Building a Latin American coalition on forests: negotiation barriers and opportunities.

• Author: Banda, Maria

ABSTRACT

Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) is one of the most important and most contentious issues in global climate talks. Deforestation talks have been fraught with many of the problems that plague international negotiations involving complex geopolitical and scientific components. In these situations, small developing countries experience particular difficulties preparing and organizing to best pursue their interests and ensure a sustainable outcome. The fact that many Latin American countries find themselves in this position should concern all parties involved, because the region is home to more than 20 percent of the world's forests and has the world's highest rate of deforestation.

This Article looks at how these difficulties might be remedied to allow Latin America to lead the world to a robust anti-deforestation agreement. Part I provides a concise background on the REDD talks at the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Conference, which serves as a useful illustration of the substantive and procedural challenges in the ongoing deforestation negotiations. It identifies the main stakeholders at the climate talks and the camps in which national delegations organized themselves at Copenhagen. It then reviews the major substantive roadblocks in the REDD negotiations and identifies a series of analytical, ideological, and structural barriers that impeded significant progress on forests at Copenhagen. We suggest that these barriers necessitate the formation of an active and forward-looking Latin American coalition on forests. Part II discusses the reasons why forming a coalition is in Latin American countries" interest. Beyond the general advantages obtained by pooling resources and negotiating strength, Part II explores the regional ecology, global politics, potential first-mover advantage, and the possibility of capacity building within the region. We conclude that the establishment of an authoritative regional coalition would ensure that, when the REDD framework is decided, Latin America is present at the table and able to maximize the benefits that the region receives. Part III suggests a two-pronged approach, including a specialized, high-level facilitator to aid Latin American countries in forming a coalition and a three-step model of coalition building. For the coalition-building model, we argue that Latin American countries should form a regional "Core Group" dedicated to forest protection, manage any potential obstructionists or spoilers, and deepen the Core Group's commitment through relationship-building and knowledge-transfer measures. The Article concludes with a discussion of the payoffs for the region and the global climate talks.

TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION II. FORESTS AND THE COPENHAGEN PROCESS: PLAYERS, ISSUES, AND BARRIERS A. Main Players B. REDD Issues 1. Reference Levels and Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification 2. Financing Methods 3. Indigenous Peoples' Interests and Rights 4. Ecological Integrity 5. Impact of a Wider Climate Change Agreement C. Process Barriers to Negotiation 1. Unmanageable Number of Parties at the Table 2. Lack of Resources and Expertise 3. Opponents of Forest Talks or "Spoilers" 4. Lack of Clarity 5. Time Constraints III. THE CASE FOR LATIN AMERICA'S EARLY COORDINATION: LONG-TERM INTERESTS AND NEGOTIATING ADVANTAGE A. Ecology B. Global Politics C. First-Mover Advantage D. Regional Capacity Building IV. BUILDING THE FOREST COALITION IN LATIN AMERICA: BARRIERS AND SOLUTIONS A. The Facilitator B. Coalition-Building Strategies Step 1: Assembling the Core Group Step 2: Managing the Spoilers Step 3: Maintaining and Deepening the Core Group's Commitment C. Knowledge Transfers and Capacity Building D. Civil Society Participation E. Avoidance of Positional Negotiation and Defection F. Interaction Between Regional Coalition Building and Global REDD+ Negotiations V. CONCLUSION I. INTRODUCTION

If a post-Kyoto climate agreement fails to act on avoiding tropical deforestation, the achievement of overall climate change goals will become virtually impossible. The lives and livelihoods of millions of people will be put at risk, and the eventual economic cost of combating climate change will be far higher than it needs to be.

