Book Review: Game Theory and the Transformation of Family Law by Kenneth H Waldron and Allan R. Koritzinsky

• Author: Bernie Mayer
• Published date: 01 July 2016
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/fcre.12233
• Date: 01 July 2016

BOOK REVIEW: GAME THEORY AND THE TRANSFORMATION

OF FAMILY LAW BY KENNETH H WALDRON AND

ALLAN R. KORITZINSKY

Bernie Mayer

In this book, Waldron and Koritzinsky, provide a stimulating and interesting new way of understanding the impact of tradi-

tional approaches to divorce on families and divorcees. They ask whether the structure of divorce can be altered so that the

payoff systems for a divorcing couple lead toward a more constructive and cooperative approach. Waldron and Koritzinsky

encourage us to understand how what appears to be irrational behavior actually makes sense when you analyze the payoffs

built into the divorce process and argue that we can change that system to reward more constructive behavior. They also urge

us to look at subjective payoffs as well as objective outcomes. Their application of game theory yields rich insights to divorce

practitioners, but it is important to remember that a rational actor model can only go so far in explaining the complexities and

variations of the divorce process.

Key Points for the Family Court Community:

This book provides a creative and powerful set of insights into how the family law system works and how it can be

improved.

The authors ask us to understand the rational basis behind seemingly irrational behavior.

They provide an insightful new analysis of the payoff structure set up by divorce procedures and how these can be

altered to encourage more cooperative behavior.

They encourage us to consider subjective as well as objective payoffs in divorce.

Game theory offers a rich tool for understanding divorce, but it is important to recognize its limits as well.

Keywords: Divorce Process; Game Theory; Rational Actors; Rational Behavior; Subjective Payoffs; and Transformation

of Divorce.

Why do people behave like they do in conflict, why do they often appear to act against their own

interests, both immediate and long term? Anyone who has worked as a conflict intervener has had to

confront these questions and no type of conflict poses this more immediately and frequently than

divorce. We gravitate towards three types of answers. One is that there are deeper, unrecognized

needs at play (the unconscious rules explanation). Second, that people act against their own interests

because they are more intent on giving vent to their anger than furthering their own needs or those of

their children (the emotions rule explanation). Third, that people are not rational (the people don’t

get it explanation).

In their creative, thorough, and insightful book, Waldron and Koritzinsky (2015) pose another

answer, which we could call the payoff explanation. They argue that, once we understand the payoff

system and the structure of the games that people are playing to attain a successful outcome, their

behavior is not so irrational. Moreover, once we understand this, we can change the nature of the

game—and the payoff structure, to promote a more constructive approach to bargaining and decision

making in divorce. As they put it, the question is:

Correspondence: berniemayer@creighton.edu

FAMILY COURT REVIEW, Vol. 54 No. 3, July 2016 535–538

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C2016 Association of Family and Conciliation Courts