Chapter 22 - § 22.4 • PLEADING STANDARDS

• Jurisdiction: Colorado

§ 22.4 • PLEADING STANDARDS

In Warne v. Hall,⁴⁸ Colorado embraced the federal standard for pleading that was articulated in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly⁴⁹ and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.⁵⁰ Accordingly, tortious interference claims must be pled with particularity.⁵¹ Conclusory and vague allegations are insufficient to avoid dismissal.⁵² For example, in Warne, the Colorado Supreme Court found insufficient the cursory and vague allegations that a town mayor used her position and authority to interfere with the plaintiff developer's agreement to purchase land intended to be used for a company's headquarters. Indeed, the court found the developer plaintiff's allegations that the defendant's actions were motivated by malice or animosity so broad that they were "not at all entitled to an assumption that they were true."⁵³ Moreover, allegations that the town mayor inquired into the amount paid for the property and that her conduct must have been improper because her opposition to the transaction conflicted with the town board's support of it were insufficient to support the interference claim, because they could also be evidence that the mayor was acting properly based on her beliefs about the town's best interests.⁵⁴ As such, applying the pleading standards articulated in Twombly and Iqbal, the Warne court dismissed the plaintiff's claim for intentional interference with contract.

A related consideration for plaintiffs is potential liability for attorney fees under C.R.S. § 13-17-201 if the tortious interference with contract claim is dismissed pursuant to a C.R.C.P. 12(b) motion.⁵⁵ For example, in Krystkowiak v. W.O. Brisben Companies, Inc., the court found that a community association board member was entitled to his attorney fees from a developer.⁵⁶ Although the trial court dismissed the developer's claim against the member on First Amendment grounds rather than under Rule 12(b), it could have dismissed the claim under Rule 12(b) for failure to state a claim, because the developer could not allege that the member's statements interfered with the community association's agreement not to object to an upcoming development plan.

--------

Notes:

^[48] Warne, 373 P.3d 588.

^[49] Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).

^[50] Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).

^[51] See Warne, 373 P.3d at 595. See also Tesone, No. 17-cv-02101-MEH, 2018 WL 828031 at *2-3 (plaintiff's claim for tortious interference with at-will employment contract and tortious interference with...