Boilerplate and economic power in auto manufacturing contracts.
| Date | 01 March 2006 |
| Author | Ben-Shahar, Omri,White, James J. |
| Published date | 01 March 2006 |
| Author | Ben-Shahar, Omri |
INTRODUCTION I. THE CONTRACTS II. DRAFTING OF BOILERPLATE III. ECONOMIC POWER A. Lower-Tier Contracts B. Sellers' Power Due to Switching Costs C. Bankruptcy IV. THE EXCEPTIONS: DEVIATIONS FROM THE BOILERPLATE A. Information Technology Transactions B. Japanese Manufacturers C. "Backdoor" Negotiations CONCLUSION INTRODUCTION
Manufacturing contracts in the automotive industry have served a canonical role in the economic theory of contract and bargaining. The famous story of General Motors' relationship with its supplier Fisher Body in the 1920s is a landmark illustration of the problem of contractual hold up, underlying a prominent theory of vertical integration and the nature of the firm. (1) The theoretical fascination with automotive procurement contracts is well deserved. There may be no other merchant-to-merchant contractual template that governs such fantastic economic stakes--hundreds of billions of dollars per year--and implemented through a process that involves almost no negotiation of the legal terms. Boilerplate rules these transactions.
There is a long line of law-and-economics scholarship studying the attributes of standard-form terms in contracts between sophisticated parties in high-stakes transactions. One of the benchmark predictions in this literature is that contractual terms have to be efficient if they are to be consistently used by the parties. (2) Any rent-seeking power that a party has should be translated into a price advantage; it should not be used to dictate selfish but inefficient performance terms. Further, since legal terms such as warranties and remedies affect the costs borne by the parties, we expect that sophisticated parties will be "pricing" the terms and will be ready to redraft terms that cost more than they save. A study of automobile contracts provides an opportunity to test these predictions. These are transactions in which economic power is unevenly distributed; much dickering takes place over prices and product design; but everything else is packed into boilerplate. Every party reads the boilerplate and understands its legal effect and its economic consequences. Do strong parties dictate efficient boilerplate and extract rents through prices and other purely distributive clauses? Do they tailor their terms to maximize their net gains from the transactions?
Moreover, automotive supply contracts are the paradigmatic long-term relationships that require a great deal of relationship-specific investments in the form of machinery, location of plants, and precontractual technology research. As the economic literature predicts, the interdependence of suppliers (who must invest in specializing for their buyers' needs) and buyers (who need specialized parts from their suppliers) gives opportunities for hold up. (3) These dangers make the contracts the primary tool for deterring hold up and encouraging investment. What are the contractual techniques used to address the risk of hold up?
In answering these questions, we have taken a simple, almost naive approach. We read and compared industry boilerplate contracts and talked to lawyers who drafted these forms and to some non-lawyer industry participants. We provide a case study, but it yields some general insights. For example, the boilerplate contract terms between the Original Equipment Manufacturers ("OEMs") and the tier-1 suppliers show how economic power is translated into transactional advantage. From the contract terms, we can identify ways the OEMs extract value from their suppliers. Contrary to the fabled GM-Fisher Body story, we find no real problem of hold up by suppliers. The claim that suppliers with a long-term contract can hold up the OEMs is based on a misunderstanding of the terms of the deal, the rules of contract law, and the structure of the market. Moreover, comparing the terms that appear in the purchase orders of the various OEMs reveals ways in which they differ and, surprisingly, it suggests that some of these terms may foster inefficiency. Finally, studying the way the form contracts are drafted gives a detailed understanding of how and when tailoring of terms takes place and how internal organizational features are harnessed to affect the outcome of negotiations over contract terms.
The study of contracting in the automotive industry also provides an opportunity to investigate the design of contracts in an industry that deals with fascinating economic changes. One major change has to do with the organization of production. By 1960, Ford was making almost everything from floor mats to steel within the company, and the other OEMs had a nearly equal degree of vertical integration. (4) But since the early 1980s, the trend toward vertical integration has reversed. (5) The biggest American OEM, General Motors, which used to produce up to seventy percent of its parts internally; is now only thirty-percent integrated. OEMs have shed whole divisions, most notably Delphi (6) and Visteon, (7) and have started to buy large subassemblies such as consoles, brake assemblies, and even frames from outside suppliers. With the business changing so vastly, have contracts changed as well?
