Book Reviews : Khrushchev and the Arms Race: Soviet Interest in Arms Control and Disarma ment 1954-1964. By LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD, WALTER C. CLEMENS, JR., and FRANKLYN GRIFFITHS. (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1966. Pp. xi, 338. $10.00.)

• DOI: 10.1177/106591296601900414
• Published date: 01 December 1966
• Date: 01 December 1966
• Author: Michael Parrish
• Subject Matter: Articles

736

shameful.

Yet

such

people

will

continue

to

come

and

go.

The

public

must

be

informed

and

educated

so

that

it

can

continue

to

evaluate

intelligently

the

infor-

mation

it

receives.

Paul

W.

Blackstock’s

book

should

be

widely

distributed

so

that

scholars

and

readers

will

be

able

to

find

out

how

frauds,

forgeries,

and

political

intrigues

arise

and

what

their

effect

has

been

on

the

relations

between

peoples

and

nations.

Villa

Maria

College

of

Buffalo

ERWIN

F.

KARNER

Khrushchev

and

the

Arms

Race:

Soviet

Interest

in

Arms

Control

and

Disarma-

ment

1954-1964.

By

LINCOLN

P.

BLOOMFIELD,

WALTER

C.

CLEMENS,

JR.,

and

FRANKLYN

GRIFFITHS.

(Cambridge:

M.I.T.

Press,

1966.

Pp.

xi,

338.

$10.00.)

The

excellent

study

sponsored

by

the

U.S.

Arms

Control

and

Disarmament

Agency

and

made

by

the

Center

for

International

Studies

of

the

Massachusetts

Institute

of

Technology

makes

an

attempt

to

analyze

the

Soviet

interest

in

the

problems

of

arms

control

during

the

Khrushchev

era.

The

subject

choice

of

the

MIT

Center

seems

puzzling,

since

the

CIA,

which

has

had

close

connections

with

the

Center,

has

been

less

than

enthusiastic

about

some

of

the

USACDA’s

efforts

in

regard

to

disarmament.

The

Soviet

interest

in

disarmament

which

during

Lenin’s

and

Stalin’s

regimes

was

used

primarily

for

propaganda

purposes

underwent

a

dramatic

change

during

the

Khrushchev

era.

This

transformation

was

made

possible

by

the

gradual

demoli-

tion

of

Stalin’s

&dquo;Science

of

War&dquo;

dogma

which

maintained

that

in

any

war

the

Soviet

Union

will

triumph

eventually

because

of

its

superior

social

system.

This

change,

as

the

authors

correctly

point

out,

was

instigated

as

much

by

the

general

thaw

as

by

the

advancement

in

military

technology

which

made

war

at

certain

levels

unacceptable

to

the

Soviet

strategists.

The

Soviet

policy

became

a

twofold

attempt

to

reach

agreements

in

areas

of

mutual

interest

to

the

West

(Test

Ban

Treaty,

nuclear-free

arctic

zones)

and

to

continue,

primarily

for

propaganda

pur-

poses,

unacceptable

proposals

clearly

disadvantageous

to

the

West

(German

neu-

trality,

abolition

of

nuclear

weapons

without

adequate

inspection).

Paralleling

these

attempts

was

the

Soviet

pursuit

of

the

elusive

formula

for

strategic

superiority

for

bargaining

purposes.

The

latter

efforts

sometimes

unduly

alarmed

the

West

and

contributed

to

such

international

incidents

as

the

Cuban

missile

crisis.

Within

the

dual-purpose

framework

Soviet

disarmament

proposals

have

fol-

lowed

a

zigzag

line

veering

according

to

domestic

and

international

politics

as

well

as

economic

considerations

and

rapid

changes

in

military

technology.

The

writers

point

out

that

Soviet

disarmament

policy

is

in

all

respects

only

a

means

to

achieve

the

greater

goal

of

advancement

of

the

Soviet

national

and

international

interests.

The

same

charge

also

could

apply

to

the

West.

As

long

as

these

goals

are

contra-

dictory,

the

chance

for

a

general

and

comprehensive

disarmament

is

minimal.

Useful

and

limited

progress

can

be

made

only

in

those

areas

of

clear

mutual

interest.