Book Review: Sebag-Montefiore, Hugh. (2006). Dunkirk: Fight to the Last Man. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

• DOI: 10.1177/0095327X07303703
• Published date: 01 October 2007
• Author: Eugenia E. C. Kiesling
• Date: 01 October 2007
• Subject Matter: Articles

Book Reviews 151

Sebag-Montefiore, Hugh. (2006). Dunkirk: Fight to the Last Man. Cambridge,

MA: Harvard University Press.

DOI: 10.1177/0095327X07303703

Historians, insist my friends in other disciplines, do not own the past, and any intel-

ligent person with a sincere interest in a past event ought to be able to write its history.

Although amateurs, in the literal sense of the word, may do fine historical work, Hugh

Sebag-Montefiore’s Dunkirk is a salutary reminder that enthusiasm and self-confidence

are no substitute for historical training.

Dunkirk’s subtitle “Fight to the Last Man” advertises as Sebag-Montefiore’s subject

the experiences of the British and French rear guard, “those soldiers who remained

behind to fight while the rest of the army retreated” before the German onslaught

(p. xi). The topic promises to be both technically interesting and emotionally gripping.

Where did the rear guard fit into the overall campaign plan? Which units were

selected and how? What orders did these units receive and what sacrifices were they

expected to make? Of course, the actual events of May-June 1940 were far too chaotic

to yield wholly to this analysis, but Sebag-Montefiore does not ask the sort of ques-

tions likely to render that chaos, if not orderly, at least instructive. The very phrase

“fight to the last man” sounds like rhetoric rather than tactics; Sebag-Montefiore

seems to confuse “the last man” with “the last bullet” while failing to specify exactly

what the troops were directed to do. Indeed, the subtitle says more about the author’s

penchant for drama rather than it does the intentions of the British commanders.

Sebag-Montefiore finds his drama in soldiers’memoirs, and the book’s only virtue

lies in the many extended quotations. But Sebag-Montefiore lacks the understanding

to piece the battle together from these vignettes, while his editorial comments range

from ignorant to fatuous. Moreover, although memoirs are rich sources, one learns

most from them by looking beneath their surfaces into places the author of Dunkirk

is not trained to go.

Among Sebag-Montefiore’s other favorite sources are casualty numbers and award

citations, using the one as evidence for the difficulty of combat missions and the other

for the bravery of the combatants. He does not understand the varieties of explana-

tions for both casualties and decorations and admits to being baffled when acts of

courage receive no recognition (p. 187).

Outside of memoirs and unit reports, the research is thin, and for his favorite

subject, the deficiencies of the French Army, Sebag-Montefiore offers no sources at

all. “Much has been written about the defeatist, even cowardly attitude of French sol-

diers during the 1940 campaign” (pp. 193, 454), he insists, but he does not tell us

where or by whom. One is simply supposed to believe the French to be cowards, just

as the opening passage of the book, describing General Alphonse Georges in tears

on 14 May 1940 (p. 1), proves them a nation of crybabies unworthy of their stoic

British allies.