A missed chance for peace: Israel and Syria's negotiations over the Golan heights.

• Author: Daoudy, Marwa
• Position: REGIONAL ISSUES

In the Middle East "no war is possible without Egypt, and no peace is possible without Syria, as suggested by former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in the 1970s. From 1991 to 2000, Syria entered into extensive peace negotiations with Israel, another key actor in the Middle East. The objective of this article is to understand these negotiations, which involved periods of intense discord as well as moments of rapprochement. Spectacular progress was made, for instance, between 1993 and 1995, when the "Rabin deposit," Israel's promise to withdraw from the Golan Heights to the 4 June 1967 border and thus allow Syria to recover access to Lake Tiberias, was proposed to the U.S. mediator. The two actors came close to an agreement but failed to put an end to the Israeli-Syrian conflict at the Shepherdstown negotiations in January 2000 and the Asad-Clinton summit on 26 March 2000 in Geneva. What lessons can be drawn from the process which took place between 1991 and 2000 in terms of the actors' objectives, motivations and perceptions of each other? Why did the talks fail to produce an agreement? What was the weight of water in stimulating or blocking the process?

A heated debate has taken place since the 1990s. Did successive Israeli governments seek a genuine peace agreement or was it a deliberate strategy to neutralize Syria while seeking a final arrangement with the Palestinians? What about the late Hafez al-Asad's true intentions? Surely, his domestic legitimacy relied on the continuation of conflict with Israel? On the other hand, was he not experiencing double pressure, both from the international level as well as internally as the Syrian people grew tired of war? And was water a primary concern to him in reaching a satisfying agreement? Many studies and firsthand accounts have provided a narrative of the Israel-Syria peace negotiations and the ambiguous role played by the U.S. mediator. (1)

The Syrian position has remained largely unknown, except for the publication in 1997 of an extended interview with the head of the Syrian delegation to Washington, former ambassador and current minister of foreign affairs, Walid al-Moalem. (2) In this highly unusual display of candor, he described the first round of face-to-face discussions with Israel. However, many questions have remained open regarding the Syrian vision of peace, the evolution of that vision over time and the impact of regional dynamics on the peace process. By providing firsthand testimonies of key negotiators and official documents obtained from Syria, this study aims to shed new light on Syria's constraints and opportunities and their impact on the actors' bargaining positions and perceptions. (3) One cannot but question the underlying negotiation puzzle: In a situation of historical conflict over land and water, and clear asymmetrical power, what brought the two actors together to discuss peace? What was the role of water in the ongoing discussions and from the perspectives of the various actors? What incentives could resume such discussions after the breakup of Shepherdstown and Geneva in 2000?

The main conclusion of this study is that structural and process-related variables were decisive in shaping the negotiation process and the lack of full agreement. Below, I will explain why the negotiations failed and what the prospects for peace are today. In addition to the strategic weight carried by the capture of territory, two additional issues increased the stakes: security and water. This paper will focus on the latter. (4) Water will appear as a catalyst for conflict but also cooperation, and often at the same time. I will analyze this issue in the context of the initial armistice regime in 1949, the negotiations launched by the United States in 1953, the ensuing 1967 conflict and the occupation of the Golan Heights by Israel and the peace process that began in the early 1990s.

Since the collapse of Israel and Syria's peace talks in 2000, major international and regional events have drastically influenced domestic and bilateral bargaining dynamics: the death of Hafez al-Asad and the rise to power of his son Bashar, the 2003 U.S.-led war in Iraq and the forced withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon in April 2005. Therefore, evaluating the likelihood that peace talks will resume and that conflict over land and water can be resolved in the new regional context requires a thorough analysis of all of the obstacles leading up to the peace. As I will show, this is a story of a missed opportunity. Drawing on conceptual tools from negotiation analysis, I will examine the structure and the process of the discussions that took place. But first, I will highlight the physical landscape where the conflict over land and water occurred.

