Bounded Democratization: How Military-Party Relations Shape Military-Led Democratization

• Author: Darin Sanders Self
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/00104140221116461
• Published date: 01 May 2023
• Date: 01 May 2023
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Comparative Political Studies

2023, Vol. 56(6) 862–896

© The Author(s) 2022

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DOI: 10.1177/00104140221116461

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Bounded

Democratization: How

Military-Party Relations

Shape Military-Led

Democratization

Darin Sanders Self

1



Abstract

A key dilemma facing a military which considers democratization is whether it

is conf‌ident that civilians will protect its interests. A military’s conf‌idence is a

function of three factors: preference alignment with parties (trust), an ex-

pectation that allied parties will survive the transition (party in-

stitutionalization), and an expectation that allied parties can win power to

protect it (party strength). When parties which the military trusts are in-

stitutionalized and strong, the military is conf‌ident that democratization will

not endanger its interests. When these factors are absent, the military seeks

to generate credible commitments through bounded democratization—a

strategy of setting parameters on open contestation and popular sover-

eignty to constrain civilians. I test this argument using an original dataset on

525 regime transitions and a novel measure of bounded democratization. I

f‌ind that when the institutionalization and strength of trusted parties decrease,

the military proactively sets constraints on the developing political system.

Keywords

democratization and regime change, military and politics, political parties,

non-democratic regimes, political regimes

1

Brigham Young University, Provo, UT, USA

Corresponding Author:

Darin Sanders Self, Brigham Young University, 745 Kimball Tower, Provo, UT 84602-0002, USA.

Email: darin_self@byu.edu

The path out of military rule is fraught with uncertainty for a military’s in-

terests.

1

Democratization reduces the military’s ability to secure its own

interests and may re-expose it to the dangers that initially enticed it out of the

barracks. If democratization puts the military’s interests at risk, why do some

militaries support democratization while others do not?

Militaries

2

support democratization when there are credible commitments

that parties will not restructure the military’s hierarchy, budget, and other core

prerogatives. If the military is unwilling to accept some terms of democracy, it

uses its powers to set parameters on political and electoral institutions an d/or

actors to constrain political contestation and popular sovereignty to create

credible commitments.

I argue that the military’s conf‌idence in parties is a function of three factors:

trust of parties, incumbent party institutionalization, and incumbent party

strength. These three factors affect how military and party preferences align

(trust), whether trusted parties will survive the transition (institutionalization),

and whether trusted parties will win power (strength). When the military’s

conf‌idence is low, it sets the terms of electoral and political contestation to

prevent opposition parties from gaining too much power. This may include

banning parties, allowing (retired) off‌icers in elections, or designing specif‌ic

electoral and political institutions to benef‌it political allies. Alternatively,

when the military has an allied party that it can trust, that it expects to survive

the transition, and that it believes will be strong enough to defend the military,

the military can return to the barracks conf‌ident in civilian rule.

I test the theory with a new dataset developed to measure how militaries

shape political institutions during transitions. Using data on 525 transitions

drawn from four datasets, I construct a measure which I call Bounded De-

mocracy—or the extent to which militaries set parameters on electoral

contestation and popular sovereignty. With this data I show that as the in-

stitutionalization and strength of trusted parties decreases, the military more

proactively shapes the development of political and electoral institutions.

The case of contemporary Myanmar illustrates the logic of the argument.

After decades of praetorian rule, the military devised the 2008 constitution

which allowed for free and fair elections but protected its power with a reserve

of seats in the legislature that could prevent any changes to the constitution,

along with guaranteed portfolios in the cabinet. This arrangement endured for

more than a decade even though the military distrusted the National League

for Democracy (NLD). After the military linked-USDP suffered three con-

secutive embarrassing electoral losses to the NLD, the military retook power

via a coup in February of 2021.

The case of Myanmar demonstrates that military rule, and its effect on

democratic development, remains relevant today. Understanding why a

military use its power to shape political institutions is key to explaining

variation in democratic development throughout much of the world.

Self 863

In addition to Myanmar, attention to military-led democratization is

necessary given the number of competitive authoritarian or democratic

systems that have emerged from military rule. As can be seen in Figure 1,

military rule comprised a quarter to half of all authoritarian regimes during the

Cold War. With the Third Wave of Democracy, 46–58% of these regimes

transitioned to either a competitive non-democratic, or democratic system,

with the military often playing a major role in developing political institutions

that can survive decades.

In this paper I highlight how the military is a major actor which inf‌luences

democratization. A key contribution that differs from previous work is that I

focus on the strategic interaction between the military and authoritarian in-

cumbent parties to explain variation in how militaries inf‌luence the devel-

opment of political institutions.

This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I justify an analysis of

military-led democratization with a narrow focus on military-party relations.

After outlining the theoretical mechanisms which explain bounded democ-

ratization, I introduce the research design. The following section provides an

empirical test of the theory before concluding with a discussion about how

future research can further prove the dynamic relationships between parties

and militaries during and after democratization.

Bounded Democratization

There is a well-developed literature on civilian-military relations (CMRs)

which focuses on the military during democratic transitions and consolidation.

Figure 1. Frequency of military rule.

864 Comparative Political Studies 56(6)