Book Reviews : Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873-1917. By JOHN A. S. GRENVILLE and GEORGE BERKELEY YOUNG. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966. Pp. xviii, 352. $7.50.)
| Author | Fred H. Winkler |
| DOI | 10.1177/106591296601900425 |
| Date | 01 December 1966 |
| Published date | 01 December 1966 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
748
Selassie
later
encountered,
both
in
establishing
a
central
administration
responsible
to
him
and
in
embarking
on
cautious
programs
of
modernization.
Scattered
throughout
the
book,
however,
are
several
unfortunate
features.
Upon
occasion
the
historical
analysis
is
interrupted
by
inappropriate
references
to
very
recent events
(often
as
experienced
directly
by
the
author).
In
a
number
of
instances
the
narrative
becomes
primarily
a
chronicle
of
names
and
court
intrigues,
with
particular
emphasis
on
scandal
and
illegitimacy.
The
net
effect
is
a
weaken-
ing
of
the
thrust
of
argument.
Yet
on
balance
the
book
presents
a
refreshing
new
account
of
contemporary
Ethiopian
politics
seen
in
historical
perspective.
It
is
recommended
for
anyone
who
wishes
an
understanding
of
difficulties
of
modern-
ization
in
Ethiopia.
Brandeis
University
SHERIDAN
JOHNS
Politics,
Strategy,
and
American
Diplomacy:
Studies
in
Foreign
Policy,
1873-1917.
By
JOHN
A.
S.
GRENVILLE
and
GEORGE
BERKELEY
YOUNG.
(New
Haven
and
London:
Yale
University
Press,
1966.
Pp.
xviii,
352.
$7.50.)
The
formulation
and
conduct
of
foreign
policy
is
frequently
conditioned
by
domestic
political
conflict
and
by
the
thinking
and
objectives
of
the
armed
forces.
These
two
factors
form
the
unifying
thread
of
these
well-written
essays
which
examine
selected
aspects
of
American
foreign
policy,
1873-1917.
Grenville
and
Young
have
relied
upon
a
variety
of
manuscripts,
including
some
used
very
little,
if
at
all,
previously,
in
their
study
of
this
era
which
saw
the
United
States
aspire
to
hemispheric
leadership
and
attempt
to
cope
with
the
problems
of
world
power.
Based
upon
these
sources
this
book
represents
in
part
a
reinterpretation
of
personalities
and
events
of
this
period.
Thus
Cleveland
emerges
less
the
man
of
courage
than
the
politician
who
frequently
sought
to
use
- maladroitly
in
the
authors’
opinion-foreign
issues
to
solve
domestic
crises.
McKinley
is
presented
not
as
a
spineless
eclair
but
as
a
skillful
leader
and
diplomat.
Both
Presidents
are
portrayed
as
being
aware
of
American
national
interests
in
their
handling
of
the
Venezuelan
and
Cuban
crises
respectively.
Theodore
Roosevelt’s
famous
order
of
February
25,
1898,
to
Commodore
Dewey
regarding
action
against
Manila
is
described
in
its
proper
perspective
against
the
background
of
naval
planning
for
a
possible
war
with
Spain.
The
examination
of
topics
such
as
the
last-mentioned
illustrates
the
second
-
and
more
valuable
-
aspect
of
this
volume:
the
investigation
of
relatively
new
historical
territory.
Using
the
records
of
the
Navy
Department,
the
General
Board
and
the
personal
papers
of
Admiral
Stephen
B.
Luce
and
Captain
A.
T.
Mahan,
the
authors
trace
the
efforts
by
certain
naval
leaders
to
modernize
the
Navy
and
make
it
a
more
efficient
instrument
in
the
formulation
and
conduct
of
American
foreign
policy.
They
conclude
that
all
too
often
these
strategic
planners
were
handi-
capped
by
not
being
&dquo;informed
of
the
major
objectives
of
the
Administration’s
diplomacy&dquo;
or
by
being
ignored,
as
exemplified
by
the
attitude
of
President
Wilson
and
Secretary
of
the
Navy
Josephus
Daniels
toward
the
General
Board.
It
is
worth
noting
that
it
was
a
naval
officer,
Mahan,
who
suggested
an
over-all
policy
for
the
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