Chapter 10 Eighth Amendment: Conditions of Confinement

• Jurisdiction: United States

Chapter 10 Eighth Amendment: Conditions of Confinement

In the previous chapter, we discussed how the Eighth Amendment applies to the imposition of punishment on people who have been convicted of a crime. In this chapter, we will discuss a slightly different aspect of the Eighth Amendment, specifically how it applies to the conditions in which people are incarcerated. Since the early 1800s, when America began its experiment with incarceration as the primary punishment for serious criminal offenders, controversy has surrounded the conditions of confinement in correctional facilities, with critics saying that such conditions add more suffering to the punishment of being confined. Prison and jail conditions have been a constant source of litigation, based on the claim that the conditions themselves constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

Throughout this book, we have documented the rights of prisoners under a variety of circumstances, such as of the restriction of free speech rights or subjection to search and seizure. However, on a more basic level, many inmates have challenged the various physical conditions in which they live. Similar to how children depend on their parents, prisoners are completely dependent on correctional officials. By law, prisoners are not allowed to leave, and in many instances, cannot do anything to improve the conditions in which they live. As a punishment, incarceration serves the goal of incapacitation, restricting the ability of offenders to further violate laws. American society has for the most part agreed that incarceration is not intended to be used as a means to vengeance and retribution. Thus, the limiting of freedom via incarceration is the punishment; any substandard living conditions while incapacitated can, many have argued, violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. While some people do believe that prisoners have it easy, the reality is quite different and this has forced the court system to take what some would consider extreme action. In some instances, entire prison systems have been placed under court control. When this happens, correctional administrators lose their authority to make decisions and must submit plans to a court for approval. If a court believes a plan is inadequate, that court will provide correctional administrators with a list of changes that need to be made (Levitt, 1996). In other circumstances, courts have continually monitored various prison managements, asking them to meet certain goals, such as a reduction in the prison population (Sturm 1993). As Robbins and Buser (1977) pointed out, this is a clear departure from the "hands off" policy that federal courts used to practice regarding penal policy. One of the key turning points in policy was the 1963 Supreme Court decision Jones v. Cunningham, in which the Supreme Court ruled that prisoners in state facilities could file writs of habeas corpus challenging the constitutionality of their conditions of confinement. After this precedent was set, a massive increase in litigation involving correctional facility conditions followed.

The federal courts' broad intervention, ruling that the total conditions of a prison system could violate prisoners' Eighth Amendment rights, can be seen in three important cases: Holt v. Sarver, Ruiz v. Estelle, and Pugh v. Locke. These three cases evaluated the prison systems of Arkansas, Texas, and Alabama, respectively. In broad rulings, the judges found in all three states a variety of deplorable conditions, including prison overcrowding, too few guards to prevent inmate violence, lack of health care and rehabilitation programs, unsafe working environments, and generally unsanitary conditions. As a result, the prison systems were placed under court supervision for many years. As stated in Pugh, the conditions were so horrible that "it is impossible for inmates to rehabilitate themselves or to preserve skills and constructive attitudes already possessed even for those who are inclined to do so." As a remedy, various federal courts have developed concrete orders for correctional officials, often requiring increased funding to correctional facilities. Federal courts have acted as overseers for many state prison systems for years.

Ruling on an Arkansas case, Hutto v. Finney, the Supreme Court approved of a federal court order that limited inmate stays in administrative segregation to 30 days. In a more recent case in California, Brown v. Plata, the federal courts noted that California's prisons were designed to house 80,000 inmates, yet these facilities held almost twice that number, a total of 156,000 inmates. This overcrowding prevented inmates from receiving adequate treatment and secure conditions, a situation the court considered cruel and unusual. A federal district court ordered the California Department of Corrections to reduce the system's prison population to 137.5% of capacity (releasing about 40,000 prisoners) and develop a compliance plan subject to court approval. Ultimately, the Supreme Court approved of the order, which capped the number of prisoners in state prisons.

While conditions have seemingly improved within many prison systems, few people could reasonably argue that additional improvements cannot be made. Furthermore, many prison systems are still overcrowded and under court order to monitor and reduce populations. While these court cases (and others) examined overall prison conditions, it is important to discuss a few different specific issues that courts have considered.

Health Care Issues

One of the most important cases regarding the provision of health care to inmates is Estelle v. Gamble. It is also notable for establishing the standard by which many different inmate needs should be evaluated. An inmate in Texas, J.W. Gamble, was performing his job assignment in prison when a bale of cotton fell on him as he was unloading a truck. Gamble continued to work, but after four hours, he became stiff and was allowed to go to the prison hospital for treatment of his back pain. In the days following his injury, he received various medications and saw physicians a total of 17 times. Eventually, prison administrators, based on advice from prison medical staff, ordered Gamble back to work after he was deemed fit for duty. Gamble refused, arguing that his medical condition prevented him from working. Gamble was placed in administrative segregation and had to appear before a prison disciplinary committee.

Gamble sued the medical director of the state corrections department and two correctional officials, claiming that he had received inadequate treatment for his back injury, and that this violated his Eighth Amendment protection from cruel and unusual punishment. The Supreme Court ultimately denied Gamble's claim, countering that it seemed that prison officials had provided him with a great deal of medical care. According to the Court, a failure to perform x-rays or additional diagnostic techniques was at most medical malpractice, which if pursued legally, should be filed in a state court. Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing the majority opinion, noted that "an inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met." That said, Marshall continued, for an inmate to successfully argue that a lack of medical care constituted cruel and unusual punishment, that inmate needed to establish that prison administrators acted with deliberate indifference. Furthermore, an inmate had to include some proof of a state of mind that authorities were deliberately indifferent to serious medical needs; an inadvertent failure was not evidence of such a state of mind. This concept was developed further in Wilson v. Seiter, when the Court rejected a suggested rule that "short-term" or "one-time" prison conditions required a proof of state of mind, but when considering "continuing" or "systemic" conditions, such a state of mind should be implicit and need no proof. Deliberate indifference is not an easy concept to define and interpret and as such, the courts have been faced with this challenge time and again due to frequent inmate lawsuits. However, as noted in Gittlemacker v. Prosse, complaints of improper or inadequate medical treatment need to go beyond tortious medical malpractice. Indeed, according to Jordan v. Fitzharris, for a claim of improper or denied inmate medical care to violate the Eighth Amendment, it must "shock the general conscience or . . . be intolerable to fundamental fairness."

One interesting issue is if an inmate seeks to avoid medical treatment. In Washington v. Harper, Harper was incarcerated in the state of Washington for a robbery conviction. During his time as an inmate and while briefly under parole, Harper was given an-tipsychotic drugs. When not taking the drugs, he engaged in violent conduct and his mental health deteriorated. Harper argued that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required a hearing before any inmate could be involuntarily administered medication. Ultimately, the Court ruled that such decisions should be made by a medical professional when the behavior of an inmate can threaten the institutional security of a correctional facility. While the Court allowed inmates who pose a threat to institutional security to be involuntarily medicated, the Court ruled in Riggins v. Nevada and Sell v. United States that the state or a correctional facility could not involuntary medicate an inmate simply so that the inmate could be ruled competent to stand trial. The Court ruled that this should be done only in narrow and appropriate circumstances, which had not been presented to the Court.

Two state court opinions further highlight the ability of inmates to refuse medical care. In Singletary v. Costello, the Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida ruled that an inmate engaging in a hunger strike could refuse any medical...