Changing Gubernatorial Power: the Measure Vs. Reality

AuthorNelson C. Dometrius
Published date01 June 1987
Date01 June 1987
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1177/106591298704000208
Subject MatterArticles
CHANGING
GUBERNATORIAL
POWER:
THE
MEASURE
VS.
REALITY
NELSON
C.
DOMETRIUS
Texas
Tech
University
VER
the
years,
social
scientists
have
become
very
adept
at
quan-
t
tifying
and
measuring
the
attributes
of
our
subject
matter.
We
recognize
that
human
institutions
and
behavior
are
changeable,
not
immutable.
Nevertheless,
we
sometimes
forget
that
as
the
objects
we
study
change,
the
measurements
we
use
for
our
studies
must
also
change.
This
paper
examines
one
case
where
our
measures
have
not
kept
pace
with
our
subject
-
Schlesinger’s
index
of
gubernatorial
power.
Schlesinger
introduced
his
well-known &dquo;Index
of the
Formal
Powers
of
the
Governors&dquo;
two
decades
ago
(Schlesinger
1965).
The
index,
plus
its
separate
appointment,
budget,
tenure
and
veto
power
components,
has
appeared
repeatedly
in
studies
of
state
politics
and
the
governorship.
It
has
shown
amazing
resilience
-
use
of
the
index
has
continued
despite
qualms
about
its
construction
(Dometrius
1979),
proposed
additions
(Beyle
1983),
and
Schlesinger’s
own
warning
not
to
equate
formal
power
with
actual
in-
fluence
(Schlesinger
1965).
The
index,
however,
has
become
a
victim
of
its
own
subject.
The
last
quarter
century
has
seen
widespread
increases
in
the
formal
powers
of
gover-
nors
(Sabato
1978;
Beyle
1983;
Mueller
1985).
Changes
in
the
states
have
reduced
the
validity
of
the
appointment
power
component
and
have
weakened
the
ability
of
the
summary
index
to
identify
differences
between
governors.
Consequently,
it
is
problematic
to
include
the
index,
or
any
of
its
components,
in
analyses
of the
contemporary
governorship.
The
following
section
reviews
the
general
problems
involved
in
apply-
ing
Schlesinger’s
index
to
the
1980s.
Additionally,
these
problems
will
be
illustrated
through
a
review
of Mueller’s
recent
study
(1985)
of
gubernatorial
power.
As
both
the
most
recent
work
in
the
field,
and
a
longitudinal
anal-
ysis,
Mueller’s
work
crystallizes
many
of
the
index’s
temporal
problems.
Mueller
sought
to
uncover
the
determinants
of
formal
power
by
ex-
amining
changes
in
Schlesinger’s
formal
power
index
between
1960
and
1982.
He
concluded
that
innovative
states
and
wealthy
states
enhanced
the
power
of
their
governors
substantially
during
this
22-year
period;
however,
a
professional
legislature
in
the
state
hindered
increases
in
formal
guber-
natorial
power.
Unfortunately,
Mueller’s
conclusions
stem
as
much
from
weaknesses
in
Schlesinger’s
index
as
from
any
real
relationships.
Received:
January
29,
1986
Revision
Received:
May
21,
1986
Accepted
for
Publication:
May
22,
1986
NOTE:
My
deepest
thanks
to
Gerry
Riposa
and
Sue
Tolleson-Rinehart
for
their
extensive
comments
on
earlier
versions
of
this
paper.

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