Bribery and corruption in weak institutional environments By Shaomin Li: Cambridge University Press, 2019. 260 pages. Hardback. £85.00. ISBN: 9781108492898

• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1002/pa.2014
• Date: 01 February 2020
• Published date: 01 February 2020
• Author: Christopher Robertson

BOOK REVIEW

Bribery and corruption in weak institutional environments

By Shaomin Li:

Cambridge University Press, 2019. 260 pages. Hardback. £85.00. ISBN: 9781108492898

In this book, Shaomin Li presents a compelling case as to why

we should study bribery and corruption in weak institutional

environments. First, the author justifies their study by situating their

research comparatively, considering mature democracies, anocracies,

and autocracies, postulating that whilst mature democracies are, as

expected, the least corrupt, it is anocracies transitioning to

democracy that are the most corrupt nations and not autocracies.

Furthermore, the author expands by exploring the characteristics of

rule-based forms of governance that are characteristic of mature

democracies and institutionally quell corruption which contrasts

relation-based forms of governance which foster corrupt practices.

Fundamentally, the regime type of a nation and the subsequent

macro-institutional environment it fosters, it is argued, determines

the propensity of corruption and affects the attitudes towards,

and incentives to engage in corrupt practices such as bribes within

a nation, with the USA and China frequently appropriated as

contrasting examples.

The author also addresses pertinent questions such as why

some nations despite corrupt practices thrive whilst others falter,

alongside why some regimes have ostensibly tolerated corruption,

whilst others, such as the famous Ming Dynasty, sought to punish

corrupt individuals. In comparative examples, Li's relation-based

governance is broadened to include clan-based governance, where

lack of trust in Filipino society is contrasted against Chinese Guanxi

culture and its increasingly generalized trust which has enabled

corruption to be more “efficiency-enhancing”(Li, 2019, p. 227).

However, whilst it is argued that whilst corruption can be more

efficient in certain anocracies and autocracies than others, Li

postulates that the only solution to quell corruption is to transition

towards a mature democracy that embraces a strong rule of law,

free and independent media, a strong civil society alongside fair

and effective political competition.

Over the book's nine chapters, important questions for scholars

across political science, economics, business, and finance are raised

that further understanding both transnationally and comparatively as

to why corrupt practices occur, with suggestions made as to how

corruption can be eradicated. Written clearly and concisely, Li

concludes the book didactically by highlighting that once autocracies

transition towards rule-based mature democracies, proper functioning

democratic institutions encompassing trust, transparency, and rule of

law must be present which fundamentally prohibit corrupt practices.

Yet, as evidenced by the conclusion opening with a sombre quote

from George Orwell, corrupt practices, led by the Chinese Communist

Party's globalization of their doctrine to make the business world

subservient to their ideology, still permeate and can only be

eradicated through transition from relation-based to rule-based

institutional governance.

The preliminary strength of this text is the excellent readability

where complex topics are examined rigorously yet will be accessible

and worth reading for both novices and experts alike. The book raises

important questions that can be applied in numerous avenues of

research which are strengthened through reference to Li's previous

works alongside the comparative nature of the book which does

not limit analyses to certain regions but rather considers case

studies intercontinentally across Africa, Asia, alongside North and

South America. In doing this, Li's assertations, often supplemented

by empirical evidence and reliable data such as Transparency

International, are strengthened and provide broad and valuable

arguments on how corruption is perceived and undertaken and how it

can be combated across governmental and institutional contexts. One

weakness of this book is that whilst it is asserted that China is

experiencing economic stagnation through relation-based governance

that could be remedied through a transition to rule-based governance,

despite reference to President Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaigns,

the Chinese Communist Party continues to globalize its ideology, and

there are no suggestions of how this globalization of corruption could

be alleviated. With China, the largest economy in the world by

Purchasing Power Parity, businesses across the globe require China as

a trading partner, yet, whilst scholars believed that economic growth

would lead China to democratize, this has not materialized. Future

empirical research on the potential and methods for democratization

in China would be beneficial, as China is currently the anomaly in Li's

governance environment model and is continuing to thrive despite

corrupt practices being prevalent in Chinese politics.

Conclusively, this is an excellent text that will be essential for

students and scholars of political science, economics, and business

who seek an understanding on corruption, regime types, and

institutions globally. Concisely and clearly presented, important

Received: 28 August 2019 Accepted: 29 August 2019

DOI: 10.1002/pa.2014

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https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.2014