Book Reviews

• Author: Corwin D. Edwards
• Published date: 01 December 1973
• DOI: 10.1177/0003603X7301800410
• Date: 01 December 1973
• Subject Matter: Book Reviews

BOOK REVIEWS 879

Erich

Hoppmann, Fusionskontrolle, Tiibingen,

West

Ger-

many:

J.

C. B. Mohr (1972), 90 pp., 16.80 marks.

In

this substantial pamphlet, one of Germany's foremost

theorists about competition policy challenges the view

that

control of mergers can have firm theoretical foundations if

it

rests on efforts to determine, case by case, whether or not

the merger involves excessive economic power, excessive con-

centration, or substantial reduction of competition in relevant

markets. Competition itself, he argues, constantly alters the

number and size of business enterprises,

their

relative eco-

nomic power, and the scope of the markets in which they

operate; and the competitive effect of

particular

bits of busi-

ness action or business structure cannot be ascertained by

examining each in isolation. So

far

as the

state

attempts to

base direct intervention upon this kind of analysis,

it

applies

itsreasoning

on ceteris paribus assumptions

that

deprive its

conclusions of significance. By such interventions public au-

thority prescribes the appropriate

structure

of

particular

in-

dustries and thus substitutes legal direction for competitive

evolution.

This appraisal does not lead Professor Hoppmann to laissez

faire conclusions. He emphasizes the need for the

state

to

enforce rules

that

maintain competition,

but

thinks

that

these

rules can be well grounded only

if

they consist of prohibitions

generally applicable

and

enforced in ways

that

preclude their

discriminatory application. Rules to curb mergers

are

among

those needed; but they should forbid all mergers or prescribed

classes of them,

and

should minimize opportunities

for

case-

by-case decisions about whether or not to apply the rules. Rec-

ognizing

that

competition policy evolves with experience,

Professor

Hoppmann does not expect

that

a complete set of

appropriate

rules can be prescribed in a single

burst

of

policy-making.

In

an

extended account of American

antitrust

policy, he argues

that

these policies have illustrated adesir-

able

trend-from

narrowly specific prescriptions toward pro-