Chapter §22.3 Meetings

• Jurisdiction: Washington

§22.3 MEETINGS

This section discusses what does and does not constitute a meeting under the Act.

(1) What is a meeting?

A meeting occurs whenever the governing body of a public agency takes "action." RCW 42.30.020(4). "Action" is denned in RCW 42.30.020(3) as "the transaction of the official business of a public agency by a governing body including but not limited to receipt of public testimony, deliberations, discussions, considerations, reviews, evaluations, and final actions." The OPMA expressly permits the members of the governing body to travel together or engage in other social activity as long as they do not take "action," such as discussing agency business. See RCW 42.30.070. Members-elect of a governing body are not yet members of that body with authority to take collective "action." Wood u. Battle Ground Sch. Dist., 107 Wn.App. 550, 561, 27 P.3d 1208 (2001).

For a meeting to occur, it is not necessary that the discussion, consideration, review, or evaluation by the governing body lead to a final action. See Eugster v. City of Spokane (Eugster I), 110 Wn.App. 212, 225, 39 P.3d 380, review denied, 147 Wn.2d 1021 (2002). "Final action" refers to "a collective positive or negative decision, or an actual vote by a majority of the members of a governing body when sitting as a body or entity, upon a motion, proposal, resolution, order, or ordinance." RCW 42.30.020(3). Reaching a consensus on a position to be voted on at a later meeting qualifies as a collective decision and, consequently, as "final action." See Miller v. City of Tacoma, 138 Wn.2d 318, 331, 979 P.2d 429 (1999); Eugster I, 110 Wn.App. at 225. Although one court has held that a decision by fire district commissioners to terminate a fire chief was not "final action" because it was not a decision upon a motion, proposal, resolution, order, or ordinance, the 1989 legislature amended the statute to require such action to be taken in an open public meeting. See RCW 42.30.110(1)(g); see also Slaughter v. Snohomish Cnty. Fire Prot. Dist. No. 20, 50 Wn.App. 733, 738-39, 750 P.2d 656, review denied, 110 Wn.2d 1031 (1988).

Physical presence by members of a governing body is not necessary for a meeting to occur. Communication among members of a governing body by telephone or e-mail may in some circumstances result in a meeting being held in violation of the Act. For example, an exchange of e-mail messages between a quorum of a governing body can constitute "action" if the messages involve communication about agency business whereby the members "collectively intend to meet to transact the governing body's official business." Wood, 107 Wn.App. at 565-66; see also Eugster I, 110 Wn.App. at 224. In Citizens Alliance for Property Rights Legal Fund v. San Juan County, 184 Wn.2d 428, 444, 359 P.3d 753 (2015), the Supreme Court adopted the standard in Wood, holding that if a series of calls or e-mails between members of a governing body "do[es] not reflect the requisite collective intent to meet, no 'meeting' has occurred and the OPMA does not apply." Likewise, because physical presence is not necessary for there...