Can politicians jeopardize public–private partnerships? The case of the Mottarone cable car crash

• Published date: 01 November 2022
• Author: Gianluca F. Delfino
• Date: 01 November 2022
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13524

VIEWPOINT

Can politicians jeopardize public–private partnerships?

The case of the Mottarone cable car crash

Gianluca F. Delfino

Department of Accounting and Management

Control, IE Business School, IE University,

Madrid, Spain

Correspondence

Gianluca F. Delfino, Department of Accounting

and Management Control, IE Business School,

IE University, Calle Marìa de Molina,

13, 28006 Madrid, Spain.

Email: gianluca.delfino@ie.edu

Abstract

This study discusses the possible effects of the intervention of politicians—actors

that operate above organizations—in the monitoring and execution of public–

private partnerships (PPPs). Using the recent case of the Mottarone cable car crash,

this research offers evidence that, pressured by private organizations, political actors

had both weakened the public sector’s ability to effectively monito r the private

sector in the execution of PPPs and facilitated private firms in deviating from

their contractual obligations. These findings suggest that the interference of the

government in PPPs likely has increased the challenges of establishing accountability,

and this is also source of ethical issues.

Evidence for Practice

•Private firms can act opportunistically by exerting pressure on politicians in an

attempt to relax their contractual obligations.

•Politicians can use their legislative power to intervene in the contractual agree-

ments between public and private organizations, with potentially tragic effects.

In doing so, they can weaken the efforts put in place by the public sector in its

monitoring activities.

•The case shows that, at least in times of crises, greed and self-interest, fuelled by

a drop in monitoring mechanisms, may reveal the existence of firms with low

ethical organizational culture.

INTRODUCTION

Public–private partnerships (PPPs) have become the stan-

dard model of governance at all levels of government.

1

Extant research focuses on a wide array of issues regarding

PPPs, from the monitoring and evaluation of service provi-

sion (Ditillo et al., 2015; Marvel & Marvel, 2009)totheprob-

lem of “risk shifting”among politicians, public managers,

and private firms (Andon, 2012; Boyer et al., 2016;Lu,2013;

Marvel & Girth, 2015). Specifically, extant research focuses

closely on the issue of accountability—the possibility of

holding the private contractors responsible for their actions

(Girth, 2012)—when assessing the performance of private

firms in meeting public interests. Since the use of specific

incentives not always prevents opportunistic behavior from

private operators, establishing accountability is far from

being straightforward. As Girth (2012,p.318)argues:

“Although well-written contracts with specified perfor-

mance measures are critical first steps towards accountabil-

ity, they are virtually worthless without vigilant execution.”

This study is meant to answer the call for more

research on the elements that hamper the public sector

to effectively control and monitor private contractors

(Ditillo et al., 2015; Steccolini et al., 2020). In this respect,

although some studies suggest that the performance

measurement systems contractually foreseen in PPPs

ensure that monitoring and incentive mechanisms func-

tion in the appropriate way (e.g., Ahmad et al., 2019), the

recent Italian tragedy of the fall of the Mottarone cable

car raises new doubts as to whether contracts, per se, are

sufficient to ensure that public interests are met. The case

shows that the government in charge—an actor that

operates “above”the organizations involved in PPPs—

can interfere in the execution of contracts by purposely

weakening the public administration’s ability to control

and monitor private contractors. The political events that

preceded the tragic events suggest that private operators

likely have exerted pressure to both the government in

charge and opposition politicians in an attempt to relax

their contractual obligations. These findings suggest that

Received: 5 August 2021 Revised: 29 March 2022 Accepted: 26 April 2022

DOI: 10.1111/puar.13524

1192 © 2022 American Society for Public Administration. Public Admin Rev. 2022;82:1192–1197.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/puar