Cyberpolitik: The Changing Nature of Power in the Information Age.

• Author: Rothkopf, David J.
• Position: International relations

For three hundred years, the aspirations of nation states and their leaders have been the principle drivers in international relations. Throughout that period, the ability of those nation states to achieve their goals has rested on three pillars: economic power, military power and political power. Economic power was derived from the resources that lay within the nation's borders and its ability to trade those resources or their by-products on favorable terms with the rest of the world. Military power derived also from available resources of people and materiel. Political power was drawn alternatively or in combination from the strength of leaders and institutions, the will of the people and/or the support the nation state could win from other nation states.

Today, those pillars of power are being shaken by tectonic shifts that are transforming the very nature of global society. Nation states are facing new rivals for power and influence on the global stage. Power itself is being redistributed, taking new forms and new characteristics. The rules of the game in international relations are changing and the origins of an extraordinary number of those changes can be traced to the Information Revolution.

That revolution has only just begun. Its full extent and implications are unclear. But, for the United States, the ability to remain the world's leader will depend on its ability to recognize the changes transforming the nature of power in the new world environment and adapt to them.

THE REALPOLITIK OF TOMORROW IS CYBERPOLITIK

Realpolitik in the days of Bismarck was a comparatively simple game, albeit one that was swathed in intrigue and subplots. There were five powers of consequence in the world. Ally with two others, thought Bismarck, and the possibility of competing coalitions was forestalled. Pursue national interests coolly and untainted by sentiment, maintain the balance of power and a nation's interests could be assured.

Today, the world stage is crowded with an ever-growing cast of actors who have the power to damage or otherwise impact each other's interests. Dozens of states possess weapons of mass destruction, limitless numbers of non-state actors possess the capability to switch a nation's vital infrastructure on or off, international opinion constrains the actions of national leaders and can transform isolated acts into political or diplomatic watersheds, cadres of young traders determine the price of national currencies, and companies find it increasingly easy to move transactions into the Infosphere and beyond the ambit of any national tax authority. Power itself is being so endlessly redistributed and redefined that its changing nature is one of the principle destabilizing forces in the world today, and a source of strength for those who can adapt to it most quickly.

The Information Revolution drives, enables or influences each of these changes. In turn, these changes undermine "the notion that relations among states are determined by raw power and that the mighty will prevail."(1) Kissinger's definition of realpolitik and that of its Clinton-era cousin, idealpolitik, that suggests that the exercise of power should be informed by a system of values, are due for a revision. The realpolitik of the new era is cyberpolitik, in which the actors are no longer just states, and raw power can be countered or fortified by information power. The mighty will continue to prevail, but the sources, instruments and measures of that might are dramatically changed.

In Diplomacy, Kissinger describes Bismarck, as a revolutionary in large part due to his development of the realpolitik ideas that have proven so influential during the past century. He asserts "revolutionaries almost always start from a position of inferior strength. They prevail because the established order is unable to grasp its own vulnerability"(2) It is a cautionary observation worth heeding by today's foreign policymakers, who base their thinking on traditional policy models that have not been updated to account for the enormous changes brought about as a consequence of the revolution in information technologies.

METASTATECRAFT: FACING AN "ONTOLOGY OF CONTRADICTIONS"

In attempting to identify the key characteristics of this revolution and their implications for international relations, we must begin with a recognition that revolutions, like wars, produce a fog of actions, distractions and other stimuli that make clear thinking a challenge and meaningful conclusions elusive. The nature of this revolution in particular demands a recognition that change has become one of the few constants and that we must accept that literally and figuratively we live in a metastate, a changing polity and a time of flux.

These changes inspired a recent report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies/Robert F. McMormick Tribune Foundation conference on "a new ontology of contradictions." The report cites as examples "simultaneous global fragmentation and integration" and "economic (fast moving) and institutional (slow moving) change."(3)

But the list of contradictory phenomena of this age is much longer. It includes the strengthening of the forces of anarchy and control. The revolution empowers individuals and elites. It breaks down hierarchies and creates new power structures. It amplifies the capacity to analyze, reduces reaction times to allow only for impulse and can be a tool for amplifying emotions or rationality It offers both more choices and too many choices, better information and more questions about authenticity, greater insight and more fog. It can reduce the risk to soldiers in warfare and vastly increase the cost of conflict. It can make the United States so strong militarily that no one dares fight her in ways in which she is prepared to fight, while enabling opponents to take advantage of new options in asymmetrical conflict. It cedes some state authority to markets, to transnational entities and to non-state actors and, as a consequence, produces political forces calling for the strengthening of the state. It is the best tool for democrats and the best weapon for demagogues. It encompasses both McWorld and Jihad,(4) the Clash of Civilizations(5) and the End of History.(6) It is the sharp instrument by which the fabric of civilization may be rent ... that by which may be used to stitch it more firmly together.

Given such contradictions, some might be inclined to suggest that it is too early to acknowledge the certainties that also accompany this revolution. But consider just the following few recent examples and observations as to how the nature and exercise of power has been deeply and permanently altered by the advent of new information technologies:

Control over determining the value of a currency--long considered one of the central prerogatives of the sovereign state--has shifted to the markets. Today, it is traders, not central bankers, who have the last word on foreign exchange rates, as the more than $1 trillion that courses through the world's forex markets dwarves the total amount available to governments with which to intervene.(7) There was a time when diplomats were the sole interlocutors between countries. Now, unmediated dialogue and information exchange between citizens from around the world occurs 24 hours a day.(8) The smallest nation, terrorist group or drug cartel could hire a computer programmer to plant a Trojan horse virus in software, take down a vital network, or cause a computer to misfire. Voltaire said, "God is for the big battalions." In this new world, he may be wrong.(9) Among the most closely guarded intelligence sources of the modern era have been the high-resolution photographs available from government spy satellites. Now, private companies are building satellites with resolution of a meter or less, offering private customers the opportunity to track the subtlest movements of other non-state actors or of governments.(10) In crisis situations from the Amazon jungle to Bosnia, from Chiapas to Tibet, Internet technologies have enabled virtual communities to unite to counter government efforts, from the use of violence to the closing off of existing media channels. These virtual communities have taken their cases to the international court of public opinion, whose influence over states has grown as its means to reach an ever greater audience has multiplied. An illustration of this latter phenomenon suggests that even the world's most powerful nation is not immune to such pressure; indeed, the United States may be especially sensitive to it:

When soldiers of a small European power methodically murder great numbers of unarmed people virtually in front of the world's television cameras and American leaders appear to do little more than look on and wring their hands, this will inevitably come to make the United States `look weak' ... if left unaddressed the bloodshed might well undermine NATO; further weaken the United Nations and other international institutions at the very time they were struggling to define their true post-Cold War purposes; and eventually erode the international order that the United States, as the new uncontested hegemon, appeared determined to bolster and maintain.(11) The largely unregulated multi-trillion dollar pool of money in supranational cyberspace, accessible by computer 24 hours a day, eases the drug trade's toughest problem: transforming huge sums of hot cash into investments in legitimate businesses. Globalized crime is a security threat that neither the police nor the military--the state's traditional responses--can meet.(12) The goals, capabilities and actions of individuals, legitimate NGOs, international organizations, terrorist groups, etc. will become central to U.S. policy and intelligence. Benign, non-state actors provide policymakers with alternative foreign policy tools. Their influence and ubiquity are dissolving the narrow focus of...