--H.E. Bharrat Jagdeo, President of Guyana (1)

President Jagdeo's statement reflects a key realization of our time: slowing deforestation is essential not only in its own right, but also as a way to mitigate climate change. Natural forests act as "carbon sinks," trapping dangerous greenhouse gases (GHG) that contribute to catastrophic climate change. (2) Deforestation and degradation, on the other hand, have the contrary effect of aggravating climate change. According to estimates, tropical deforestation accounts for some 20 percent of emissions worldwide, (3) although its share may decrease as other factors that induce climate change continue to rise. Although the global rates of deforestation have slowed after 2000, they remain alarmingly high. (4) The trends vary across the world and across different types of forests. Europe, for instance, has recorded a minor net gain as its forests have expanded in the last ten years; so has Asia, thanks to large reforestation campaigns. (5) Yet Latin America, a region that holds one of the world's most bio-diverse forests and 44 percent of all tropical forests on earth, (6) is still experiencing one of the highest net losses of forest cover in the world. (7) Every year, 13 million hectares of the world's tropical forests are lost, representing an average rate of deforestation of 0.9 percent per year. (8) The reforestation trends in other parts of the world might thus conceal the reality that tropical forests are increasingly under threat of extinction. (9)

Although preventing further deforestation is an issue of global concern, this Article focuses on Latin America. In particular, it analyzes how Latin American countries--given their shared interest in avoiding the effects of climate change and conserving their remaining forests--should work together to develop a joint position on forest protection and financing, which they could then advance at the global level. The issue of reducing emissions from REDD is one of the most important, and most contentious, topics on the international climate agenda. (10) This makes it crucial for all countries--especially those that, like Latin American countries, have a high stake in the outcome of the REDD talks--to articulate a compelling vision of a future REDD framework.

It took years for forests to be added to the international climate change agenda. At the seventh Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in Marrakesh, Morocco, in 2001, for instance, the topic was excluded from the debate because it was deemed too controversial and intractable. (11) However, since it was first proposed at the UN climate talks in Montreal in 2005, (12) REDD has featured prominently at all rounds of UN climate talks--Nairobi in 2006, Bali in 2007, Poznan in 2008, (13) and, finally, Copenhagen from December 7 to 19, 2009. (14) The fifteenth Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (Copenhagen Climate Conference) represented the culmination of a two-year negotiating process that began with the "Bali Roadmap," launched at the December 2007 Bali climate talks to enhance international cooperation on climate change. (15) One hundred fifteen world leaders attended the high-level segment of the Copenhagen Climate Conference, and the conference as a whole received unprecedented public attention and press coverage and drew more than 40,000 participant applications from governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations, and the media. (16) The last-minute decisions of many heads of state and government to attend led to a resurgence of expectations; there were high hopes that the Copenhagen Climate Conference would "seal the deal" and produce a "fair, ambitious and equitable agreement, setting the world towards a path to avoid dangerous climate change." (17) However, the final conference text, the "Copenhagen Accord" (the Accord), disappointed these expectations: not only is the Accord seen as a "weak agreement," but the fact that it was not formally adopted as the outcome of the Copenhagen negotiations raises considerable doubts about its practical relevance. (18)

Against this background, the negotiations on deforestation were one of Copenhagen's few highlights. The Accord specifically recognized the role of deforestation in climate change (19) and held out the prospect of actual progress and funding for REDD in the future, once the many institutional questions about implementation have been resolved at subsequent meetings. (20) Of the four new bodies established by the Accord, one is focused on reducing deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries, plus conservation (REDD+). (21) The Accord also included tangible pledges of funding: six countries jointly committed $3.5 billion for the next three years to get REDD+ activities off the ground. (22)

In fact, the International Institute for Sustainable Development described progress on REDD+ throughout the year preceding Copenhagen as "positive," (23) suggesting that REDD would feature prominently at the conference. In the five rounds of international negotiations within the subgroups of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) during 2009, REDD was the most debated subject. (24) The UNFCCC's Executive Secretary, Yvo de Boer, felt that the forest provisions of a future climate pact were "oven ready" and would be easily implemented during 2010. (25) Going into the Copenhagen Conference, many REDD negotiators felt confident that they would reach a strong deal. (26) Their failure to reach this goal raises interesting questions about the negotiation dynamics at Copenhagen, as well as how the REDD...