Can public‐private innovation partnerships improve public services? Evidence from a synthetic control approach

Published date01 November 2022
AuthorJosé M. Alonso,Rhys Andrews
Date01 November 2022
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13514
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Can public-private innovation partnerships improve public
services? Evidence from a synthetic control approach
José M. Alonso
1,2
| Rhys Andrews
2
1
Departamento de Economía, Universidad de
Cantabria, Santander, Spain
2
Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University,
Cardiff, UK
Correspondence
José M. Alonso, Departamento de Economía,
Universidad de Cantabria, Avda de los Castros
s/n, 39005 Santander, Spain.
Email: alonsoajm@unican.es
Funding information
European Union
Abstract
Public-Private Innovation (PPI) Partnerships can generate innovative approaches
to improving public services. However, incomplete contract theories point to diffi-
culties in making public-private collaborations work effectively and efficiently.
Drawing on these theories, we analyze the transfer of the management of a chil-
drens social services department in a large metropolitan government in England
to an improvement partnershipbetween the local government and two private
firms. Using a synthetic control method approach, we find little evidence of
improved health or educational outcomes for looked after children during the
years following the creation of the partnership. However, there appears to be an
increase in the costs of providing childrens social services, which documentary
evidence suggests may be attributable to weak contract management capacity,
difficulties embedding performance monitoring, and additional expenditures on
the partnerships reform programme. Our findings therefore highlight that effec-
tive supervision of PPI partnerships is essential for making them a success.
Evidence for practice
Partnerships between public and private organizations have become popular
worldwide as a way for governments to develop innovative and cost-effective
solutions to pressing public problems.
Public-Private Innovation partnerships require careful management to be an
effective vehicle for improving public services.
Strong contract and performance management capabilities are required to coor-
dinate the involvement of private partners in the strategic management of pub-
lic services.
INTRODUCTION
Across the globe, partnerships between public and private
organizations are regarded as a vital means for govern-
ments to develop innovative and cost-effective approaches
to delivering public services (Hodge & Greve, 2007;
Koppenjan & Enserink, 2009; Wang et al., 2018;Yang
et al., 2013). However, there is currently a paucity of evi-
dence on the performance of Public-Private Innovation
(PPI) partnershipspublic-private collaborations in which
government and business constitute mutual development
partners based on complementary skills and resources
(Brogaard, 2021, p. 135). In particular, while scholarly effort
devoted to the use of PPI partnerships for the provision of
public services is slowly emerging (Brogaard, 2021;Evald
et al., 2014; Gallouj et al., 2013), the impact of these part-
nerships on service outcomes and costs is rarely examined.
PPI partnerships can productively combine the entre-
preneurial spirit, management expertise and financial
know-how of the private sector, with the public capabili-
ties of democratic legitimacy, political authority, and a
stable resource base (Osborne & Gaebler, 1993; Rufin &
Rivera-Santos, 2012). However, like all forms of public-
private collaborations, PPI partnerships are characterized
by incomplete contracts that require careful management
to ensure that the partnership is a success. In particular,
Received: 17 March 2021 Revised: 24 February 2022 Accepted: 11 May 2022
DOI: 10.1111/puar.13514
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribu tion and reproduction in any medium, provided the
original work is properly cited.
© 2022 The Authors. Public Administration Review published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of American Society for Public Administration.
1138 Public Admin Rev. 2022;82:11381153.
wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/puar
incomplete contracts theory suggests that the introduction
of profit maximization incentives within a public service
delivery system can have a downward effect on service
quality where contract performance is difficult to measure,
monitor, and manage (Elkomy et al., 2019; Hart et al., 1997;
Jensen & Stonecash, 2005). This is more likely to be the
case for human services due to the low measurability of
outcomes and the complex contracts that are required to
achieve those outcomes (Brown & Potoski, 2005;Romzek&
Johnston, 2005). If contract performance is not managed
effectively in these circumstances, partnering with the pri-
vate sector for innovation can therefore generate increased
rather than reduced costs, especially if the organizational
risk falls largely on public partners (Barlow et al., 2013;
Edler et al., 2015).
