CHAPTER 2 WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS: DECISION POINTS AND DECISION-MAKERS

JurisdictionNorth Carolina

Chapter 2 Wrongful Convictions and the Criminal Justice Process: Decision Points and Decision-Makers

A. Introduction

Wrongful convictions are the product of numerous interrelated decisions made by diverse actors in the criminal justice system. The police ordinarily are at the front end of the process as they investigate reported crimes and exercise their powers of arrest. Then, prosecutors, working closely with the police, typically oversee formal charging decisions and determine which cases will proceed to disposition, to be resolved either through guilty pleas or contested trials. The accused, of course, is an active participant in deciding how to plead to a charged offense. If a guilty plea is tendered the case will come before a judge for final resolution. A not guilty plea sets the stage for a trial before a judge or jury. The defendant is entitled to be acquitted unless the prosecution sustains its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If it meets its burden of persuasion and judgment is entered on the guilty verdict, the defendant—even if innocent in fact—will stand convicted under law.

Once guilt is formally adjudicated, the defendant, no longer cloaked in a legal presumption of innocence, must affirmatively demonstrate that error tainted the conviction if the judgment is later to be disturbed. In this respect, innocent defendants face a peculiar disadvantage on appeal because, for the most part, appellate review focuses on detecting procedural error rather than re-examining the facts supporting a guilty verdict. An appellate court nevertheless may be asked to review the sufficiency of the evidence that underlies a conviction, and federal courts on habeas corpus review are empowered to decide whether a constitutionally adequate quantum of evidence supports a judgment of guilt. New evidence bearing on a defendant's professed innocence sometimes surfaces after a trial has been completed. Since that evidence is not part of the record reviewed on appeal, it may serve as the basis for a petition for a hearing and request for a new trial on post-conviction review. The federal courts also may be asked to issue a writ of habeas corpus (a legal remedy for prisoners protesting unfair or illegal detainment) to prisoners who maintain their innocence, coupled with a claim that their constitutional rights have been violated. Finally, executive clemency (such as a pardon issued by a state governor or, in federal cases, the President) may be available to individuals who have been denied judicial relief notwithstanding their claims of innocence.

In this chapter we introduce several of the decision points and decision-makers in the criminal justice process that are instrumental in producing and perpetuating wrongful convictions. More positively, these same decision-makers can help guard against and correct wrongful convictions when the process works effectively. We begin by considering the police decision to arrest.

B. The Police and the Decision to Arrest

The decision to arrest is momentous. An arrest sets in motion a chain of events that, in the normal sequence, immerses the suspect increasingly deeper in a process that can entail pre-trial incarceration, the filing of formal criminal charges, adjudication, and punishment. The police exercise vast discretion and are entrusted with broad authority in making arrests. Although statutes frequently constrain some of their arrest powers, the federal Constitution permits the police to make custodial arrests even for minor offenses that are not punishable by jail time.1 The police normally are entrusted to make arrests without prior judicial authorization in the form of a warrant as long as they have probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed a crime.2 And, significantly, the "probable cause" standard is a forgiving one. It does not require the police to be correct that the person arrested is in fact guilty of committing a crime, but only that ample, objective reasons support their decisions. The Supreme Court elaborated on the meaning of probable cause to arrest in Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003), a case in which the defendant—a front-seat passenger in a car stopped for speeding around 3:00 a.m., who was arrested after the police found cocaine hidden in the vehicle's back seat—disputed the lawfulness of his arrest.

The long-prevailing standard of probable cause protects "citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime," while giving "fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community's protection." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949). On many occasions, we have reiterated that the probable-cause standard is a "'practical, nontechnical conception'" that deals with "'the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.'" Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983) (quoting Brinegar, supra, at 175-176). "[P]robable cause is a fluid concept —turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even Gates, 462 U.S., at 232.

The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances. We have stated, however, that "[t]he substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt," [Brinegar, supra, at 175] and that the belief of guilt must be particularized with respect to the person to be searched or seized, Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979). In Illinois v. Gates, we noted:

"As early as Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch 339, 348 (1813), Chief Justice Marshall observed, in a closely related context: '[T]he term "probable cause," according to its usual acceptation, means less than evidence which would justify condemnation.... It imports a seizure made under circumstances which warrant suspicion.' More recently, we said that 'the quanta ... of proof' appropriate in ordinary judicial proceedings are inapplicable to the decision to issue a warrant. Brinegar, 338 U.S., at 173. Finely tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal trials, have no place in the [probable-cause] decision." 462 U.S., at 235.

To determine whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual, we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide "whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to" probable cause, Ornelas [v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996)].

In this case, Pringle was one of three men riding in a Nissan Maxima at 3:16 a.m. There was $763 of rolled-up cash in the glove compartment directly in front of Pringle. Five plastic glassine baggies of cocaine were behind the backseat armrest and accessible to all three men. Upon questioning, the three men failed to offer any information with respect to the ownership of the cocaine or the money.

We think it an entirely reasonable inference from these facts that any or all three of the occupants had knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control over, the cocaine. Thus, a reasonable officer could conclude that there was probable cause to believe Pringle committed the crime of possession of cocaine, either solely or jointly.

With these observations in mind, we consider a Louisiana case in which a man who was convicted of murder and served several years in prison before his conviction was vacated and he gained release sued the police for damages on the ground that he had been wrongfully arrested.

Gibson v. State
758 So.2d 782 (La. 2000)

TRAYLOR, Justice.

In 1968, Plaintiff, Roland Gibson was convicted of first degree murder and received a life sentence. He subsequently filed an application for post conviction relief and, in 1993, was granted a new trial based upon the failure of the District Attorney to furnish Brady material. Lloyd West, the sole witness testifying against Gibson, recanted his previous testimony and confession wherein he implicated Gibson as the triggerman in the murder. Gibson, his wife, and two sons filed the instant suit for false arrest and imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and personal injury for Gibson's twenty-five-year incarceration. Without West's testimony, the District Attorney entered a nolle prosequi as to Gibson's indictment on March 31, 1993.

After the civil trial in the instant matter, the trial court found the Police lacked probable cause for Gibson's 1967 arrest and awarded Plaintiffs in excess of eleven million dollars in damages.... The court of appeal affirmed the trial court, but ... apportioned forty-five percent of the fault to the State, forty-five percent to the City, and ten percent to West....

We granted writs to determine whether, after being duly convicted of a crime and later released, a party may succeed in a suit for civil damages against the municipality for his arrest, prosecution, and incarceration on the basis of an alleged wrongful arrest.... [W]e answer this question in the negative. We hold that the City cannot be found at fault for Plaintiff's alleged wrongful arrest and prosecution and, therefore, vacate the contrary findings of the lower courts.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Murder Investigation and Trial

On December 30, 1967, at approximately 8:30 p.m. Charles Reinecke, Jr., a New Orleans Yellow Cab driver, was shot and killed in his taxi during an armed robbery. On January 1, 1968, the New Orleans Police (Police) completed an Offense Against Person Case Report detailing that an unknown five-foot, eleven-inch tall white male, twenty-five to thirty years of age, and weighing approximately 160 pounds was wanted in connection with the investigation "for questioning only." The Police lifted a fingerprint from a rear cab window and later...

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