Chapter § 2-57 29 CFR § 782.2. Requirements for Exemption in General

JurisdictionUnited States

2-57 29 CFR § 782.2. Requirements for Exemption in General

(a) The exemption of an employee from the hours provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act under section 13(b)(1) depends both on the class to which his employer belongs and on the class of work involved in the employee's job. The power of the Secretary of Transportation to establish maximum hours and qualifications of service of employees, on which exemption depends, extends to those classes of employees and those only who:

(1) Are employed by carriers whose transportation of passengers or property by motor vehicle is subject to his jurisdiction under section 204 of the Motor Carrier Act (Boutell v. Walling, 327 U.S. 463 (1943); Walling v. Casale, 51 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); and see Ex parte Nos. MC-2 and MC-3, In the Matter of Maximum Hours of Service of Motor Carrier Employees, 28 M.C.C. 125, 132), and (2) engage in activities of a character directly affecting the safety of operation of motor vehicles in the transportation on the public highways of passengers or property in interstate or foreign commerce within the meaning of the Motor Carrier Act. United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U.S. 534 (1940); Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 330 U.S. 649 (1947); Ex parte No. MC-28, 13 M.C.C. 481; Ex parte Nos. MC-2 and MC-3, 28 M.C.C. 125; Walling v. Comet Carriers, 151 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1945).
(b)
(1) The carriers whose transportation activities are subject to the Secretary of Transportation jurisdiction are specified in the Motor Carrier Act itself (see Sec. 782.1). His jurisdiction over private carriers is limited by the statute to private carriers of property by motor vehicle, as defined therein, while his jurisdiction extends to common and contract carriers of both passengers and property. See also the discussion of special classes of carriers in Sec. 782.8. And see paragraph (d) of this section. The U.S. Supreme Court has accepted the Agency determination, that activities of this character are included in the kinds of work which has been defined as the work of drivers, driver's helpers, loaders, and mechanics (see Secs. 782.3 to 782.6) employed by such carriers, and that no other classes of employees employed by such carriers perform duties directly affecting such "safety of operation." Ex parte No. MC-2, 11 M.C.C. 203; Ex parte No. MC-28, 13 M.C.C. 481; Ex parte No. MC-3, 23 M.C.C. 1; Ex parte Nos. MC-2 and MC-3, 28 M.C.C. 125; Levinson, 330 U.S. 649; Pyramid Motor Freight Corp. v. Ispass, 330 U.S. 695 (1947); Southland Gasoline Co. v. Bayley, 319 U.S. 44 (1943); see also paragraph (d) of this section and Secs. 782.3 through 782.8.
(2) The exemption is applicable, under decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, to those employees and those only whose work involves engagement in activities consisting wholly or in part of a class of work which is defined:
(i) As that of a driver, driver's helper, loader, or mechanic, and,
(ii) As directly affecting the safety of operation of motor vehicles on the public highways in transportation in interstate or foreign commerce within the meaning of the Motor Carrier Act. Pyramid Motor Freight Corp., 330 U.S. 695 (1947); Levinson, 330 U.S. 649; Morris v. McComb, 332 U.S. 442 (1947). Although the Supreme Court recognized that the special knowledge and experience required to determine what classifications of work affects safety of operation of interstate motor carriers was applied by the Commission, it has made it clear that the determination whether or not an individual employee is within any such classification is to be determined by judicial process. (Pyramid Motor Freight Corp., 330 U.S. 695; Cf. Missel v. Overnight Motor Transp., 40 F. Supp. 174 (D. Md. 1941), reversed on other grounds 126 F.2d 98 (4th Cir. 17d. 1942), aff'd, 316 U.S. 572; West v. Smoky Mountains Stages, 40 F. Supp. 296 (N.D. Ga. 1941); Magann v. Long's Baggage Transfer Co., 39 F. Supp. 742 (W.D. Va. 1941); Hager v. Brinks, Inc., 6 W.H. Cases 262 (N.D. Ill.)). In determining whether an employee falls within such an exempt category, neither the name given to his position nor that given to the work that he does is controlling (Pyramid Motor Freight Corp., 330 U.S. 695; Porter v. Poindexter, 158 F.2d 759 (10th Cir. 1947); Keeling v. Huber & Huber Motor Express, 57 F. Supp. 617 (W.D. Ky. 1944); Crean v. M. Moran Transp. Lines (W.D.N.Y.) 9 Labor Cases, par. 62,416 (see also earlier opinion in 54 F. Supp. 765)); what is controlling is the character of the activities involved in the performance of his job.
(3) As a general rule, if the bona fide duties of the job performed by the employee are in fact such that he is (or, in the case of a member of a group of drivers, driver's helpers, loaders, or mechanics employed by a common carrier and engaged in safety-affecting occupations, that he is likely to be) called upon in the ordinary course of his work to perform, either regularly or from time to time, safety-affecting activities of the character described in paragraph (b)(2) of this section, he comes within the exemption in all workweeks when he is employed at such job. This general rule assumes that the activities involved in the continuing duties of the job in all such workweeks will include activities which have been determined to affect directly the safety of operation of motor vehicles on the public highways in transportation in interstate commerce. Where this is the case, the rule applies regardless of the proportion of the employee's time or of his activities which is actually devoted to such safety-affecting work in the particular workweek, and the exemption will be applicable even in a workweek when the employee happens to perform no work directly affecting "safety of operation."
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