Candidacy Eligibility Criteria and Party Unity
| DOI | 10.1177/0010414019897700 |
| Author | Jochen Rehmert |
| Published date | 01 July 2020 |
| Date | 01 July 2020 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
research-article2020
Article
Comparative Political Studies
2020, Vol. 53(8) 1298 –1325
Candidacy Eligibility
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Unity
Jochen Rehmert1
Abstract
Extant research suggests that candidate selection methods can be
consequential for party unity in legislative voting. Yet thus far, only variations
in the selectorate and the degree of centralization have been examined. This
article argues that Candidacy Eligibility Criteria (CEC), too, have implications
for party unity. I theorize that with stricter formal requirements, parties
avoid adverse selection and ensure the nomination of committed candidates.
By using roll-call vote data from 16 industrial democracies, candidate
surveys and an original data set consisting of nearly 500 historical party
constitutions, I show that parties demanding prior membership and nudging
aspirants to maintain networks within the party tend to be more unified
in parliamentary voting. Moreover, their candidates, too, express greater
loyalty when compared with parties without formal CEC. Thus, this article
contributes to the literatures on party unity and on candidate selection by
showing how certain party rules, hitherto neglected, affect party unity.
Keywords
candidate selection, candidacy, eligibility criteria, party unity
Introduction
Party unity is essential for parliamentary democracy and most parties in parlia-
mentary systems, indeed, exhibit highly unified voting records. Explanations
1Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany
Corresponding Author:
Jochen Rehmert, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Institut für Sozialwissenschaften,
Universitätsstraße 3b, 10117 Berlin, Germany.
Email: jochen.rehmert.1@hu-berlin.de
Rehmert
1299
for variation in parliamentary voting range from systemic factors (e.g., Carey,
2009), over electoral incentives (e.g., Kam, 2009), to the sorting of like-minded
citizens into parties at the individual level (e.g., Willumsen, 2017). In addition,
previous research has identified that the way how parties select their candidates
and who within the party wields power over candidates’ (re-)nomination can be
consequential for party unity (e.g., Bowler et al., 1999; Hazan & Rahat, 2010;
Rahat & Hazan, 2001).
However, despite its central theoretical significance in explaining unified
party behavior, empirical research examining the role of candidate selection
methods (CSM) is still limited. Only a small number of recent studies aiming
to explain voting unity has produced some empirical findings on the impact
of CSM on party voting unity (Depauw & Martin, 2008; Faas, 2003; Hix,
2004; Shomer, 2016, 2017). These studies assume that Members of Parliament
(MPs) respond rationally to the incentive structure of parties’ selection meth-
ods and understand observed party unity as the result of incentive-induced
obedient behavior by re-(s)election seeking MPs.
To gain some leverage on the effect of CSM on party voting unity, these
studies have modeled in one fashion or another the extent to which party
leaders control access to the ballot. This usually has been measured by the
exclusiveness of the selectorate (e.g., Faas, 2003; Shomer, 2016), the level at
which selection takes place—that is, decentralized selection versus central-
ized selection (e.g., Depauw & Martin, 2008; Hix, 2004; Shomer, 2016)—or
by collapsing both dimensions together (e.g., Shomer, 2017). Empirically,
centralization of candidate selection and the exclusiveness of the selectorate
have been found to exert influence on party unity in line with expectations;
more centralized selection is correlated with higher unity (Depauw & Martin,
2008; Hix, 2004) and more exclusive selectorates are associated with more
unified parties as well (Shomer, 2016), with a twisted result for members of
the European Parliament though (Faas, 2003).
Yet, while previous studies have primarily looked at who selects, an
equally important question is to ask who can be selected? In other words,
who can formally present themselves as candidates at the time of nomina-
tion? Is candidacy open to all citizens or is it restricted to party members
which might even have to sign pledges of loyalty, collect signatures or be
affiliated with labor unions? The question is not merely about who can
become the party’s candidate, but more profoundly what type of personnel
and applicants are wanted for or barred from standing as candidates accord-
ing to formal party rules? How lenient or strict are parties in their nomina-
tions, what type of personnel is excluded from standing as a candidate and
what consequences does this have for the unity of the party? As voters in
most electoral systems face a “take it or leave it option” in the voting booth,
1300
Comparative Political Studies 53(8)
these candidacy criteria set by parties have crucial implications for the make-
up of the party-elect in parliament.
