Cellphones in the Hindu Kush.

AuthorHoffman, Bruce
PositionCompany overview

THE LAWLESS border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan has become America's most acute foreign-policy challenge. Virtually every major al-Qaeda attack or plot of the past four years has emanated from the region. Islamic militants threaten not only the nascent democratization and territorial integrity of Afghanistan, but the very stability and future cohesion of nuclear-armed Pakistan.

We recently toured the front lines of this struggle, traveling through such eastern-Afghanistan border provinces as Khowst, Paktika, Kunar and Nuristan. The variety of climactic conditions was astonishing. We made our way by helicopter over snow-packed glaciers, followed by vast, empty deserts to bucolic valleys with flowing rivers coursing through steep, forested hills. In spite of the idyllic scenery, the picture is grim. A concatenation of at least fourteen different terrorist and insurgent groups based in Pakistan regularly traverse the border to target Afghan security forces and the American and NATO military units stationed there. These militants include a range of Taliban groups, al-Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and other radical Afghan religious zealots such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezbi-Islami and their Pakistani jihadi counterparts such as Lashkar-e-Taiba. The problem, as one military intelligence officer candidly told us, is obvious: "We recognize the border. They don't."

The unfortunate irony is that just as U.S. forces have finally begun to understand counterinsurgency in a region that since antiquity has been a graveyard of ambitions for some of the world's most-powerful militaries--including those of Alexander the Great, Great Britain and the Soviet Union--the progress that U.S. military forces have achieved is threatened by the porous border. Pakistan has become a sanctuary for these insurgent forces, which are able to train, equip and mount attacks from the country's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and other border areas with relative impunity.

The unrelenting operations of these insurgent forces imperil everything the United States is trying to achieve in Afghanistan. Indeed, the threat we came to understand is not only to Afghanistan but also to Pakistan and even South Asia, as these powerful centrifugal forces work to destroy national and regional stability while the United States remains preoccupied with Iraq. A hundred years ago, Lord Curzon of Kedleston, viceroy of India and subsequently British foreign secretary, described these border fault lines as "the razor's edge on which hang suspended the modern issues of war and peace, of life and death to nations." His statement is no less true today.

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One Step at a Time

WITHOUT CONTROL of Afghanistan, it will be impossible to control the lawless border regions. But can conventional militaries effectively counter insurgent groups? Until recently, the evidence was arguably discouraging for the U.S. military. Insurgents captured in eastern Afghanistan regularly told their American captors: "We are fighting because two years ago the Americans kicked in doors, searched our homes, took our arms." These sentiments underscored the inadvertently counterproductive effects of prior U.S. counterinsurgency operations.

America's inability to reverse the rising tide of insurgent violence submerging Iraq, coupled with the alienation that clumsy, heavy-handed American tactics had on the Afghan people, sowed considerable doubt about the U.S. military's ability to contain, much less defeat, the irregular adversaries it faced in both countries. While the success of the Iraqi surge, orchestrated by General David Petraeus, received the lion's share of attention, the progress achieved in Afghanistan by Major General David M. Rodriguez, commander of the 82nd Airborne Division's Combined Joint Task Force-82, is no less significant. We spoke with members of the 82nd Airborne on our visit to the region in early March, shortly before their return to the United States following a fifteen-month deployment.

Reflecting on their previous experiences both in Afghanistan and Iraq, the 82nd Airborne under General Rodriguez set out to do things differently during this deployment. Its mission embraced the holy trinity of counterinsurgency: security, governance and development. This involved separating the population from the enemy; building the capacity of the Afghan government to address the needs of the Afghan people; and facilitating reconstruction, development and economic growth. In the end, they were doing "nonsoldier things," as one officer put it, more often than combat operations. A trooper explained that this involved "one day handing out kites to kids and the next night setting up an ambush with the ANA [Afghan National Army]." Looking at the numbers, 99 percent of the 82nd Airborne's operations when they were last deployed to Afghanistan in 2004, they told us, were kinetic. This time around, 75 percent were nonlethal.

And even though military operations remained necessary at times, soldiers clearly understood they could backfire. "Even when you do a righteous hit and take out a bad guy kinetically," one field commander explained to us, "we take steps, not a step, but steps, backward." He credited his father's experience as an officer in Vietnam over thirty years ago for this epiphany and the heavy emphasis on the nonkinetic side of counterinsurgency. "It's fighting the IO [information operations] piece that's most important," this colonel argued. "The use of the nonlethal stuff is what changes communities. Bullets don't work to change [this] fight; IO does. Through effects, through governance." In the six districts under his command, he boasted, there was less crime and violence than back in Washington, DC. So in the 82nd Airborne's battle space, winning popular support for the Afghan government, backed up by...

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