Book Reviews : The Study of Coalition Behavior. Edited by SVEN GROENNINGS, E. W. KELLEY, and MICHAEL LEISERSON. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1970. Pp. xv, 489. $8.50.)

Published date01 December 1971
DOI10.1177/106591297102400427
AuthorGlenn R. Parker
Date01 December 1971
Subject MatterArticles
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827
The Study of Coalition Behavior. Edited by SVEN GROENNINGS, E. W. KELLEY,
and MICHAEL LEISERSON. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.,
1970. Pp. xv, 489. $8.50.)
The infusion of coalition research into Political Science has been sporadic,
as well as sparse; The Study of Coalition Behavior contributes both substantively
and theoretically to the body of knowledge concerned with coalition formation.
The substantive dimension of the book is composed of twelve original case studies
of coalition formation in a variety of contexts; these essays are of particular value
in clarifying existing formulations of the processes involved in coalition formation.
For instance, Gerald Pomper, after examining the roll-call behavior of delegates
to the United States’ Constitutional Convention, cites a number of conditions
under which the theoretically expected coalition of minimal size will not materi-
alize. Similarily, Dean Yarwood puts forth the argument that a coalition may
withdraw from the system even though the majority alliance is not exacting ex-
cessive costs from its minority counterpart: if the minority alliance sees that its
ability to secure future rewards is inadequate, the coalition may withdraw from
the system, while it is still capable of doing so.
In his examination of coalition formation in Japan, Michael Leiserson develops
a principle akin to William Riker’s &dquo;minimum winning coalition&dquo; - winning
coalitions with fewest members form. He argues that when faced with a number
of possible winning combinations, there is a tendency for members to select an
alliance encompassing the smallest number of coalition partners; according to
Leiserson, these &dquo;minimum membership&dquo; coalitions form because negotiations and
bargaining are easiest to maintain under these circumstances. Finally, Eldon Ken-
worthy distinguishes between coalitions which &dquo;reign&dquo; and those which &dquo;rule,&dquo;
and between coalition resources of coercion and...

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