Candidate Repositioning, Valence, and a Backfire Effect from Criticism

• Author: Andrew Gooch
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X221125222
• Published date: 01 November 2022
• Date: 01 November 2022
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

American Politics Research

2022, Vol. 50(6) 757–768

© The Author(s) 2022

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DOI: 10.1177/1532673X221125222

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Candidate Repositioning, Valence, and a

Backf‌ire Effect from Criticism

Andrew Gooch

1



Abstract

Politicians who switch policy positions are often criticized for being inconsistent “f‌lip-f‌loppers”, which suggests a valence penalty

for repositioning. Using a survey experiment with six treatment conditions and a sample of 2694 respondents, results show tha t

candidates receive an increase in favorability and perceived competency when holding a consistent position on asylum seekers

from the campaign to holding off‌ice. Repositioning on asylum seekers reduces favorability and perceived competency . However,

in treatment conditions where the candidate is criticized for “f‌lip-f‌lopping”by unelected groups, can didate favorability improves

relative to a treatment condition where only the repositioning is presented. These results suggest that a back f‌ire effect might

occur from criticisms. This backf‌ire occurs on average across all respondents. This study contributes to the line of research that

shows mechanisms that offset the negative effects of repositioning.

Keywords

repositioning, experiment, valence, backf‌ire effect

An enduring part of American politics includes politicians

repositioning from one side of an issue to another throughout

their careers, often dubbed negatively as “f‌lip-f‌lopping”.

When repositioning occurs, politicians are often criticized for

it, and the conventional wisdom is that it can negatively affect

their electoral prospects. Even before the term f‌lip-f‌lopping

became in vogue, criticisms of repositioning were associated

with the term “waff‌ling”, which originated as a criticism of

Jimmy Carter for “waff‌ling and wiggling”on issues (Allgeier

et al., 1979). Repositioning is also criticized in terms of

valence by political elites where repositioning creates a

“credibility gap”for candidates (Spragens, 1980). Salient

examples of repositioning have their own rich history and

specif‌ic circumstances, which are not exactly replicated here,

but the pervasiveness of criticisms for f‌lip-f‌lopping in con-

temporary politics suggests that repositioning comes with a

reputational cost. This study evaluates how citizens respond

to a candidate who repositions in the short term from a

campaign to taking off‌ice. More crucially, this study evalu-

ates how citizens are affected by criticisms of “f‌lip-f‌lopping”

from unelected groups like the media, voters, and activists.

Do these criticisms further reduce the popularity of candi-

dates? Or, do they backf‌ire and actually help the f‌lip-f‌lopping

candidate?

Repositioning is also an enduring part of political science

research. Downs (1957) argued that individuals care about

statements made during campaigns “only insofar as those

statements serve as guides to the policies that party will carry

out in off‌ice”(107). Candidates who want to maximize their

vote share should hold a consistent position from one time

period to another so that their policy statements are reliable

(Downs, 1957). Consistent positioning also benef‌its the party

brand, which in turn inf‌luences a candidate’s electoral success

(Snyder & Ting, 2002). However, isolating the effect of

repositioning on a candidate’s electoral prospects is con-

founding because repositioning occurs at the same time as

many other potentially causal factors. In addition, the nature

of each repositioning case has time period-specif‌ic features

making generalizations diff‌icult. This makes attributing

electoral success or failure to repositioning confounding

using observational data. In addition, successful politicians

do not reposition haphazardly or randomly. Switching po-

sitions typically occur because the politician believes they are

advantaged by doing so for a variety of possible reasons,

perhaps because constituents, donors, and/or interest groups

support the new position (e.g., Karol, 2009). Previous re-

searchers recognized these threats to causality, and as a result,

research has focused on isolating specif‌ic aspects of re-

positioning using experiments. Most experimental research

1

Rowan University, Glassboro, NJ, USA

Corresponding Author:

Andrew Gooch, Political Science and Economics, Rowan University, 201

Mullica Hill Road, Glassboro, NJ 08028, USA.

Email: gooch@rowan.edu