a fair tendency to accomplish or aid in the accomplishment of some purpose for which the city may exercise its power." In the present case we see nothing essential to the protection or preservation of the public health, safety, welfare or morals, which justifies or requires the singling out of the drive-in restaurant business and according to it a different treatment than the many other uses permitted under the B-2 classification. Stated differently, we see nothing inherently different in the character of the business plaintiffs seek to establish on their property, so far as it [affects] the public interests, from the many other business uses that could be put there as a matter of right under the B-2 business classification. Statutory classifications, even those [affected] by zoning ordinances, can be sustained only where there are real differences between the classes and where the selection of a particular class, as distinguished from others, is reasonably related to the evils to be remedied by the statute or ordinance. . . .
We fail to see how a drive-in restaurant of the nature here planned is significantly more detrimental to the public health, safety, welfare or morals than a restaurant fully enclosed within four walls, or than a bakery, a candy or ice cream store, a grocery store, a meat market, a delicatessen, or a retail liquor store and many more of the sixty-two businesses permitted in B-2 districts (citations omitted).³

B. Factors Determining Validity of Classification

In determining whether a particular zoning classification is valid, various factors must be taken into consideration.⁴ In LaSalle National Bank of Chicago v. County of Cook,⁵ the Illinois Supreme Court undertook a synthesis of prior zoning tests and held that, in reaching a decision, the following circumstances should be given consideration:

1. the existing uses and zoning of nearby property;
2. the extent to which property values are diminished by the particular zoning restrictions;
3. the extent to which the diminution in value of the plaintiff's property promotes the health, safety, or general welfare of the public;
4. the relative gain to the public as compared to the hardship imposed on the individual property owner;
5. the suitability of the subject property for the zoned purposes; and
6. the length of time the property has been vacant as zoned considered in the context of land development in the area surrounding the subject property.⁶

In Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. Village of Richton Park,⁷ the court added two additional factors:

1. community need for the proposed use; and
2. the care with which the community has undertaken to plan its land use development.

Superficially, these tests pose little problem. They have a beguiling simplicity that almost begs for facts to be thrown into their hopper so that the appropriate judicial determination can be sifted out. In practice, however, the refining process is much more complex.

C. Presumption of Validity

Every zoning case is overshadowed by the doctrine that there is a presumption of validity in favor of the ordinance. The burden is on the person attacking the ordinance to overcome this presumption by clear and convincing evidence and to show that the ordinance, as applied, is without reasonable relation to public health, safety, and welfare.⁸

The burden of proof in a zoning case is twofold. The property owner must prove that the existing zoning is unreasonable and that the proposed use is reasonable.⁹ It is interesting to note that in Glenview State Bank v. Vill. of Deerfield,¹⁰ the court, in determining whether the existing zoning ordinance was valid as applied to the subject property, considered not only the permitted uses in the district but also uses that would require variations and special uses, including planned unit developments.

D. Difference of Expert Opinion

It is clearly not enough to establish a difference of opinion as to the reasonableness of the classification. On the other hand, it is not enough for a municipality simply to introduce the testimony of its expert witness to contradict the expert witness of the plaintiff. The fact that there is a difference of opinion between the experts does not mean that it is a "reasonable" difference. Only when there is a reasonable difference of opinion does the presumption of validity in favor of the ordinance act to uphold its validity.¹¹

In State Bank of Countryside v. City of Chicago,¹² the city presented no expert witnesses but rather only an alderman who was not put on as an expert witness. In contrast, the plaintiffs introduced the evidence of a land developer and general contractor, a real estate appraiser, a registered engineer, and a registered architect and certified land planner. Despite this, the trial court ruled in favor of the city, and the appellate court, in affirming the trial court, concluded, "Plaintiffs ascribe error to the court's finding that their experts' testimony was unpersuasive with respect to this factor, as well as the other factors. An expert's opinion, however, is only as valid as the bases and reasons for that...