A telling example of the importance of candidate screening is provided by
the Dutch List Pym Fortuyn (LPF). Founded only briefly before the 2002
Dutch general elections, the party was in a hurry to nominate candidates to
exploit its advantageous standing in the electorate. Gaining eventually 17%
of the seats, the LPF became pivotal in the coalition arithmetic and entered
government as a junior partner to the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA),
besides the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD). Yet, the lack
of formal and informal screening mechanisms led to the selection of a set of
inexperienced and incoherent candidates, many of whom campaigned solely
because they were friends of Fortuyn. The dismal performance and constant
infighting among the party’s ministers and MPs finally resulted in the prema-
ture termination of the coalition (de Lange & Art, 2011, p. 1242). A few years
later, Geert Wilders left the VVD and founded his Party for Freedom (PVV)
with a similar ideological outlook as the LPF. One of the biggest differences
between both parties, however, are the screening and vetting procedures
employed when selecting candidates. In fact, Wilders personally vetted can-
didates and mentored MPs thoroughly in the beginning of the party building
process and even imposed an admission stop on new party members (de
Lange & Art, 2011). Nowadays, the PVV is one of the most unified parties in
the already highly cohesive Dutch parliament and many parties have institu-
tionalized screening mechanisms in many formalized ways.
Yet, despite the fundamental significance of these party rules, extant
research has neglected this “candidacy” dimension of candidate selection
(see Hazan & Rahat, 2010; Rahat & Hazan, 2001). The empirical studies
mentioned above have so far examined only one or two dimensions of selec-
tion, namely the dimension of the selectorate and the degree of centralization
of selection. Overall, research on candidacy eligibility is scarce. Early stud-
ies, however, have already emphasized the importance and consequentiality
of the incentive structure set by institutional arrangements that govern elite
recruitment and candidacies for the type of aspirant coming forward (e.g.,
Black, 1972; Schlesinger, 1966; Seligman, 1964). In contrast to the dimen-
sion of the selectorate and the degree of centralization, the unifying effect of
the candidacy dimension does not work through the (in-)dependency on party
selectors for renomination felt by candidates but rather through its effect on
the self-selection of committed personnel coming forward. Contributions in
the edited volume on candidate selection by Gallagher and Marsh (1988)
present cross-sectional information on candidacy criteria, but lack systematic
research on the unifying consequences of variations on the candidacy dimen-
sion. Limited empirical research has shown that candidates selected through
Rehmert
1301
open recruitment following nationwide and formally undiscriminating calls
for applications exhibit policy attitudes different from those of co-partisans
that were selected through traditional channels (Smith & Tsutsumi, 2014) and
that these candidates are less active in parliament than those MPs with a
stronger party membership background (Rehmert, 2017). As of now, the the-
oretical and empirical research on the candidacy dimension is bleak and
empirical evidence on its effect on party unity is lacking completely.
In this study, I draw on the principal-agent framework to flesh out the
reasoning of why parties may choose to set stricter Candidacy Eligibility
Criteria (CEC), such as a minimum length of party membership or the collec-
tion of signatures, and present the first empirical investigation of the unifying
effects of different types of CEC. My theoretical argument is that by impos-
ing more demanding CEC, parties avoid the problem of adverse selection
through screening aspirants for candidacy. By employing tougher screening
mechanisms parties can uncover candidates’ commitment to the party, as
opportunists are likely to be deterred by demanding criteria while loyal aspi-
rants can signal their commitment to the party by fulfilling the very same.
Empirically, I make use of roll-call voting data from 16 countries, a unique
and new data set with information on parties’ CEC over time based on roughly
500 historical...
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