To explore the potential for incomplete contracts to
influence the performance of PPI partnerships, we investi-
gate a highly distinctive example of a tender-driven gover-
nance innovation in England: an improvement partnership
with two private firms contracted to manage Sandwell met-
ropolitan childrens social services department, which was
regarded as performing poorly by government inspectors.
This partnership was the first of its kind to run a childrens
services department in the United Kingdom, and was
described at the time as a radical course of action to accel-
erate the pace of change and boost management capacity
(Britton, 2013). To evaluate the success of this innovative
public-private partnership, we focus on the health and edu-
cation outcomes for looked afterchildreninSandwell,and
the costs of providing services for those children. English
metropolitan governments have a statutory duty to care for
children that family courts deem to be suffering or at risk of
suffering significant harm and are responsible for ensuring:
an appropriate standard of care; proper training and support
forcarers;andthatachilds views, and those of their family,
are taken into account (HM Government, 2018).
Given the potentially tragic (and very public) conse-
quences of child protection failures (Marinetto, 2011), UK
central government strives to closely monitor and manage
the performance of childrens social services departments
through inspections based on a combination of perfor-
mance indicators and on-site visits. For departments
receiving adverse inspection judgments, legal responsibil-
ity for service provision can potentially be outsourced to
another organization (Wilkins & Antonopoulou, 2020),
which places considerable pressure on local governments
to implement radical changes to the management and
working practices in such departments. Sandwell is one of
only two metropolitan boroughs in England to have ten-
dered the management of its childrens social services to a
PPI partnership in response to negative inspection reports.
As such, the improvement partnership is a comparatively
unique case requiring the application of a research tech-
nique that can facilitate comparisons between its service
achievements and a counterfactual.
To investigate whether the improvement partnership
generated better outcomes for Sandwells looked after
children, we use a synthetic control method (SCM)
approach to analyze health and education outcomes
between 2004 and 2016, and the costs of providing ser-
vices to looked after children for that period. A SCM
approach approximates treatment effects by comparing a
treatedcase with a synthetic untreatedversion of
that case based on information from counterfactual cases
(Abadie et al., 2010). We therefore compare outcomes
and costs for Sandwell with those for a synthetic version
of the borough constructed using weighted data drawn
from other similar English metropolitan boroughs. For
health outcomes, we focus on the percentage of looked
after children receiving: (i) annual health assessments;
(ii) up-to-date immunisations; and, (iii) regular dental
checks. For educational outcomes, we focus on: (i) the
percentage of school sessions looked after children mis-
sed due to absenteeism; and (ii) the percentage of care-
leavers who were in education, employment, or training.
The cost of delivering childrens social services was
gauged using expenditure figures per looked after child.
To better understand the management and performance
of the improvement partnership, we supplement our SCM
analysis of outcomes and service costs, with a range of
documentary and archival evidence, including: annual
accounts, improvement plans, inspection reports, practi-
tioner articles, and local government cabinet and commit-
tee minutes.
Based on the available data, the SCM model suggests
that the improvement partnership neither improved nor
weakened the performance of Sandwells childrens social
services department, but that the costs of providing ser-
vices to looked after children may have increased when
the partnership was responsible for managing the depart-
ment. The documentary evidence provides further
insights into the ways in which the challenges associated
with managing incomplete contracts may explain these
results.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Public administration scholarship dealing with the man-
agement, governance, and performance of Public-Private
Partnerships (PPPs) has grown rapidly in recent times
(Torchia et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2018; Warsen
et al., 2018). Within that literature, increasing attention is
being paid to the role that PPI partnerships can play in
addressing major public service delivery challenges, such
as improving provision for vulnerable populations, solu-
tions to rising healthcare demands, and environmentally
sustainable transportation (Gallouj et al., 2013; Lassen
et al., 2015; Smith et al., 2019). Although PPI partnerships
are expected to result in public service improvement, to
date, most studies have focused on their utility for the
development of product, process, and service innovations
(Brogaard, 2021). So far, little systematic attention has
been paid to the use of PPI partnerships for governance
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW 1139

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