Another major change in the automotive industry is its profitability. American OEMs lose money; this is no secret. Ford and General Motors, two bastions of American industrial power, issue debt that is graded as junk. (8) Since the OEMs are limited in their ability to renegotiate with their most burdensome creditors (9)--their current and retired employees they have turned to their suppliers. The drive to save money by paying suppliers less that began in the mid-1980s has accelerated, and as these suppliers are pressed, the pressure cascades down the supply chain. This study traces the cascade of the contract terms that suppliers are required to accept.
The automotive supply industry is sometimes described as a pyramid built in "tiers." At the top are the OEMs. This Article focuses mostly on the "Big Three" OEMs--General Motors, Ford, and DaimlerChrysler--but it looks also at six foreign OEMs who assemble cars in the U.S. and who are a growing force in the American manufacturing market. Directly below the OEMs are the "tier-1" suppliers--anyone who sells directly to an OEM. These companies usually sell sophisticated assemblies or parts, and most of them specialize in designing and manufacturing automotive-specific products. They purchase their supplies from "tier-2" suppliers, who in turn purchase from "tier-3" suppliers, and so on. Since there are only a few OEMs at the top but roughly six hundred to eight hundred tier-1 suppliers, (10) a pyramid is an inaccurate metaphor. The metaphor is important, as we will explain below. The main issues that need to be governed by the contracts between OEMs and tier-1 suppliers are different than in lower tiers. Some of that difference will be attributed to the fact that there is a much smaller set of potential buyers above tier-1 sellers than there is above sellers in the lower tiers.
This Article is structured as follows. Part I compares the terms and conditions in the purchase orders of the OEMs and highlights important differences in the substance of these boilerplate provisions. It argues that these differences cannot be easily reconciled with the prediction that sophisticated parties draft the most efficient boilerplate terms. Part II examines how these forms are drafted, how their terms are negotiated, and how the OEMs guard their terms from erosion. It provides some insight on how tailoring occurs and how the internal organization of a party to a deal affects the terms that this party can secure. Part III focuses on the role of economic power. There, we examine how power is harnessed to administer and modify contracts. This analysis revisits the claims made on the basis of the GM-Fisher Body deal and argues that some of these claims are not valid. We demonstrate the subtle ways in which hold up and renegotiation are curtailed. Finally, Part IV examines ways in which a less powerful party can nevertheless get favorable contract terms.
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THE CONTRACTS
Supply contracts in the automotive industry are made through competitive bidding. An OEM issues requests for quotations for a particular part or assembly. The supplier whose bid is picked would ordinarily make a significant capital investment in R&D and production assets, and supply this part for the duration of the car model in which the part is assembled, a period that normally lasts four to eight years. The winning bidder, however, does not always get the security of a long-term, fixed-price contract. While some OEMs accord the supplier a long-term sourcing commitment, the actual purchase orders are issued on a short-term basis. (11) Shorter contracts give the parties opportunities to renegotiate aspects of the deal like price and quantity estimates; OEMs commonly demand (and receive) price reductions every year. (12) Technically, most of these adjustments are not modifications of the contract but rather renewals of short-term purchase orders ("POs"), all entered into under a master long-term agreement.
The contracts we looked at are the boilerplate POs governing the actual supply agreements. While there is some interest in the long-term master agreements, their language is usually brief and subordinates them to the terms of the shorter-duration POs. The OEMs draft and issue these forms through a process that will be described in Section II. Each OEM has a single form, titled either "Global Terms" or "General Terms," that is used almost without exception for procuring all of the manufacturing parts. General Motors, for example, enters into roughly one million procurement contracts every year, at a total amount in excess of $80 billion--all governed by a single contract form containing thirty-one paragraphs, (13) translated into six languages. In terms of economic stakes, this form may be the single most important commercial...
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