Book Review: Aggression American Style

• Author: Gorden L. Bowen
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/106591297903200217
• Published date: 01 June 1979
• Date: 01 June 1979
• Subject Matter: Book Review

228

Western Political Qrrarterly

think about inequality and violence, one on the ways in which Robert Paul

Wolff

and John Raids deal

with

political obligation and violence, and one on democratic

violence. Macfarlane’s text, which is not designed for any particular course or Ievel

of instruction, is on the whole concrete, drawing for illustration from

a

broad range

of

political practice but unfortunately deficient in theoretical structure. Macfar-

lane

makes

some good points about allegiance and political obligation, but for this

purpose one might more usefully turn to his work on that topic. Honderich’s essay,

however, in spite of its limitations, is sufficiently rich to be rewarding reading.

His

comparison between the distress of inequality and the distress of violence, for

ex-

ample, is striking and disturbing. His treatment of Raids, however, seems both

overly drawn out and insufficiently deep. The final chapter, which asks to what

extent violence against the state is

or

is

not compatible with democracy is worth

serious consideration, despite

his

sudden move to equating democratic violence with

an altogether too briefly explicated notion of coercive persuasion.

KAREN

JOHNSON

The University

of

Texas at

El

Paso

Aggression American Style.

By

WILLIAAI

H.

BmNcIim. (Santa Monica: Good-

year Publishing Co.,

1978,

Pp.

314. $8.50.)

The central concern of this book is to demonstrate that American foreign policy

inadvertantly is aggressive due to dangerous, unconscious psychological patterns

among Americans. Post TVorld War

I1

case studies on the origins of the Truman

Doctrine, the Bay of Pigs, the Dominican Intervention, the

North

Vietnamese

bombing, and others reiterate this theme. Such breadth

of

treatment, combined

with

a

readable style, invite its adoption in undergraduate foreign policy and gen-

eral American government classes; the invitation ought to be declined.

Blanchard contends that American leaders, convinced of our national virtue,

repeatedly, yet unconsciously, have deceived themselves regarding the properties

of,

and potential for, American power to have influence in the world. To Blanchard,

the deception of the American people which has accompanied many foreign-policy

blunders flows naturally from

a

romantic, self-deceiving American national charac-

ter which deludes leader and citizen alike. Conscious deception and lying are only

marginally important. Discounted, too, are exigencies of

U.S.

elections as they

influence presidential candor, economic interest group influences on definition of

vital extranational interests, and Machiavellian conspiracies of all sorts. America

“inadvertantly” is “aggressive” because we do not know ourselves, our motives.

Presumably, some

sort

of national T-Group, EST weekend or

a

cathartic primal

scream could remedy

all

this.

JVith psychological meta-generalizing

such

as

Blanchard‘s one problem is

theoretical: just how can we confirm

or

disconfirm steps in an argument about the

1961

Cuban invasion such

as:

“perhaps.

.

.

there was

a

feeling that the President

would panic,” or “there must have been those who believed..

.

,”

etc. The indefi-

niteness of the argumentation, however, doesn’t inhibit precise conclusions: “The

tragedy

of

the Cuban invasion was primarily

a

refusal on the part of those involved

. .

.

to face their real intentions.”

Historical dimensions

of

Blanchard’s case studies may

also

inhibit reliance on

the book. Most increduously, for example, postwar American foreign aid pro,srms

are described

as

“American generosity” and “vast” in the complete absence of any

consideration of their calculated use

as

tools

of

American interest or any comparison

to

other TVestern nations’ much larger per capita programs. The case-study

evi-

dence itself reveals scant original source research, relying almost exclusively on

1960s

era, personalistic memoirs of decision advisors. This undermines solid

argu-

ment, especially in the Bay of Pigs chapter. Drawing generously from Arthur

Schlesinger’s

I000

Days,

1965,

Blanchard argues that the CIA covert operations

division drew President Kennedy into more serious intervention than the preceding

administration had “intended.” Blanchard‘s Kennedy,

a

circumspect leader, inad-

vertantly

was

drawn into the flawed plot since CIA-presidential briefings occurred