Can Honor Killings Be Explained With the Concept of Social Death? Reinterpreting Social Psychological Evidence

• Date: 01 May 2020
• Author: Recep Doğan
• Published date: 01 May 2020
• DOI: 10.1177/1088767919827344
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/1088767919827344

Homicide Studies

2020, Vol. 24(2) 127 –150

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DOI: 10.1177/1088767919827344

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Article

Can Honor Killings Be

Explained With the

Concept of Social Death?

Reinterpreting Social

Psychological Evidence

Recep Doğan1,2

Abstract

This article uses the concept of social death to explore the experiences and

motivations of perpetrators of honor killings in light of social psychological evidence.

This analysis then seeks an explanation for some honor killing cases where ostracism

or extreme social exclusion of the perpetrator has preceded the murder. I argue that

in some honor killing cases, extreme rejection and exclusion may lead the individual

to feel that he or she has no choice but to seek validation or approval through killing

to be re-included and recognized by the community and family.

Keywords

honor killings, honor killings in Turkey, social death, social psychological evidence,

perpetrator’s perspective

Introduction

In communities or societies where honor killings tend to occur, the concept of honor

that inspires violent conduct has a very different meaning than that of reputation and

prestige. In this context, a person’s honor is believed to be a sacred value, and the loss

of honor is equated with the loss of life (Bourdieu, 1966; Doğan, 2014a, 2016; Pitt-

Rivers, 1966). In such communities or societies, people are surrounded by those for

whom the loss of honor requires killing or violence in return, and there is an explicit

1Uppsala University, Sweden

2TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Ankara, Turkey

Corresponding Author:

Recep Doğan, Swedish Institute Postdoctoral Research Fellow, The Hugo Valentin Centre, Uppsala

University, Thunbergsvägen 3D, Box 256, 752 38 Uppsala, Sweden.

TOBB Ekonomi ve Teknoloji Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakultesi, Söğütözü Caddesi No: 43, Söğütözü, Ankara,

06560, Turkey.

Email: recep.dogan@valentin.uu.se, recepdogan06@hotmail.com

827344HSXXXX10.1177/1088767919827344Homicide StudiesDoğan

research-article2019

128 Homicide Studies 24(2)

or implicit pressure on the perpetrator from the community, or extended family mem-

bers, to restore family honor. Indeed, as happened in the case of Alican Yılmaz, who

was killed by the family of his sister’s husband, because he did not kill his sister for

family honor, the degree of pressure and threat might amount to a form of duress, in

which the perpetrator has to make a choice—either he kills the female relative to

restore honor or he is killed.1

As a result of interaction over time with those for whom the loss of honor requires

killing or violence in return, the individual comes to accept and to learn that killing,

though itself criminal, is the correct response. This perception of honor provides an

environment conducive for the perpetrators to perceive that the loss of honor is equal

to loss of life; and that the person who lost his or her own honor is indeed worthless.

He or she should be regarded as dead (Husseini, 2009; Van Eck, 2003), until he or she

restores honor by killing or seeking violence. The question then arises whether honor

killings can be explained with the social-psychological concept of social death.

Social death reflects elements of ostracism and stigma, and it occurs as a result of

rejection, maltreatment, the withdrawal of community support, or the support of those

who had close and continuous relationship with the individual in question (Biehl,

2004; Borgstrom, 2015; Caswell & O’Connor, 2015; Králová, 2015; Mulkay & Ernst,

1991; Williams, 2007). It is defined as a process or state in which an individual is

gradually removed from mainstream society and ceases to be an active participant in

the social worlds of others (Caswell & O’Connor, 2015; Mulkay & Ernst, 1991). This

particular process of exclusion makes the person who has experienced this consider

himself or herself as dead.

Although available published data underline the important role of pressure and

exclusion in honor killings (Hoyek, Sıdawi, & Mrad, 2005; Husseini, 2009; Onal,

2008; Sev’er & Yurdakul, 2001; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2003; Van Eck, 2003;

Yirmibesoglu, 2007) and suggest that the psychological well-being of men in cultures

of honor might be particularly weak (Baker, Gregware, & Cassidy, 1999; Cihangir,

2012; Osterman & Brown, 2011; Polk, 1994), a thorough search of the relevant litera-

ture shows that a very few studies have specifically addressed the issue of whether

honor killings can be explained with the concept of social death (Alkhatib, 2012;

Ermers, 2018; Ermers, Goedee, Albrecht, & De Jong, 2010; Shah, 2016). Social death

occurs when the value of a person in his own eyes and in the eyes of the other is pro-

foundly lost. Or it occurs when a person ceases to exist for other people, and at the

same time it ceases to exist for themselves, despite the fact he or she is physically

alive. Similarly, as far as the loss of honor and honor killing is concerned, there is an

intimate relationship between honor and the existence. The person who has lost his

honor no longer exists. He ceases to exist for other people, and at the same time he

ceases to exist for himself (Bourdieu, 1966). Seen from this perspective, the concept

of social death seems to have a potential to provide an explanation for some honor

killing cases. Thus, the need to integrate the social psychology of rejection and of

emotion with the study of honor has been underscored by other scholars (Rodriguez

Mosquera, 2013). Therefore, this article discusses whether the concept of social death

has a potential to provide an explanation for some honor killing cases. These are cases