Book Reviews : Atomic Energy Policy in France Under the Fourth Republic. By LAWRENCE SCHEINMAN. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. Pp. xxiv, 259. $6.50.)
| DOI | 10.1177/106591296601900440 |
| Date | 01 December 1966 |
| Author | Truman Driggs |
| Published date | 01 December 1966 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
764
Atomic
Energy
Policy
in
France
Under
the
Fourth
Republic.
By
LAWRENCE
SCHEINMAN.
(Princeton:
Princeton
University
Press,
1965.
Pp.
xxiv,
259.
$6.50.)
Scheinman’s
study
demonstrates
clearly
that
the
force
de
frappé
concept,
so
frequently
associated
with
the
Gaullist
regime,
is
in
fact
a
continuation
of
policies
formulated
and
adopted
by
agencies
of
the
Fourth
Republic.
In
April
1958,
Prime
Minister
Félix
Gaillard
signed
the
order
for
testing
an
atomic
bomb
in
1960,
a
decision
implicit
in
programs
authorized
even
earlier.
Thus
President
de
Gaulle
inherited
not
only
atomic
energy
facilities,
but
the
decision
upon
the
bomb
itself.
France
has
long
been
interested
in
matters
involving
uranium
and
radiation.
The
French
scientific
community
pioneered
early
work
in
this
area
-
a
tradition
set
by
the
Curies
and
exemplified
most
recently
by
Fr6d6ric
Jaliot-Curie.
French
military
planners
were
interested
in
the
possibilities
of
atomic
fission
and
had
acquired
substantial
quantities
of
both
uranium
and
heavy
water
before
the
out-
break
of
World
War
II.
Defeat
in
1940
interrupted
French
efforts
in
the
atomic
field,
but
French
scientists
did
participate
in
Allied,
particularly
Canadian,
war-
time
atomic
energy
programs.
One
of
the
early
actions
of
the
Provisional
Govern-
ment
of
the
Republic
in
1945
was
the
re-establishment
of
officials
atomic
research.
The
explosion
of
an
atomic
device
in
1960
was
the
culmination
of
a
direct,
though
often
slow
and
usually
controversial,
line
of
development
beginning
in
1945.
Scheinman’s
book
is
a
history
of
the
formulation
of
policy
for
that
development.
A
principal
thesis
of
the
author
is
that,
unlike
the
situation
in
the
United
States
and
Great
Britain,
French
atomic
policy
was
not
determined
primarily
by
elected
government
officials.
Rather,
the
instability
of
ministries
under
the
Fourth
Republic
placed
the
appointed
officers
of
the
semi-autonomous
Commissariat
à
l’Energie
Atomique,
like
other
&dquo;middle
level&dquo;
permanent
administrators,
in
a
favorable
position
to
formulate
the
very
policy
which
they
were
supposed
to
imple-
ment.
Scheinman
substantiates
his
theory
quite
successfully
for
the
period
before
1956.
The
main
arena
for
policy
conflicts
was
the
Commissariat
itself.
Elected
politicians
in
the
ministries
or
the
legislative
chambers
were
called
in
as
auxiliaries,
especially
in
the
battle
over
peaceful
as
opposed
to
military
uses
of
the
atom.
The
anti-military
faction
was
defeated
in
the
early
1950’s
after
the
dismissal
of
Joliot-
Curie
for
his
active
membership
in
the
Communist
party.
The
author
admits,
however,
that
not
later
than
1956
the
great
majority
of
parliamentary
political
blocs,
influenced
by
the
Suez
crisis
and
an
apparently
declining
credibility
of
the
American
nuclear
umbrella
over
western
Europe,
favored
a
French
nuclear
striking
force.
They
decided
that
France
needed
a
more
independent
foreign
policy
supported
by
an
independent
military
force.
To
them
this
meant
atomic
weapons
of
their
own.
This
is
a
very
interesting
and
useful
book.
The
literary
style
is
spare
but
pleasant.
The
narrative
is
easy
for
a
non-scientist
to
follow,
being
concerned
pri-
marily
with
high
policy
rather
than
technical
details.
Scheinman
does
not
reveal
much
that
was
not
known
before,
nor
does
he
pass
judgment
upon
French
policies.
His
contribution
consists
of
having
put
together
in
a
clear,
readily
available
form,
a
description
of
the
development
of
those
policies.
His
principal
sources
were
To continue reading
Request your trial