THE JORDAN RIVER BASIN GEOGRAPHY: LITTLE BIG RIVER

The Jordan River is generally considered to have an average flow of approximately 1,400 million cubic meters per year. The river rises as three spring-fed streams: the Hasbani in Lebanon, the Banias in Syria and the Dan in Israel. The three watercourses meet at about 14 kilometers upstream of the once-drained Huleh Lake--the former border of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) between Syria and Israel--before constituting the Jordan River itself. The river's annual flow at the exit point of the Huleh Valley is estimated at 640 million cubic meters. Sixteen kilometers downward, the upper Jordan meets with Lake Tiberias, also called the Sea of Galilee and Lake Kinneret, where its annual flow is diminished to about 550 million cubic meters. A combination of evaporation (140 million cubic meters) and extraction by irrigation canals in the Bissan Valley (60 million cubic meters) reduces the flow to an amount of 440 million cubic meters at the exit point of the lake. At that point, the Yarmuk River, its largest tributary, joins the Jordan. The Yarmuk rises in Syria and forms the border between Syria and Jordan in its lower reaches. The lower Jordan runs from its meeting point with the Yarmuk until it discharges in the Dead Sea, over a distance of about 100 kilometers. The total length of the Jordan River from its three spring sources to the Dead Sea is about 360 kilometers.

The Jordan River is one of the most frequently studied transboundary watercourses in the world, and the allocation of its flow has been the source of conflict for a considerable period of time. (5) At the heart of the Israel-Syria negotiations lies a small territory of 20 square kilometers. This disputed piece of land determines access for Syria to the lake's waters and the Upper Jordan Valley. The history of the conflict over land gives an overview of explanatory variables of the land/water nexus.

THE NEGOTIATION STRUCTURE: HISTORY OF COOPERATION AND CONFLICT OVER LAND/WATER: 1949 TO 1967

The identification of the negotiation structure is crucial for understanding the process and the outcome of negotiations. Structural variables impact the options available to actors. They are usually defined within the context of bilateral dynamics, and include influencing variables such as the history of mutual relationships, cultural perceptions and the distribution of power. (6) This study will not address the underlying theoretical debates, but it is worth mentioning that power is ingrained in the structure of interaction. (7) In understanding the context in which Israel and Syria entered into extensive negotiations, it is important to address the most significant historical variables in relation to conflict over land in the aftermath of the War of 1948 and the fight for scarce water resources, and to disentangle the impact of mutual perceptions.

Early Water Disputes and Negotiations: 1951 to 1954

Following the signing of the Sykes-Picot Accords of 1916, which distributed spheres of influence over Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq between France and Great Britain, respectively, intensive discussions took place between the two mandatory powers after the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. Under the influence of claims made by the World Zionist Organization for a viable Palestine with sufficient water resources, the British Mandate negotiated in 1922 a modified common border--the Paulet-Newcombe line--which placed Syria under French Mandate 10 meters away from the eastern shores of Lake Tiberias. (8) Inclusive of the mouth of the Yarmuk River, the Jordan River north of Tiberias and the Huleh and Tiberias Lakes within the territory of Palestine, the new frontier was ratified in 1923 without being recognized by Syria, as the border was drawn during French rule preceding the country's independence in 1946. (9)

The armistice conventions between Israel and Syria were signed on 20 July 1949. (10) The Arab-Israeli boundary problem was launched when temporary lines of demarcation were established to separate opposing forces, partly on the basis of the curfew lines of 1949. (11) Syria, along with other Arab nations, insisted that a peace regime would be conditional upon return of the borders established in the UN resolution of 1947. Israel maintained control over the zones it received in the Partition Plan, with an additional 3,600 square kilometers taken from the Arab side. Iraqi and trans-Jordanian troops, on the other hand, occupied 3,700 square kilometers in the area allocated to the Palestinians. This "addition" carries particular significance because the zone encompasses the region inclusive of the sources of the Jordan (north of the Huleh and Tiberias lakes), the Yarmuk triangle south of Lake Tiberias and the western part of the Jordan River. It gives the upstream actor the power to secure access to water while controlling the quantity left to downstream users. Syria agreed to withdraw from the 32 square kilometers it occupied on the Israel-allocated share, under the strict condition that a DMZ would be established between the two parties. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was put in charge of...