Chapter 17 - § 17.3 • INTENTIONAL TORTS

• Jurisdiction: Colorado

§ 17.3 • INTENTIONAL TORTS

Although rare, intentional torts such as false imprisonment, assault, and battery do arise in the workplace. Most often, these claims are associated with allegations of sexual harassment, or in medical nonconsent cases against employee-physicians and their employers. The statute of limitations to bring any of these three claims is one year from the time the cause of action accrues. C.R.S. § 13-80-103(1)(a).

§ 17.3.1—False Imprisonment

"False imprisonment is an unlawful restraint upon a person's freedom of locomotion, or the right to come and go when or where one may choose." Blackman v. Rifkin, 759 P.2d 54, 58 (Colo. App. 1988) (citing McDonald v. Lakewood Country Club, 461 P.2d 437, 440 (Colo. 1969)). To prove a claim of false imprisonment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: "(1) the defendant intended to restrict the plaintiff's freedom of movement; (2) the defendant, directly or indirectly, restricted the plaintiff's freedom of movement for a period of time, no matter how short; and (3) the plaintiff was aware that (his) (her) freedom of movement was restricted." CJI-Civ. 21:1 (CLE ed. 2022); Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 35 and 41 (1965).

There are few reported cases of false imprisonment in the employment context, due in part to the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act. See Ventura v. Albertson's, Inc., 856 P.2d 35, 39 (Colo. App. 1992). Often however, these cases arise in the context where facts also support claims of assault and battery. Most of the cases reported in Colorado involving the employment relationship are claims by third parties against an employer and its employees. A typical fact pattern arises where the plaintiff is a patient in a hospital or other institution and makes claims of false imprisonment against the hospital and its employees or agents. See Blackman, 759 P.2d at 58.

In a claim for false imprisonment, the plaintiff must prove intent to restrict freedom of movement, as mere confinement without the intent to confine is not sufficient. Id. Intent exists if one does an act for the purpose of restricting another's freedom of movement, or does an act with knowledge that such a restriction probably will result. "This intent exists even if a person acts without malice or ill will or acts under a mistaken belief that he or she is privileged to restrict the other's freedom of movement." CJI-Civ. 21:3 (CLE ed. 2022). It is not necessary that the plaintiff be physically restrained. If the defendant restrains the plaintiff by force or by fear, the acts will generally constitute a false imprisonment. McDo...