Book Reviews : Paul Cambon: Master Diplomatist. By KEITH EUBANK. (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1960. Pp. xii, 221. $4.00.)

• Date: 01 September 1961
• Author: Peter H. Rohn
• Published date: 01 September 1961
• DOI: 10.1177/106591296101400323
• Subject Matter: Articles

782

needed

self-discipline,

economic

stability,

justice,

international

recognition,

and

democracy.

It

achieved

much.

Milwaukee,

Wisconsin

ERWIN

KARNER

Paul

Cambon:

Master

Diplomatist.

By

KEITH

EUBANK.

(Norman,

Oklahoma:

University

of

Oklahoma

Press,

1960.

Pp.

xii,

221.

$4.00.)

The

author

is

professor

of

history

at

North

Texas

State

College.

The

book

is

the

first

biography

in

English

of

one

of

the

most

prominent

professionals

of

the

pre-1914

decades

of

cabinet

diplomacy.

To

the

historian

the

book

commends

itself

by

filling

a

biographical

gap

and

by

using

some

unpublished

manuscripts

and

Cambon’s

correspondence

as

well

as

the

usual

documentary

sources

for

pre-1914

diplomacy.

To

the

political

scientists

the

book

offers

hardly

any

generalizations.

It

merely

describes

a

man

and

his

time.

Nevertheless,

it

stimulates

comparisons

and

raises

questions.

For

instance,

under

what

circumstances

will

diplomats

change

positions

on

the

scale

from

messenger

boy

to

history-maker?

Which

countries

tend

to

maxim-

ize

the

messenger

boys

or

the

history-makers

in

their

ambassadorial

corps?

Being

historically

oriented,

the

book

does

not

explicitly

ask

these

questions

in

which

political

scientists

would

be

most

interested.

It

only

supplies

some

isolated

but

well-documented

answers

for

a

single

case.

By

refusing

to

transmit

to

Paris

an

official

communication

from

the

British

Government,

Cambon

saved

his

face

and

career

and

also

contributed

to

expanding

the

Austro-Serbian

crisis

into

World

War

I.

Normally,

however,

Cambon

was

content

with

the

finding

of

elegant

solutions

to

relatively

petty

problems.

Thus

he

accumulated

professional

virtuosity

and

seniority

in

the

French

foreign

service

and

became

the

recognized

doyen

of

pre-1914

European

diplomacy.

Readers

will

appreciate

the

labors

of

depth

and

detail

that

went

into

the

book

as

well

as

the

meaningful

anecdotes

and

insights

it

offers.

For

instance:

By

the

end

of

the

summer

[of

1882]

some

of

the

tribes

and

their

leaders

began

to

cross

the

border

into

Tunisia,

where

they

surrendered

to

the Bey

and

the

French.

Cambon

promised

amnesty

to

those

who

returned

peacefully

and

pleaded

with

them

to

submit

because

Allah

dis-

tributed

power

as

He

saw

fit.

As

the

refugees

returned,

Cambon

hurried

to

protect

them

against

robbers

and

French

colonists,

the

latter

being

often

worse

than

the

robbers.

And

later:

Cambon

pointed

out

the

grand

design

in

Kiderlen’s

blackmail:

if

Germany

obtained

the

French

Congo

[in

1911],

she

would

next

try

for

the

Spanish

colony,

Rio

Muni,

then

for

the

Portuguese

holdings

at

the

mouth

of

the

Congo

River,

and

eventually

for

the

right

to

take

part

in

the

partition

of

the

Belgian

Congo,

if

that

should

ever

occur.

The

analogies

are

obvious

today,

but

they

are

not

systematically

examined.

In

every

comparison

of

this

kind,

there

will

be

elements

of

similarity

and

ele-

ments

of

difference.

Which

are

which?

Without

explicit

definition

such

an-

alogies

can

be

quite

misleading.

The

author

refers

to

French

&dquo;economic

aid&dquo;

to

Tunisia

in

1882

and

uses

the

term

&dquo;satellite&dquo;

in

connection

with

Albania

and

Austria-Hungary

in

1913.

Such

questionable

terminology

as

well

as

the