CEO Succession Origin and Firm Performance: A Multilevel Study

Published date01 January 2017
AuthorDimitrios Georgakakis,Winfried Ruigrok
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/joms.12194
Date01 January 2017
CEO Succession Origin and Firm Performance:
A Multilevel Study
Dimitrios Georgakakis and Winfried Ruigrok
University of St. Gallen
ABSTRACT There has been much controversy concerning the relationship between outside
CEO succession origin and firm performance. Some scholars take the organizational-adaptation
view to highlight the benefits of outside succession; yet others adopt the organizational-disruption
view to pose the selection of an outsider CEO as a disruptive and disadvantageous event for
organizations. In this study, we develop an integrated multilevel framework that reconciles
these opposing perspectives and examines the conditions under which the benefits of outside
CEO succession outweigh the costs. Data from 109 CEO succession events in large
international firms show that the performance advantages of outside succession materialize
when the new CEO: (a) socio-demographically resembles incumbent executives, (b) possesses a
variety of experience, and (c) is hired by a well-performing firm operating in a munificent
industry. Overall, our research demonstrates that the performance implications of new CEO
origin should not be considered in isolation, but in interaction with multilevel characteristics.
Keywords: CEO succession, firm performance, top management teams, multilevel, strategic
leadership
INTRODUCTION
Appointing a chief executive officer (CEO) from outside the firm has become a frequent
phenomenon in recent years. Empirical evidence shows that the rate of outside CEO
succession among the world’s largest international organizations rose from 14 per cent
in 2007 to 29 per cent in 2012 (Favaro et al., 2013). This rising tendency of hiring
CEOs from the external labour market is partially driven by the increasing information
processing and external knowledge demands facing large international corporations
(Hermann and Datta, 2002; Magnusson and Boggs, 2006; Menon and Pfeffer, 2003).
Yet, while outside CEO succession becomes widespread, extant research shows its rela-
tionship with post-succession firm performance to vary from positive to negative (for a
Address for reprints: Dimitrios Georgakakis, University of St. Gallen, Research Institute for International
Management, Dufourstrasse 40a, CH-9000 St. Gallen, Switzerland (dimitrios.georgakakis@unisg.ch).
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C2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd and Society for the Advancement of Management Studies
Journal of Management Studies 54:1 January 2017
doi: 10.1111/joms.12194
review: Karaevli, 2007). Such inconsistency among prior studies suggests a need to
investigate the conditions under which firms can reap benefits from the selection of an
outsider CEO (Finkelstein et al., 2009). Assessing the relationship between outside CEO
succession and firm performance without considering the individual-, organizational-,
and environmental-level factors surrounding succession is unlikely to fully capture the
complex nature of this relationship.
In the extant literature, two opposing theoretical streams have nurtured a longstand-
ing debate over whether, or not, appointing an outsider CEO is the right choice for
organizations. On the one hand, the organizational adaptation view poses outside CEO suc-
cession as a beneficial aspect (Helmich and Brown, 1972). It implies that CEOs
appointed from the external labour market possess more external knowledge and infor-
mation compared to those hired from the firm’s internal ranks, and thus, are better
equipped to expand the resource base of the firm and promote innovation, learning,
and high performance (Menon and Pfeffer, 2003; Wiersema, 1992). In direct contrast,
another volume of research adopts the organizational disruption view of succession, and sees
the selection of an outsider CEO as a disruptive event related to costs for the firm
(Vancil, 1987). It advocates that outsiders lack firm familiarity which – in combination
with the difficulty of integrating in the incumbent top management team (TMT) and
organization (Friedman and Saul, 1991) – causes disruption to internal processes and
results in low performance (Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2004). Due to this theoretical inde-
terminacy among prior studies, scholars have called for research that goes beyond
unitary-based assumptions of the effects of new CEO origin per se (Finkelstein et al.,
2009), and ‘moves forward with contingency explanations’ of when (under which condi-
tions) the benefits of outside succession are more likely to occur (Giambatista et al.,
2005, p. 982).
To resolve the current debate on the performance implications of new CEO origin,
we explore both the organizational adaptation and disruption views of succession. Although
these theoretical views lead to opposing predictions, an important goal of this study is to
integrate these perspectives and examine the boundary conditions under which the ben-
efits of outside succession posed by the organizational adaptation view outweigh the
organizational disruption costs. In doing so, we propose and test a multilevel contin-
gency framework suggesting that outside CEO succession is neither ultimately benefi-
cial, nor ultimately detrimental to firm performance – but its effects depend on factors
nested at different layers of context.
Central to our framework is the notion of executive job demands and its multilevel
implications (Hambrick et al., 2005). This notion suggests that the challenges facing
CEOs in their jobs vary, and the degree to which these challenges can be overcome is
contingent upon the individual-level compatibility between the CEO’s characteristics
and job requirements, as well as the organizational- and environmental-level impera-
tives facing the firm (Nadkarni and Chen, 2014). Building on this conception, we theo-
rize that the underlying disadvantages posed by the organizational disruption view can be
better described as the lack of firm familiarity and integration job challenges that out-
sider CEOs face compared to internal hires and should overcome early after their entry
in the firm (Chen, 2015). At the same time, the informational benefits stressed by the
organizational adaptation view can be seen in relation to the ‘going-in-mandate’ of outside
59CEO Succession Origin and Firm Performance
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C2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd and Society for the Advancement of Management Studies

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