Change Direction' 2006: Israeli Operations in Lebanon and the International Law of Self- Defense

• Author: Michael N. Schmitt
• Position: Professor of International Law, United States Naval War College
• Pages: 265-301

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"Change Direction" 2006:

Israeli Operations in Lebanon and the

International Law of Self-Defense

Michael N.Schmitt*

OnJuly 12, 2006, Hezbollah launched Operation True Promise, the ambush

ofIsrael Defence Force (IDF) soldiers patrolling the border with Lebanon. 1

Three Israelis were killed and two captured. Four more died in an IDF tank re-

sponding to the attack, while an eighth perished as Israeli forces attempted to re-

cover the bodies of the tank crew. Meanwhile, Hezbollah rocket attacks against

northern Israeli towns and IDF facilities killed two civilians.

Israel reacted quickly and forcefully with Operation Change Direction. The mil-

itary action included anaval and air blockade of Lebanon, air strikes throughout

the country and, eventually, amajor ground incursion into southern Lebanon. As

the IDF acted, Israel's Ambassador to the United Nations transmitted identical let-

ters to the Secretary-General and the Security Council setting forth the legal basis

for the operation.

Israel thus reserves the right to act in accordance with Article 5 1of the Charter of the

United Nations and exercise its right of self-defense when an armed attack is launched

against aMember of the United Nations. The State of Israel will take appropriate

*Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law, United States Naval War College.

Israeli Operations in Lebanon (2006) and the Law of Self

-Defense

actions to secure the release of the kidnapped soldiers and bring an end to the shelling

that terrorizes our citizens. 2

This article explores and assesses the Israeli justification for Operation Change

Direction. Did the law of self-defense provide abasis for the operation? If so, de-

fense against whom—Hezbollah, the State of Lebanon or both? Were the Israeli

actions consistent with the criteria for alawful defensive action—necessity, pro-

portionality and immediacy? Did Operation Change Direction unlawfully breach

Lebanese territorial integrity?

In order to frame the discussion, it is necessary to distinguish two distinct com-

ponents of the international law governing the use of force. The jus ad helium sets

normative boundaries as to when aState may resort to force as an instrument of its

national policy. 3Its prescriptive architecture is modest, at least in terms of lex

scripta.

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force in interna-

tional relations. 4Only two exceptions to the proscription enjoy universal accep-

tance. The first is enforcement action sanctioned by the Security Council pursuant

to Chapter VII of the Charter. By this linear scheme, the Security Council may de-

clare that aparticular action or situation represents a"threat to the peace, breach of

the peace, or act of aggression." 3Once the declarative condition precedent has

been met, it may implement non-forceful remedial measures.6Should such mea-

sures prove "inadequate," or if the Security Council believes they would not suf-

fice, "it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to

maintain or restore international peace and security." 7The Security Council does so

by authorizing and employing UN-commanded and -controlled forces or by giving a

mandate for enforcement action to either aregional organization or individual

member States organized as an "ad hoc" coalition (or acombination of the two).

Although the Security Council did employ its Chapter VII authority to enhance

the size and mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) as

part of the August 2006 ceasefire,8it did not mandate Operation Change Direction,

either in July 2006 or at any previous time. Instead, the legal basis for Operation

Change Direction submitted by Israel lay in the second express exception to the Ar-

ticle 2(4) prohibition—self-defense.

Article 51codifies the right of States to use force defensively: "Nothing in the pres-

ent Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if

an armed attack occurs against aMember of the United Nations, until the Security

Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and secu-

rity."9AState acting in self-defense must immediately so notify the Security

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Michael N. Schmitt

Council, arequirement epitomized during Operation Change Direction by Israeli

notification on the very day defensive military operations began. 10

The jus in hello, by contrast, governs how force may be employed on the battle-

field. It addresses such matters as the persons and objects that may lawfully be tar-

geted, how targeting has to be accomplished, and the protections to which

civilians, civilian objects and those who are hors de combat are entitled. 11 All sides to

an armed conflict must comply with the jus in bello; status as an aggressor or avic-

tim in the jus ad bellum context has no bearing on the requirement. 12 This article

does not address the jus in bello. 13

The Prelude

Abasic grasp ofthe complex historical predicates to the 2006 conflict in Lebanon is

essential to understanding Operation Change Direction and its normative context.

Southern Lebanon is apredominately Shiite area that has been largely ignored by

the Lebanese government. The absence of astrong governmental presence ren-

dered the area susceptible to exploitation by anti-Israeli groups.

Until its expulsion from Lebanon in 1982, the Palestinian Liberation Organiza-

tion (PLO) used southern Lebanon as abase of operations against Israel. 14 In 1978,

aPLO attack on two Israeli busses left thirty-seven dead and scores wounded. The

IDF reacted with Operation Litani, an operation designed to force the PLO and

other Palestinian armed groups from Lebanese territory south of the Litani River.

In response, the Security Council, in Resolutions 425 and 426, called on Israel to

withdraw from Lebanon. It also created UNIFIL to monitor the withdrawal, help

restore international peace and security, and assist Lebanon in establishing effec-

tive authority in the area. 15

UNIFIL and the Lebanese government proved impotent in deterring further

Palestinian attacks. 16 In 1982, the Abu Nidal Organization's attempted assassina-

tion of the Israeli Ambassador to the United Kingdom precipitated Operation

Peace for Galilee. 17 During the controversial invasion of Lebanon, the IDF ousted

Syrian forces from Beirut and expelled the PLO, including its leader Yasser

Arafat. 18 Israel established abuffer zone in the southern part of the country, where

the IDF remained for the next eighteen years.

The 1982 invasion radicalized many of southern Lebanon's Shiites. Inspired in

part by the 1979 Iranian Revolution, they created Hezbollah (Party of God).

Trained, armed, financed and logistically supported by Syria and Iran, Hezbollah's

manifesto includes the liberation of Jerusalem, the destruction of Israel and the es-

tablishment of an Islamic State in Lebanon. 19

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