Brexit and British Business Elites: Business Power and Noisy Politics*

• Date: 01 March 2021
• DOI: 10.1177/0032329220985692
• Published date: 01 March 2021
• Author: Glenn Morgan,Magnus Feldmann
• Subject Matter: Special Issue Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329220985692

Politics & Society

2021, Vol. 49(1) 107 –131

© The Author(s) 2021

Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI: 10.1177/0032329220985692

journals.sagepub.com/home/pas

Article

Brexit and British Business

Elites: Business Power and

Noisy Politics*

Magnus Feldmann and Glenn Morgan

University of Bristol

Abstract

This article analyzes business power in the context of noisy politics by comparing

business involvement in two British referendum campaigns: one about membership

in the European Communities in 1975, and the Brexit referendum about European

Union membership in 2016. By exploring these two contexts, the article seeks

to identify the conditions under which business elites can and cannot be effective

in a context of noisy politics. Three key factors are identified as determinants of

business influence during periods of noisy politics: the incentives to get directly

involved in noisy politics; the legitimacy of business involvement; and, finally, the

capacity to act in a cohesive way. The article shows that these factors have changed

substantially over the last four decades because of wider changes in the nature of

capitalism, and their impact on business power in the United Kingdom and more

generally is discussed.

Keywords

business power, business elites, noisy politics, United Kingdom, Brexit

Corresponding Author:

Magnus Feldmann, Senior Lecturer in Politics, University of Bristol, 11 Priory Road, Clifton,

Bristol BS8 1TU, UK.

Email: m.feldmann@bristol.ac.uk

*This is one of six articles that constitute a special issue titled “Quiet Politics and the Power of Business:

New Perspectives in an Era of Noisy Politics.” Some of the articles in the issue were first presented at the

SASE annual meeting at the Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 in June 2017, organized by Glenn Morgan,

Christoph Houman Ellersgaard, Stéphanie Ginalski, and Christian Lyhne Ibsen, and at a workshop at the

University of Bristol funded by the School of Management and the Political Studies Association section on

Labour Movements in June 2018, organized by Glenn Morgan, Christian Lyhne Ibsen, and Magnus Feldmann.

985692PASXXX10.1177/0032329220985692Politics & SocietyFeldmann and Morgan

research-article2021

108 Politics & Society 49(1)

This article aims to contribute to the debate about business power under conditions of

“noisy politics,” when policy issues are highly salient and popularly contested.

Culpepper’s seminal study of “quiet politics” shows that business influence is generally

at its greatest where it is exercised “quietly,” behind the scenes in technical discussions

between representatives of business and government.1 Under such conditions, govern-

ment is likely to bend to the requirements of the business elite, not least because many

of the issues of interest to business are very technical and hence of low salience to the

general public. By contrast, when the salience of an issue is high and the media and

public take an active interest, business power tends to be lower. Business may be more

cautious, avoid taking a stance, or hedge its bets, for example, by donating to all the

significant political parties during electoral campaigns.2 In the current age of populism,

various aspects of economic policy and business influence are more actively contested

by members of the public and NGOs, raising new challenges for business about how to

act in noisy contexts.3 Therefore, this article investigates whether, and in what circum-

stances, business can influence politics in high-salience, noisy democratic contexts.

In order to assess this issue, we compare two referendum campaigns, one on the

United Kingdom’s membership in the European Communities in 1975, the other on

the United Kingdom’s membership in the European Union in 2016.4 These campaigns

can be viewed as particularly good examples of noisy, high-salience politics, given the

degree of public contestation surrounding them and the high turnout (particularly in

the 2016 referendum, when turnout was 72.2 percent compared to 68.7 percent in the

2017 general election and 66.1 percent in the 2015 election; in 1975 turnout was 64.6

percent). Although the issue at hand was similar, the role of business differed across

the two campaigns as, crucially, did the outcomes, allowing us to analyze the factors

contributing to varying degrees of business influence.

We identify three factors that are critical to the exercise of business influence under

conditions of noisy politics—the incentives for exercising influence, the legitimacy of

such interventions, and the capacity to intervene in the first place. We argue, first, that

business interventions under conditions of noisy politics are partly reactive and a

response to specific challenges perceived by business. Given that business involve-

ment under conditions of noisy politics requires considerable resources, the nature of

the challenge shapes the stakes and the incentives as well as the degree of involvement

in the issue. Business agency is more likely when there is a greater perceived urgency

for it, most obviously where the labor movement and left-wing politics are challenging

business and close to controlling the state in ways that would weaken business power,

as in the United Kingdom in the 1970s. Second, business influence also depends on the

legitimacy of the claims that business makes under conditions of noisy politics. If the

electorate perceives such interventions as advancing sectional and narrow business

interests and not as expressions of general concern about the health of the economy,

then such intervention can backfire. It may undermine the broader legitimacy of busi-

ness influence across a range of areas and not just that of the initial cause. Business

may therefore fear the impact of a mistimed intervention and stay out of the contro-

versy or intervene to a very limited extent. Third, we argue that the nature and organi-

zation of the business elite, particularly its organizational cohesiveness, is a key