Book Reviews : President and Congress: Power and Policy. By LOUIS FISHER. (New York: The Free Press, 1972. PP. xvi. 347. $7.95.)
| Date | 01 December 1972 |
| Published date | 01 December 1972 |
| Author | Robert S. Ross |
| DOI | 10.1177/106591297202500416 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
790
President
and
Congress:
Power
and
Policy.
By
LOUIS
FISHER.
(New
York:
The
Free
Press,
1972.
PP.
xvi.
347.
$7.95.)
With
much
being
written
of
late
critical
of
the
extent
of
executive
power -
a
concern
shared
by
author
Louis
Fisher
- President
and
Congress
is
valuable
as
a
description
of
how
and
why
the
executive
has
accrued
such
sweeping
control.
His
book
provides
material
on
the
historical
development
of
the
relationship
between
these
two
institutions
as
they
share
legislative
powers,
spending
power,
taxing
power,
and
the
war
power.
Although
the
emphasis
is
on
formal,
legalistic
analysis,
the
author
does
offer
discerning
comments
on
political
reality.
For
example,
he
finds
that
Congress
has
delegated
power
to
the
executive
partly
because
it
wishes
to
be
removed
from
politi-
cal
responsibility.
&dquo;Delegation
and
acquiescence
are
natural
products
of
the
better-
safe-than-sorry
approach.&dquo;
But,
Fisher
goes
on
to
point
out,
&dquo;it
is
not
true
that
Congress,
after
delegating
power,
is
placed
in
a
weaker
position
than
before.&dquo;
Many
responsibilities
are
simply
unsuited
to
a
legislative
body,
such
as
tariff-making
and
preparing
the
budget.
Congress
could
perform
these
tasks,
&dquo;but
only
at
the
cost
of
abandoning
a
number
of
other
duties
which
it
is
better
equipped
to
handle.&dquo;
Although
the
author
insists
that
the
shift
of
power
to
the
executive
is
not
irre-
versible,
the
book
details
a
continuing
trend
of
granting
the
executive
(though
not
always
the
President)
more
and
more
responsibility
in
each
of
the
areas
studied.
This
trend
has
only
ebbed
with
respect
to
foreign
policy,
where
Congress,
in
response
to
the
Vietnam
War
and
the
tremendous
cost
overruns
of
weapons
systems,
has
become
more
assertive.
Fisher,
however,
shows
that
attempts
to
justify
assertions
in
foreign
policy
in
historical
or
constitutional
terms,
as
is
done
by
the
Senate
Foreign
Relations
Committee,
have
little
foundation,
while
the
very
real
political
power
of
withholding
support
for
various
presidential
programs
such
as
foreign
aid
has
proven
somewhat
more
effective.
This
is
consistent
with
other
studies
which
have
found
the
use
of
amendments
and
appropriations
by
Congress
more
effective
weap-
ons
than
a
direct
challenge
of
presidential
programs.
The
author
lays
to
rest
many
misconceptions
about
the
&dquo;intent&dquo;
of
the
Framers
with
respect
to
executive
power.
Particularly
well
done
is
the
discussion
of
the
extent
to
which
the
practices
and
experiences
of
government
during
the
Revolution
and
under
the
Articles
of
Confederation
led
to
the
creation
of
the
Executive
Depart-
ment.
Discussion
of
the
views
of
the
Founders
concerning
separation
of
powers,
which
is
extended
in
a
well-written,
thirty-page
appendix
is
first-rate.
The
text
is
not
without
its
shortcomings.
Most
important
is
the
failure
to
tie
the
threads
of
the
book
together;
the
conclusions
are
far
too
short
and
inconclusive.
How
do
these
powers
relate?
What
hypotheses
might
be
suggested
pertaining
to
executive-legislative
relations?
What
is
the
relative
importance
of
Congress
relin-
quishing
control
in
some
areas,
or
as
in
foreign
affairs,
attempting
to
gain
some
initiative?
Are
these
the
only
shared
powers?
If
not,
why
were
they
analyzed
and
not
others?
The
text
is
technically
well
done
and
quite
readable.
However,
although
refer-
ences
can
be
found
at
the
end
of
the
book,
I
found
the
lack of
footnotes
in
the
text
-
as
well
as
the
lack
of
full
citations
of
court
decisions
-
bothersome.
Perhaps
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