Book Reviews : Anarchy, State, and Utopia. By ROBERT NOZICK. (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1974. Pp. 367. $12.95.)

• Author: Karen Johnson
• Published date: 01 March 1975
• Date: 01 March 1975
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/106591297502800113
• Published By: Sage Publications, Inc.
• Subject Matter: Articles

199

BOOK

REVIEWS

Anarchy,

State,

and

Utopia.

By

ROBERT NOZICK.

(New

York:

Basic

Books,

Inc.,

1974.

Pp.

367.

$12.95.)

Anarchy,

State,

and

Utopia

is

a

powerful

philosophic

defense

of

the

minimal

or

night-watchman

state:

the

state

of

the

nineteenth-century

liberal

and

the

twen-

tieth-century

libertarian,

&dquo;limited

to

the

narrow

functions

of

protection

against

force,

theft,

fraud,

enforcement

of

contracts,

and

so

on.&dquo;

An

anachronism

now,

one

might

think,

when

the

watchword

is

&dquo;community&dquo;

and

&dquo;liberal&dquo;

seems

to

have

be-

come

a

term

of

reproach!

But

if

it

is

an

anachronism,

it

is

one

to

be

reckoned

with.

The

reader

who

disagrees

with

its

prescription

will

have

to

reassess

his

own

position

in

order

to

refute

it.

The

case

for

the

minimal

state

is

made

in

three

interlocking

arguments.

Part

I

is

a

justification

of

the

minimal

state,

to

counter

the

anarchist’s

claim

that

the

state

is

intrinsically

immoral.

Here

Nozick

argues

that

the

state

would

arise

out

of

anarchy-out

of

a

Lockean

state

of

nature-by

an

&dquo;invisible

hand&dquo;

process

which

no

one

intends

and

which

need

not

violate

anyone’s

rights.

He

pictures

individuals

in

the

state

of

nature

forming

private

protective

associations

to

guarantee

their

security.

One

of

these

becomes

the

dominant

protective

association

within

a

terri-

tory,

and

it,

because

it

has

a

monopoly

of

force

and

protects

all

persons

within

that

territory,

turns

out

to

be

a

de

facto

state

(and

a

de

facto

state

is

the

only

kind

of

state

there

is) :

a

state

which

has

arisen

by

morally

permissible

means

and

is

there-

fore

morally

legitimate.

Part

II

makes

the

claims

that

any

more

extensive

state

will

violate

individual

rights

and

therefore

is

not

legitimate.

Here

Nozick

argues

against

the

view

that

a

major

function

of

the

state

is

to

achieve

distributive

justice

con-

ceived

as

the

right

pattern

of

distribution

of

goods.

He

holds

that

a

patterned

principle

of

distribution

requires

constant

interference

with

people’s

liberty

in

order

to

maintain

the

pattern.

He

develops,

in

part

through

a

probing

critique

of

Rawls,

an

entitlement

theory

of

distributive

justice,

which

focuses

on

how

people

acquire

things

rather

than

on

who

has

what

and

thus

does

not

require

governmental

action

to

ensure

&dquo;justice

in

holdings.&dquo;

Part

II

ends

with

an

ingenious

moral

tale,

entitled

&dquo;Demoktesis,&dquo;

which

is

designed

to

&dquo;illuminate

essential

aspects

of

the

more

ex-

tensive

states

people

everywhere

now

live

under,

laying

bare

their

nature.&dquo;

In

Part

III,

Nozick

contends

that

the

minimal

state,

because

it

provides

an

environment

in

which

individuals

are

free

to

seek

the

good

life

as

they

perceive

it,

singly

or

in

small

communities,

is

an

inspiring

vision,

a

&dquo;framework

for

utopia.&dquo;

The

book

is

notable

for

what

it

does

not

say

as

well

as

for

what

it

does.

Many

of

the

standard

&dquo;problems

of

political

philosophy&dquo;

are

conspicuously

absent.

There

is,

for

example,

no

discussion

of

the

problem

of

political

obligation.

But,

of

course,

there

would

be

no

political

obligation

in

the

minimal

state

Nozick

recommends.

It

is

impossible

in

the

brief

compass

of

a

review

to

do

justice

to

the

intricacies

of

Nozick’s

analysis--or

to

its

inadequacies,

for

I

think

he

is

quite

wrong.

A

num-

ber

of

points

might

be

made,

but

at

bottom

it

is

a

matter

of

how

one

sees

the

poli-

tical

order.

Nozick

begins

and

ends

with

the

importance

of

individual

rights;

his