§ 22.2 Original Actions Against State Officers

• Jurisdiction: Washington

§22.2 ORIGINAL ACTIONS AGAINST STATE OFFICERS

The Washington Constitution gives the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to hear actions involving state officers. This section explores in detail the bases for such jurisdiction and then describes the procedures associated with such actions.

(1) Jurisdiction of the Washington Supreme Court

Article IV, §4 of the Washington Constitution authorizes the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in three instances. First, the court has "original jurisdiction in habeas corpus, and quo warranto and mandamus as to all state officers." Wash. Const. art. IV, §4. Second, the court has "appellate jurisdiction in all actions and proceedings, excepting [some civil actions involving the recovery of a small amount of money or personal property]." Id. Third, the court has the "power to issue writs of mandamus, review, prohibition, habeas corpus, certiorari and all other writs necessary and proper to the complete exercise of its appellate and revisory jurisdiction." Id.

The Supreme Court has held that the qualifying clause, "necessary and proper to the complete exercise of its appellate and revisory jurisdiction," was not intended to limit the power to issue writs of mandamus, review, prohibition, habeas corpus, and certiorari. The purpose of the clause was to confer on the court the power to issue writs other than those specifically enumerated that might be necessary to complete the exercise of the court's appellate and revisory jurisdiction. State ex rel. Murphy v. Taylor, 101 Wash. 148, 150-51, 172 P. 217 (1918). The court's appellate jurisdiction is not self-executing, and the legislature may confer appellate jurisdiction on the court. Residents Opposed to Kittitas Turbines v. State Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council (EFSEC), 165 Wn.2d 275, 296, 197 P.3d 1153 (2008).

As a general rule, the Supreme Court has not used the writ procedure to exercise its appellate jurisdiction since promulgation of the Rules of Appellate Procedure (RAP). Kreidler v. Eikenberry, 111 Wn.2d 828, 840, 766 P.2d 438 (1989). RAP 2.1(b) provides that the procedure for seeking review of trial court decisions established by the Rules of Appellate Procedure supersedes the review process formerly available by extraordinary writ. The court has on occasion permitted nonparties to use the writ procedure to obtain review of a trial court decision despite RAP 2.1(b). For example, in Seattle Times Co. v. Serko, 170 Wn.2d 581, 588-90, 243 P.3d 919 (2010), the Supreme Court permitted a newspaper to bring an original action seeking a writ of mandamus to review a trial court's orders in a criminal case exempting documents from disclosure under the Public Records Act, Chapter 42.56 RCW.

Although the Supreme Court has the power to issue writs necessary and proper to complete the exercise of its appellate and revisory jurisdiction, the court has not defined its "revisory jurisdiction." Cmty. Care Coalition of Wash. v. Reed, 165 Wn.2d 606, 617, 200 P.3d 701 (2009) ("[M]odern courts have searched in vain for what is encompassed by the term 'revisory jurisdiction' . . . ."). Because appellate jurisdiction for purposes of an original action for a writ of certiorari is limited to review of the decision of a lower court or lower tribunal, the Supreme Court in Reed concluded it did not have jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari "to directly review and revise a decision of the secretary of state, as opposed to a decision of this court or a lower tribunal." Id. at 617.

(2) Nature of writs

As discussed in the previous subsection, the Washington Constitution gives the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue various writs. Wash. Const. art. IV, §4. The writs of quo warranto, habeas corpus, and mandamus are described in the following subsections.

(a) Quo warranto

The writ of quo warranto is used to challenge the entitlement of a person to hold office. See, e.g., State ex rel. Quick-Ruben v. Verharen, 136 Wn.2d 888, 893, 969 P.2d 64 (1998).

(b) Habeas corpus

The writ of habeas corpus is the remedy for one illegally deprived of his or her liberty. Grieve v. Webb, 22 Wn.2d 902, 904, 158 P.2d 73 (1945). While superior courts retain jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus under Chapter 7.36 RCW, the procedures established by RAP 16.3 through 16.15 and 16.24 through 16.27 for personal restraint petitions "supersede[] the appellate procedure formerly available for a petition for writ of habeas corpus." RAP 16.3(a), (b); see Toliver v. Olsen, 109 Wn.2d 607, 746 P.2d 809 (1987). The Toliver court stated that a superior court may transfer a habeas corpus proceeding to the Court of Appeals for consideration as a personal restraint petition (PRP). The procedures governing personal restraint petitions are set out in Chapter 24 of this deskbook.

(c) Mandamus

The writ of mandamus may be used to require a state officer to perform a clear duty. Gerberding v. Munro, 134 Wn.2d 188, 195, 949 P.2d 1366 (1998). In Gerberding, the Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus requiring the secretary of state to accept declarations of candidacy from individuals who would have been ineligible to seek reelection under the terms of an initiative that established term limits, based on the court's holding that the initiative was unconstitutional. Id. at 211. In Department of Ecology v. State Finance Committee, 116 Wn.2d 246, 248, 259, 804 P.2d 1241 (1991), the court issued a writ of mandamus to require the State Finance Committee to approve the form of a master lease and trust agreement for the construction of a new headquarters for the Department of Ecology, based on the court's conclusion that the method of financing the new building did not violate the state's constitutional debt limit.

The writ of mandamus is also an appropriate remedy when a party seeks to prohibit a state officer from performing a mandatory duty. Wash. State Labor Council v. Reed, 149 Wn.2d 48, 55, 65 P.3d 1203 (2003) (en banc). In Washington State Labor Council, the petitioner sought a writ of mandamus to prevent the secretary of state from canvassing and certifying to the governor the vote count in the election on a referendum measure. Id. at 50. The petitioner claimed that the referendum did not fall within the constitutional referendum power. Although the court did not issue the writ, because it held that the measure was within the referendum power, the court concluded that mandamus would have been an appropriate remedy. In State ex rel. La Follette v. Hinkle, 131 Wash. 86, 94, 229 P. 317 (1924), the court issued a writ of mandamus prohibiting the secretary of state from certifying to election boards the names of candidates for office under the party designation of the La Follette State Party, based on the court's conclusion that the party designation had not been authorized.

A writ of mandamus will lie to direct an officer to exercise the discretion that is his or her duty to exercise. Whitney v. Buckner, 107 Wn.2d 861, 865...