Book Review: Political Brokers in Chile: Local Government in a Centralized Polity

• Author: Steve C. Ropp
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/106591297903200230
• Published date: 01 June 1979
• Date: 01 June 1979
• Subject Matter: Book Review

242

JYestertr Political Quarterly

revolutionary dynamic in Chile, he was pessimistic about the chances of success.

Initially enthusiastic over the success of the Tupamaros, Debray later analjzed their

movement and concluded that Guevarist pra,gnatism was inadequate in the long

run. Thus Debray arrives

at

yet another theoretical position which may be charac-

terized as eclectic. In Ramm’s words: “Debrags theory is not orthodox

-

not

orthodox Guevarism nor orthodox Leninism nor orthodox reformist. It has ele-

ments of all of these without being clearly dominated by any

of

them.”

The book contains excellent summaries

of

the events which transpired in Latin

America and did much to inflrience Debray’s thinking. Thc presentation and in-

clusion

of

these events has the important effect of illuminating and enliving the

analysis of Debrays writings. However, it may have had the unintended effect of

exaggerating the difference between Debray and Lcnin with respect to the issue of

revolutionary pragmatism. In other words, a similar analysis

of

Lenin’s theory

and

practice with the developments of his time would be likely to reveal that Leninism

is more pra>matic than this study suggests.

Ramm’s presentation is on the whole concise, well-written and objective. The

study is thoroughly documented and reflects thc author’s familiarity with the whole

body of Debray‘s political writings.

A

bibliographical note

at

the end and

a

list

of

sources are particularly useful.

ROBERT

L.

DELORIIE

California State University, Long Beach

Politica2 Brokers

in

Chile: Local Government

in

a

Centralized Polity.

By

ARTURO

VALENZUELA.

(Durham: Duke University Press,

1977.

Pp.

230.

$13.75.)

Arturo Valenzuela presents

a

thorough description of politics at the local

municipal level in Chile. First,. he documents the contention that Chilean politics

is highly competitive

at

the local level, with

all

of

the major national party cleav-

ages being present there in microcosm. Secondly, he argues that this high degree

of local political competitivcness is not entirely attributable to the use

of

municipal

office

as

a

springboard for national politics. Rather, the fundamental importance

of

these local offices is that they provide access channels to resources available from

the national political center.

The primary theoretical contribution of this book is its further refinement

of

the patron-client model. Valenzuela makes

a

distinction between the network of

vertical relationships he observes in Chile and the standard patron-client model as

derived primarily from the observations of anthropolo~sts. Chilean local-center

relationships differ in that they are more voluntaristic and more egalitarian. In the

majority

of

omes, the clientele represented

by

the municipal intermediaries in their

dealings with the central government were not subservient participants in the rela-

tionship, nor was the relationship coercive in nature.

To

distinguish this type of

vertical representational pattern from the patron-client mode, Valenzuela uses the

term “broker politics.”

If

the book has

a

major weakness, it

is

that the central hypotheses concerning

the effects of national political structure on

local

political behavior are not con-

vincingly supported by the evidence presented. Valenzuela contends that local

politics in Chile

is

primarily conditioned by two structural variables

-

the scarcity

of

resources and thc centralization of the polity. The contention is that these factors

affect local politics in Chile by imposing constraints on

collective

behavior. He

argues that group-based programmatic politics rarely occurs for these reasons, and

explains this absence as a function

of

structure rather than culture.

However, Valenzucla does not adequately demonstrate the direction

of

his

causal linkages.

Is

local collective action_ constrained because the polity

is

central-

ized, or is the polity centralized due to the absence

of

collective local activity?

Also,

even assuming that these two structural features are major independent variables,

why should they necessarily result in fragmented personalistic local politics? Much

of the sociological and anthropological literature on Latin American would seem

to suggest that it is precisely the lack

of

local resources that reinforces certain types

of

collective local behavior (e.g., the use

of

agricultural labor

juntaJ).