Budgetary savings from military restraint.

• Author: Friedman, Benjamin H.
• Position: America's Armed Forces - Essay

THE U.S. DOES NOT have a defense budget. The adjective is wrong. Our military forces' size now has little to do with the requirements of protecting Americans. The U.S. military is supposed to contain China; transform failed states so they resemble ours; chase terrorists; train various militaries to do so; protect sea lanes; keep oil cheap; democratize the Middle East; protect European, Asian, and Middle Eastern states from aggression and geopolitical competition; popularize the U.S. via humanitarian missions; respond to natural disasters at home and abroad; secure cyberspace; and more.

The forces needed to accomplish this litany of aspirations never can be enough. Hence, neither can the defense budget. Yet, the relationship between these objectives and the end they are supposed to serve--the protection of Americans and their welfare--is tenuous. In fact, defining the requirements of our defense so broadly is counterproductive. Our global military activism wastes resources, drags us into others' conflicts, provokes animosity, drives rivals to arm, and encourages weapons proliferation. We can save great sums and improve national security by adopting a defense posture worthy of the name.

Arguments about defense spending are arguments about defense strategy. What you spend depends on what you want to do militarily, which depends, in turn, on theories about what causes security. A more modest strategy--restraint-starts with the observation that power tempts the U.S. to meddle in foreign troubles that we should avoid. Restraint means fighting that temptation. It would husband American power rather than dissipate it by spreading promises and forces hither and yon.

Restraint does not require cuts in military force structure and spending. It allows them. A less busy military could be a smaller and less expensive one, but though you can have restraint without savings, you cannot save much without restraint. Indeed, it would be a mistake to take up force structure reductions without also adopting their strategic rationale. That would overburden the force without improving security.

Substantially reducing military spending requires reducing the ambitions it serves. Efforts to increase the Pentagon's efficiency--through acquisition reform, eliminating waste and duplication, or improving financial management---might save a bit, but these hardy perennials of defense reform historically have delivered few savings. The 50% growth in our military's cost in the last 12 years (adjusting for inflation and leaving out the wars) sterns more from the proliferation of its objectives than from the way it is managed. We spend too much because we choose too little.

Rather than use efficiency gains to drive savings, we should cut spending to enhance efficiency. Market competition encourages private organizations to streamline operations. No such pressure exists in government, but cutting the top line and forcing the military services to compete for their budgets can incentivize them to cut costs.

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Our military budget should be sized to defend us. For this end, we do not need to spend $700,000,000,000 a year---or anything close. By capitalizing on our geopolitical fortune, we safely can spend far less. Contrary to conventional wisdom, counterterrorism does not require much military spending. U.S. military forces are most useful in defeating well-armed enemies. Terrorists mostly are hidden and lightly armed. The difficulty is finding them, not killing or capturing them once they are found. The best weapons in that fight are intelligence and policing. The most useful military tools are relatively inexpensive niche capabilities...