Can Hierarchy Dodge Bullets? Examining Blame Attribution in Military Contracting

• Author: Nehemia Geva,Austin P. Johnson,Kenneth J. Meier
• DOI: 10.1177/0022002718824984
• Published date: 01 September 2019
• Date: 01 September 2019
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Can Hierarchy Dodge

Bullets? Examining

Blame Attribution

in Military Contracting

Austin P. Johnson

1

, Nehemia Geva

1

, and Kenneth J. Meier

1

Abstract

The increased outsourcing of national security endeavors to private military com-

panies (PMCs) raises questions concerning public evaluations of their performance

and the extent to which government officials are held accountable. We use a survey

experiment to test public blame attribution associated with a failed military oper-

ation that was conducted by either regular or private military personnel. Our

findings suggest that there are multiple mediating pathways in the process of attri-

buting blame in foreign policy. Furthermore, our findings suggest that contracting

out military functions to a PMC can damage perceptions of performance, perhaps

increasing blame attribution by the public. These impacts on the attribution of blame

suggest that PMCs are viewed as inferior service providers by the mass public and

politicians will be held accountable, directly or indirectly. Implications from our

study add to the discussion on the outsourcing of military capacities which are

rapidly expanding in the Western world.

Keywords

military contracting, blame at tribution, survey experimen t, bureaucratic politics,

foreign policy

1

Department of Political Science, Texas A&M University–College Station, College Station, TX, USA

Corresponding Author:

Austin P. Johnson, Department of Political Science, Texas A&M University–College Station, 2010 Allen

Bldg., 4348 TAMU, College Station, TX 77843, USA.

Email: john31860@tamu.edu

Journal of Conflict Resolution

2019, Vol. 63(8) 1965-1985

ªThe Author(s) 2019

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DOI: 10.1177/0022002718824984

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The use of private military companies (hereafter “PMCs”) has become pervasive in

conflicts around the world (Avant 2005). During the second Gulf War at the height

of the “surge” in Iraq, an estimated half of all US personnel involved in the conflict

were PMC employees, amounting to more than 160,000 contractors (Singer 2007a).

This phenomenon is hardly unique to the United States (Mandel 2002; Singer 2002),

nor is this industry new. The use of military contractors has existed since antiquity,

but the use of these professionals had fallen strongly out of favor in recent centuries

in light of their relative inefficiencies when compared to a citizen army (Avant 2000;

Machiavelli [1532] 2010). However, military contractors have made a resurgence on

the battlefield as Western militaries have transitioned into purely professional orga-

nizations composed of volunteers. This second wave of military privatization begs

numerous questions from a political perspective. The classical Machiavellian cri-

tique about relative efficiency is, of course, still a concern in military contracting

(Tkach 2013), but the political equation for government incumbents has become

more complicated since the time of the Renaissance. Autocracies have been dis-

placed by liberal democracies in the West, and this naturally places a greater empha-

sis on the importance of public opinion and its linkage to reelection. Military

performance is a very salient and sensitive topic, especially with respect to high-

profile mistakes and military casualties (Eichenberg 2005; Gartner and Segura 1998;

Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2009).

Countries go to great lengths to mitigate negative audience costs associated with

military difficulties. In the Russian Federation, the government is able to conceal

casualty reports in peace time for purposes that are deemed relevant to national

security (BBC 2015). Similarly, the United States does not report military contractor

losses as official casualties. In fact, the true death toll of PMC contractors from the

recent occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan is still an unknown for this reason

(Singer 2007a). The death of American military contractors, however, is not a secret

and even made headlines with the death and subsequent mutilation of four Black-

water employees in Fallujah (Singer 2007b). Ultimately though, private companies

to decide whether or not to disclose any incidents. This opacity may make PMCs a

useful tool for governments that are sensitive to domestic public opinion. Based on

this reasoning, an important question then arises with respect to the use of PMCs in

conflict zones: Can blame attribution by the mass public be influenced by the use of

military contractors and under what circumstances?

In this article, we selected a setting that is realistic and salient. Our scenario

emphasizes a failed mission to protect an American diplomat in a foreign country,

a situation that is consistent with facts on the ground. Much security for US diplo-

mats has been privatized for a number of years. Until recently, Blackwater held a

contract valued at around US$1 billion for certain diplomatic security services with

the US government, but they lost this contract following a heavy-handed shootout

that led to civilian casualties and friendly fire (Singer 2007a). We believe this topic

deserves a more in-depth examination, especially given that military contractors will

continue to play a role in military conflicts. In our research design, we use a survey

1966 Journal of Conflict Resolution 63(8)