Britain, China, and Hong Kong: the pot keeps boiling.

• Author: Frankenstein, John

Can democracy exist in the crown colony once it transfers to Chinese rule in 1997?

The war of words between Hong Kong Gov. Chris Patten and Beijing is at a simmer. While talks between the United Kingdom and China have continued, Beijing's harsh rhetoric has caused considerable unease in Hong Kong, driving the stock market into a pattern of erratic swings, with nervous collapses followed by euphoric highs.

On the surface, there doesn't seem much to argue about. Patten's proposal expands the voting lists for representatives from functional constituencies - groups representing economic interests and occupations - and increases their number. This hardly signals the arrival of "one man, one vote" in the territory. To be sure, if implemented, the plan would include most working people, nearly all of whom are excluded from voting today. Yet, it actually could serve to reduce political competition, rather than heighten it. Functional constituencies, features of corporate states, are designed to achieve representation through consensus-seeking economic interest groups, not individualistic and competing political parties. It is only a small step from these groups to the easily controlled "mass organizations" favored by communist parties.

So, there is a lot of speculation about just why the Governor made his proposals and what is behind China's reaction. Did the British want to leave a little more "democracy" behind when it gives up this colony in 1997? Or did the Governor want to show that the Hong Kong government - marginalized in earlier disputes about the new airport, privatization of the government's radio and television services, and other projects - still had some clout?

Chinese motives are even more cloudy. Is the reaction simply an overly sensitive response to a change in what appeared to be a done deal, a smooth "through train" of convergence and shift of administrative responsibilities? Or does it reflect simple distrust of the election process, especially since pro-Beijing candidates were defeated, despite growls of "consequences" in the local pro-Beijing press, in the September, 1991, voting for the Legislative Council.

It is more likely that deeper political and cultural factors are at work. At one level, the Chinese response looks like Bolshevik intimidation, a show of muscle designed to split the business community and other potential sources of support for the Governor. At another, it may be a display of the traditional Chinese compulsion to control. Some observers feel that the People's Republic of China (PRC) can not allow any liberalization in Hong Kong for fear of the spread of political viruses. This interpretation - the Brezhnev Doctrine with special Chinese characteristics - overlooks the virtual independence of South China and the spread of Hong Kong values there.

The response could be the echo of a power struggle in the PRC itself. Opponents of economic reform may have picked on the current...