Book Review: Unmailable: Congress and the Post Office

AuthorChester W. Handleman
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1177/106591297903200221
Published date01 June 1979
Date01 June 1979
Subject MatterBook Review
232
Western
Political
Quarterly
from long-term developments. In the aggregate analysis, of course, the perceptions
and motivations of the actors could not be taken into account. An attempt to com-
pensatc for this lacuna
is
effected in the second part
of
the volume through
a
series
of nine
case
studies written by other authors. The Conclusion then compares the
aggregate findings with those of the case studies.
While
a
few of the reported findings seem trivial, such
as
the annual number
of incidents because they are not related to an explanatory theory, these are the
esception. hlfost are interesting and of potential policy relevance
if
carefully in-
terpreted. Among the latter are strong correlations between presidential popularity/
national sense of confidence and the propensity to
use
force as an instrument of
diplomacy. The service branch most frequently employed is the
Navy,
involved in
more than
80
percent of the incidents, reflecting its flexibility in demonstrating
a
presence without necessarily making
a
commitment. Land-based air and ground
forces, by contrast, were used less frequently but associated with higher levels of
force and hence greater commitment. Moreover, the use
of
land-based
air
and
ground forces was more frequently associated with positive outcomes than com-
parable amphibious activities. This suggests that the Navy is
a
less
successful
in-
strument of persuasion than has been assumed by
U.S.
policy-makers for discrete
military operations and that modem tactical land-based aircraft could be
used
more
frequently for such purposes.
Other important findings include the fact that positive outcomes (from the
U.S.
perspcctive) were most often
a
short-term phenomenon. An examination of the
targets thrce years after the incidents frequently showed
a
drop in the number of
objectives still realized. This category is further refined to show that
U.S.
objectives
are most successful when they are concerned with supporting
a
regime in power,
less
successful when concerned about another actor‘s use of force, and least success-
fuI when trying to dissuade one actor from supporting the actions of
a
third
as,
for csample, when the
US.
tried to pressure China and the Soviet Union to stop
their support for the Vietnamese communists in the Iate
1950s
and early
1960s.
Put another way, positive outcomes were most often associated with the rein-
forcement of behavior already occurring but not with attempts to change behavior.
Psychological theory suggests that it is easier
to
maintain patterns than to alter
them. Similarly, deterrence appeared more successful than efforts to reverse
a
situation once it had begun.
The authors conclude judiciously that despite the erosion of favorable short-
term outcomes over time, the discrete employment of force may still
be
justified
insofar
as
it “buys time” for the introduction of more fundamental policies and
actions designed to achieve outcomes on
a
more lasting basis.
This is
a
monumental study based on careful data acquisition and analysis.
Its policy implications are rightly controversial and should generate considerable
debate within both the policy and academic communities.
SHELDON
W.
SIMON
Arizona Sfate University
Unmailable: Congress and
the
Post Ofice.
By
DOROTHY
GANFIELD
FOWLER.
(Athens: The University of Georgia
Press,
1977.
Pp.
x,
202.
$14.50.)
This is
a
scholarly study of the history of the United States Post Office, includ-
ing the concept
of
what is considered unmailable and how both relate to the Con-
gress. In
1797
Congress enacted the first law placing
a
limitation on what could
be sent through the mail;
but
according to Dorothy Ganfield Fowler this
was
a
mild regulation
-
simply to prevent damage to the rest of the mail. Still, this was
thc first of many such acts in which material was defined
as
unmailable.
In
1829
the postmaster general became
a
member of the President’s cabinet.
The first real attempt at postal censorship came in
1835
when Amos Kendall was
postmaster general. The newly organized American Anti-Slavery Society “sent out
over
a
million pieces of abolition literature, chiefly by mail.” IYhen
a
southern
postmaster compIained bitterly because thousands of abolition pamphlets
Came
to

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