Book Reviews

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BOOK

REVIEWS

FACING THE PHOENIX:

THE CIA AND

THE

POLITICAL DEFEAT

OF

THE UNITED STATES IN VIETNAM*

Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander John

R

Rolph

(USN)"

Vnderstandmg the progression of events that marked

America's

trail to failure during the Vietnam war requires in-depth analysis of

the Vietnamese people themselves-uho they were, w-hat they were

fighting for, and ahere they saw their countl?. gomg after years of

French colonial occupaoon.

Facing

the

Phoeniz

1s

a

detailed and

riveting analyse of the evolution of Vietnam from

1945

under colo-

nial rule to the fall of Saigon

in

1975 This compelling and complex

story

LS

examined in part through the eyes of those who were there

during the earliest days of America's interest and presence

in

In-

dochina and throughout the

war

years.

multifaceted

CIA agents who

struggled to understand

a

culture they aould never quite grasp, am-

bassadors, statesmen, and them staffs who suspected the motives

oi

the CIA and the many "advisors" Vvashington poured into the

coun-

try to thhart the

''river

of

communism";

newspaper reponers who

were viewed

as

racing to the doomsday conclusion that the

war

could

not be won: and

a

military machine (tkpified by the likes of General

William Westmoreland) unwilling to accept that

a

political solution

existed

to

end

a

conflict they believed could only be

won

by

raw

military might. The fulcrum of the book. however,

1s

the chronicle

of

Tran

Sgoc

Chau.

a

brilliant Vietnamese soldier, straregm, and

statesman uho knew pacification was the

on15

strategy that would

reunite his country, and who dedicared himself

to

this

cause

Chau

s

gift

of

incredible insight and

energ?.

brought him quickly to rhe at-

tention of both the French and the Americans

(in

particular

the

CIA)

~n

Vietnam. but time and time again his wxkable and

realistic

ideas

far

winning

back his country from the influences and destruction

of communism were ignored by the

very

individuals

in

both the

American and

Saigon

governments who admired him most. This

faiiure

as

the author carefully and thoroughly documents. may have

been the greatest single failure of the entire conflict. ensuring defeat

of

Amencan

and South Vietnamese forces

y

fkr

Phu

I

II

lork

U

MILITARY

LAW

REVIEW

[Vd

133

Ran

Kgac

Chau

was

a

fierce Vietnamese nationalist who

rose

through

the

ranks

of

his country's fickle mllitary and political systems

soiely

as

a

result

a1 hard work and innate ability From

Boy

Scout

m

1942

to

Guerrilla

fighter by

1946,

Chau's

brand of nationalism

found hlm fating against coioniahsm with the Viet Xlmnh communist

guerrillas

~n

the jungle

wars

after World

War

I1

Chau was not at

all

sympathetic to

the

cause

of communism but

he

realized that

his

goal

of an independent Vietnam had its best

chance

through

this

medium

called the Viet

Mmh

For

Chau,

the

Viet Yinhs war against French

occupation was

a

patriotic struggle that had

verr

little to do with

the

cauae

of

communism.

despite

the

fact that

Ha

Chi Minh ha&

>ti

leader

All

Chau

cared about was ridding his country of the French,

any

collateral

benefit

his

participation might glean

for

the

cause

of

communism seemed

BL

nebulous

as

the communist

cause

itself at

ihe

time

Chau viewed himself as

a

nationalist dedicated to

bringing

about the expulsum of

the

French first. and introducing democratic

prmciples to his country second.

To

the extent that

Ho

Chi

Mmh

shared Chau's initial goal the

two

were "brothers.' and

Chau's

par-

ticipation

m

the struggle was not at

all

hampered by the fact that

Ho

Chi Mmhs end result contemplated

a

communist dictatorship

for

iietnam Indeed. the

author

documents

the

biens

of

man)

thar

America missed the opportunity to support

Ho

Chi

Minh m

his earl?

years of struggle against the French. and that It

1s

tery

likely that

he

was

pro-Amencan at this point

Once

in

power, it

wab

theorized

that

Ho

would be amenable

to

democratic reform

For

Chau.

na~

tionaiism

was

the motivating

force,

and

it

would

continue

to

be

for

many

hean

to come. Chau left the Viet

Minh

strusgle after four

)pan

when ~ommunist influence began to avershadan nationalistic

goals

and

'

meticulously organized tatahtananism" began

creeping

in

from

all sides

Having

became

firmly

anrmmmunist by this point. it struck

Chau

as

not

at

all

incongruous

to

nowjoin

the French in their battle

against the Viet

Ilinh,

leaiing fm

a

later day the struggle for

an

in

dependent Vietnam This

was

rhe

essence

of

the

ideological

Chau

the

man

America

would eventually

invest

its

stock

in.

ani?

to

ignore

wrtuall)

every

dividend the investment reaped

Chau rose quickiy within the political organization of South Viet

nam

From

Province Chief to

Mayor

of

DaUang,

and

fmali)

to the

position of Secretary

Geiieral

of the Natmnal Assembly

111

Saigon

HP

was

a

theorist with

real

amld experience under his belt that

gate

credibility to everbthing

he

said

and did. both with the French and

wiih the Americans

His

experiences

in

particular that of

Province

Chief. helped him to formulate

a

philosophy later known

as

'

pacifica-

tion."

i\

hich offered the

onl)

real

hope of salvation for his cauntr)

350