Can Rebels Bolster Trust in the Government? Evidence from the Philippines
Author | Jori Breslawski |
DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00220027221123319 |
Published date | 01 April 2023 |
Date | 01 April 2023 |
Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Journal of Conflict Resolution
2023, Vol. 67(4) 728–751
© The Author(s) 2022
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/00220027221123319
journals.sagepub.com/home/jcr
Can Rebels Bolster Trust in
the Government? Evidence
from the Philippines
Jori Breslawski
1
Abstract
Commitment problems make civil wars difficult to end. Research on overcoming
commitment problems focuses on warring parties, however civilians’perceptions are
central to successful transitions from war to peace. While civilians residing in areas
previously controlled by armed groups may be highly distrustful that governments will
implement peace agreements, I argue that some armed groups are both motiva ted and
capable of improving trust in the state. Using survey data from civilians in the
Bangsamoro, Philippines, I show that civilians that experienced rebel security provision
or rebel justice provision from the MILF are more likely to trust that the Government
of the Philippines will fully implement the peace agreement than civilians that did not
experience rebel governance provision.
Keywords
rebel governance, peace agreement, conflict, trust, broker
One of the primary reasons that civil wars are difficult to end is commitment problems.
That is, neither the government nor rebels can credibly commit to implementing the
negotiated settlement in the future. Concerns surrounding commitment problems are
especially acute for rebels and their constituents, since once rebels lay down their arms,
they are vulnerable to the government reneging on the agreement as it consolidates
power (Walter 1997).
1
Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
Corresponding Author:
Jori Breslawski, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel.
Email: mtbreslawski@gmail.com
Rebels and their constituents’concerns are not unfounded. Only half of all com-
prehensive peace agreements between 1989 and 2012 were fully implemented, and the
likelihood of conflict recurrence continues to be elevated for as many as ten years
following the signing of peace agreements (Joshi and Quinn 2017,Binningsbø 2017).
Even peace agreements that appear successful initially can fail months or years into the
process. Thus, a crucial step of peace processes is convincing rebels that the gov-
ernment will fully implement their end of the deal. Researchers have identified various
strategies to address concerns caused by commitment problems, such as the design of
political institutions as well as international involvement and peacekeeping (Walter
1997, 345).
However, rebels are not the only actor that need to be convinced that the government
will implement the peace agreement. Civilians, and specifically rebels’constituents—
the civilians whom rebels claimed to fight for—are important actors in the transition
from war to peace. The field’s lack of knowledge surrounding civilians’perceptions of
whether the government will implement the peace agreement is rather surprising
because a growing body of literature that recognizes that civilians’engagement with
and acceptance of peace processes is critical for the sustainability of peace (Haass et al.
2022). Indeed, despite the fact that peace agreements are primarily negotiated and
ultimately signed by warring parties, how civilians perceive the peace process is central
to the transition from war to peace (Dyrstad et al. 2021, 607).
The implementation of peace agreements is just as relevant to civilians as it is to
elites. In fact, provisions relating to social groups and civil society are just as common
in peace agreements as provisions that are thought of as being “elite-focused”, such as
amnesties, power sharing, and security sector reform (Haass et al. 2022, 5). Not only
that, but deviations from promises made in a peace agreement serve as a warning to
civilians that the government cannot be trusted on highly important issues, meaning
government implementation of peace agreements can inform civilian political trust
more broadly (Dyrstad et al. 2021). It can be especially challenging for governments to
gain the trust of civilians that lived under the influence of rebels during the war, since
civilians in these areas typically undergo ideological indoctrination to mobilize support
against the government and may have been victims of state-sponsored violence due to
their assumed relationship to rebels (Arjona et al. 2015). Indeed, Martin (2020) found
that areas controlled by the Forces Nouvelles in Cote d’Ivoire held more negative
attitudes about state institutions after the war came to a close than other areas of the
country.
So what convinces civilians that governments will implement peace agreements? In
this article, I argue that rebels can act as brokers to re-establish civilian trust in the
government. Specifically, rebels that are engaged in negotiations with the government
are motivated to increase civilian trust that the government will implement the peace
agreement for two reasons. First, after years of anti-state propaganda and the fueling of
grievances against the state, armed groups have incentives to re-establish trust in the
government so that the armed group does not lose legitimacy by negotiating and
making concessions to the enemy. In other words, armed groups do not want to be
Breslawski 729
To continue reading
Request your trial