The Bride, the Groom, and the Court: A One-Ring Circus
| Author | Alan Grant/Emily Grant |
| Position | Associate Professor of Economics, Baker University/Assistant Professor, University of Illinois College of Law |
| Pages | 743-760 |
Page 743
In August of 1994, Jerod proposed to Heather and gave her a diamond engagement ring that cost him $9,033.1 By October of 1995, Jerod had decided to end the engagement and asked for the engagement ring back.2Heather refused to return the ring, and Jerod filed a lawsuit the following April.3The Kansas Supreme Court decided that "engagement rings should be considered, by their very nature, conditional gifts given in contemplation of marriage."4 As a result of that determination, the court said that Heather had no ownership rights in the ring until wedding vows were exchanged.5
The court went on to conclude that the issue of who was at fault for the termination of the engagement6 was ordinarily irrelevant for purposes of determining ownership of the engagement ring.7 As such, the court required Heather to return the diamond engagement ring to Jerod.8
The dissenting judge refused to infer a condition precedent on the gift of an engagement ring.9 She asserted that the engagement ring was aPage 744 complete and valid gift, transferring title of the ring to Heather.10 In the alternative, the lone dissenter suggested, fault should be a relevant factor for the court to consider.11 She argued that it is unfair for Jerod, the one who called off the engagement, to be made financially whole while Heather remained uncompensated for the wedding preparation expenses she had incurred.12
This case is not a unique or unusual occurrence.13 With the increasing number of lawsuits to recover engagement rings,14 it is time for an economic discussion of the costs, benefits, and incentives that courts create when they rule on these cases. Was the Kansas Supreme Court right in adopting a conditional gift approach? Or was the dissent correct in stating that fault must be a determining factor? Which approach creates the appropriate economic incentives for parties deciding whether to get engaged?
This Article seeks to answer some of those questions by first describing both the historical context of civil lawsuits concerning broken engagements and also the development of diamond engagement rings. Part II then undertakes an economic analysis of the alternative approaches courts have taken. First, property law is examined to determine the incentives that gift and conditional gift law create and how the parties will respond to either law. Next, various contract law (fault-based) approaches are analyzed, again with an eye to the incentives created by any one particular regime. Finally, in Part III, this Article concludes with the surprising recommendation that courts should order specific performance for broken engagement contracts.Page 745
Prior to the 1930s, many states allowed a legal claim for breach of promise to marry.15 The legal mechanism for these actions arose from English common law standards, which essentially treated marriage as a property transaction.16 A breach of promise to marry action was typically brought by a woman whose fiancé had broken their wedding engagement.17 She filed such a lawsuit to recover monetary damages of three types: expectation damages to place her in the financial and social position she would have attained had the marriage taken place (very much akin to the rights of a divorced spouse); traditional tort damages to recover for the emotional anguish and humiliation of the broken engagement; and reliance damages including the lost economic security,18 opportunity costs of a foregone alternative such as employment, and also the impaired prospects of marrying another due to the woman's status now as "damaged goods."19
The only defense that could be offered by the male defendant in a breach of promise to marry suit was that his prospective bride "lacked chastity or otherwise acted in a manner substantially at odds withPage 746 prevailing norms of womanhood."20 With this evidence, the defendant could seek to reduce the amount of damages awarded by the jury.21However, the jury was just as likely to increase the damages if they believed that the defendant was simply casting unfounded aspersions at the plaintiff's character.22
By the late nineteenth century, breach of promise to marry suits were more popular in America than they were in England.23 The trials had become "social phenomen[a]"-entertainment for the entire town and fodder for sensationalistic tabloid media.24
Many criticisms of the breach of promise to marry action arose. The jury often awarded verdicts that seemed excessive.25 Lax evidentiary standards allowed for private and sensational details to be admitted and often skewed the outcome of the case in favor of the plaintiff.26 These suits were used as blackmail and extortion by malevolent women.27 In addition, societal attitudes had shifted the focus of engagement and aPage 747 subsequent marriage from a mere property transaction to a union of love.28Thus, plaintiffs were no longer deemed worthy of receiving monetary damages for a broken heart.29
Beginning in the 1930s,30 31 many states enacted laws that have come to be known as "heartbalm" statutes.32 These laws attempted to rectify the problems with the breach of promise to marry action by abolishing it.33Legislatures claimed that the new laws were enacted to promote gender equality in light of the changing societal views of engagements and marriages.34 Some commentators suggest, however, that many of the laws were written because of the "overzealous" female plaintiffs who abused the breach of promise to marry action.35
As of 1997, twenty-one states explicitly prohibit breach of promise to marry actions via heartbalm laws.36 In addition, a few states have opted to impose restrictions on the breach of promise to marry actions.37
Page 748
In 1377, Emperor Maximilian gave to Mary of Burgundy the first reported diamond engagement ring.38 Although diamonds were associated with a proposed marriage in the United States beginning in the 1840s,39diamond engagement rings were not a standard part of a marriage proposal for another one hundred years.40 By 1945, however, engagement rings had grown in commonality so that the "typical" bride wore one with a wedding ring to match.41
In a 1990 economic study of the demand for diamonds,42 Professor Margaret F. Brinig established a causal connection between the removal of breach of promise to marry actions and the emergence of diamond engagement rings. "The change in demand for diamond engagement rings may . . . be explained by an increase in need for such a bond because of the abolition of a cause of action for breach of marriage promise."43
As Coase44 might have predicted, since transactions costs are low between two lovers, the change in law (abolishing breach of promise to marry actions) had no great effect on the rate of parties getting engaged in the 1930s.45 The prevalence of diamond engagement rings coincides withPage 749 the removal of the breach of promise to marry actions because the parties used the rings to contract around the law. The rings served as a "bond" for the woman and allowed her monetary compensation by means of the diamond should her fiancé break off the engagement.
In current society, engagement rings are part of the marriage tradition. Attitudes and circumstances, however, have changed significantly from the 1930s. Women now have increased access to the labor market and are therefore not economically dependent upon men.46 In addition, most men do not expect virgin brides.47 "A prospective bride's access to the marriage market is no longer significantly impaired by virtue of having indulged in pre-marital sexual activity."48 As a result of these societal changes, the need for a diamond engagement ring as a bond for sexual intimacy is significantly lessened.49
Recently, courts have been faced with litigants who were once parties to an engagement that has been terminated.50 The focus, however, hasPage 750 shifted from "the social consequences of broken engagements for women to the narrower question of who will keep the engagement ring."51 Many courts treat such cases as property disputes and choose between treating the ring as a gift and treating it as a conditional gift.52 Others engage in a contract-based discussion, which includes a discussion of which party is at fault for breaking the engagement.53
Many commentators have suggested that the approach of the courts should generally be to accommodate, and not punish, those who wish to leave an engagement.54 This argument is based on the notion that engagements are trial periods during which parties can determine if they truly want to marry their partner.55 Imposing costs on persons who wish to break engagements would destroy the utility of the engagement period as itPage 751 relates to marriages, and make it "'as expensive to get engaged as it is to get married.'"56
Economic analysis, however, suggests otherwise; efficiency is best served if parties "test the waters" prior to engagement and use the dating relationship as the trial period.57 In other words, in addition to desiring an efficient number of marriages, the law should also seek an efficient number of engagements. In so doing, society can avoid not only wasted expenses on an engagement ring and wedding...
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