Blame Avoidance Strategies of Multiple Administrative Agencies During Policy Failure: A Case Study of Taiwan’s 2014 Waste Oil Scandal
| Date | 01 April 2021 |
| Published date | 01 April 2021 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0095399720953143 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
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Article
Administration & Society
2021, Vol. 53(4) 569 –594
Blame Avoidance
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Administrative Agencies
During Policy Failure: A
Case Study of Taiwan’s
2014 Waste Oil Scandal
Hongwung Wang1 and Yi-Ching Tsai2
Abstract
This study examines the blame avoidance (BA) strategies that may be
adopted after policy failures of multiple agencies. A classification of agencies
is proposed based on two factors: the amount of actual responsibility
that an agency is obliged for, and the extent of an agency’s perceived
responsibility. Agencies can thus be classified into four types, which may
have different tactical goals and specific BA strategies that contradict other
agencies’ goals, thereby leading to a complicated interaction between them.
The results show that one of the three related agencies does not adopt
suggested BA strategy and therefore fails to avoid blame.
Keywords
blame avoidance, policy failure, crisis, waste oil
Introduction
Societies face various risks, including those related to the environment, food
safety, labor safety, and financial order. To avoid or mitigate the potential
1National Taiwan University, Taipei
2Kaohsiung City Government, Kaohsiung
Corresponding Author:
Hongwung Wang, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and Graduate Institute
of Public Affairs, National Taiwan University, No. 1, Sec. 4, Roosevelt Road, Taipei 10617.
Email: hongwung@ntu.edu.tw
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Administration & Society 53(4)
damage due to these risks, governments must adopt specific public policies.
However, if a significant incident happens and human factors are involved in
the cause of the crisis, the media, public, politicians, and other supervisory
agencies will likely question which agency is responsible and to what extent.
Hence, an incident may cause the agency to be blamed, which may seriously
damage its reputation. To protect the agency’s reputation, which is a precious
asset (Carpenter & Krause, 2012), certain blame avoidance (BA) strategies
can be adopted by the agency before and after a crisis erupts (Busuioc, 2016;
Hinterleitner & Sager, 2019; Hood, 2010; Hood et al., 2009).
Since Weaver (1986), many scholars have studied the strategies used
by agencies and politicians for BA. However, most studies focus on a
single agency and its BA strategies before or after a crisis (Hinterleitner
& Sager, 2015; Hood et al., 2009). Although some studies analyze the
interactions between the trustee and trustor (Brändström & Kuipers,
2003; Hood, 2002) or examine the network failure of multiple agencies
(Brändström & Kuipers, 2003; Moynihan, 2012), little attention has been
devoted to the interactions between the culpable agencies. Thus, this
article seeks to provide a deeper understanding of the BA strategies taken
by multiple agencies.
In many circumstances, risks are managed by multiple administrative
agencies. Several government agencies are usually involved in a govern-
ment’s risk governance, seeking resolution through cooperation and divi-
sion of labor (Hood, 2010; Hood et al., 2009). In BA studies, an agency
may adopt strategies such as redefining the issue, passing the buck, finding
a scapegoat, and circling the wagons (Weaver, 1986, 2013); these strate-
gies imply that a crisis is caused by multiple agencies, making it possible
to pass the responsibility to other agencies or to find a scapegoat, but only
when they are involved.
This study’s main purpose is to identify BA strategies adopted by multi-
ple government agencies after a crisis caused by a policy failure, the defini-
tion of which is a policy program that has failed to achieve the results desired
by the government, because of poor implementation by related agencies
(Brändström & Kuipers, 2003; McConnell, 2010). The research questions
are the following:
Research Question 1: What factors affect the BA strategies of these
agencies?
Research Question 2: What are the BA strategies expected to be used by
different types of agencies?
Research Question 3: What is the possible impact of the BA strategies of
one agency on other agencies’ subsequent BA strategies?
Wang and Tsai
571
To answer these questions, the staged BA model developed by Hood et al.
(2009) is used to analyze the strategies used by various agencies, because their
model can show the BA strategy changes when these agencies deal with a cri-
sis. Next, this study proposes that the BA strategies expected to be used by
government agencies vary systematically depending on levels of actual respon-
sibility an agency is obligated to bear, and the perceived responsibilities the
public and media believe an agency is liable to undertake. Each different com-
bination of actual responsibility and perceived responsibility produces a differ-
ent type of agency and its own specific BA strategy. For example, agencies
with less actual responsibilities and more perceived responsibilities will face
the greatest challenges, because of the huge pressure from the public and the
media. They need to respond appropriately; otherwise, it is easier for them to
become the scapegoat. They are expected to spend more resources to identify
the true causes of the incident, transfer responsibilities to other agencies, admit
their own small responsibilities, and perform some remedial activities. On the
contrary, agencies with less perceived responsibilities and more actual respon-
sibilities are fortunate and want to escape from the attention of the media or the
public. They are not expected to transfer responsibilities to other agencies
many times, because this may anger other agencies and attract the attention of
the media and the public. While they are expected to take remedial activities
whenever necessary, it is not easy for them to admit their own responsibilities
unless it is unavoidable. Thus, this article contributes to a deeper understanding
of the BA strategies used by different agencies, especially when the perceived
responsibility of some agencies does not match their real responsibility.
To test our expectations, this study examines one major policy failure in
Taiwan, the waste oil scandal in 2014. The incident is traced to an elderly farmer
in Pingtung, who reported to various authorities the stench and pollution ema-
nating from an underground factory. After investigations, the Pingtung District
Prosecutor’s Office found that the underground factory collected waste oil, pro-
cessed it, and then sold products to downstream oil factories, including the
Qiangguan Company, Taiwan’s second largest lard oil supplier at that time. Lard
is an important ingredient in Taiwanese pastries and cookies. This waste oil inci-
dent shocked society, because Taiwan’s last waste oil scandal occurred in 1985.
In addition, before the waste oil crisis in 2014, several food safety incidents
occurred in Taiwan, and public confidence in the government began to decline.
The polarization of political elites at that time was very serious in Taiwan.
Therefore, the incident was widely reported in the press from September 4, 2014
and generated more than 1,000 news reports in about 1 month.
Although waste oil products were manufactured by a private under-
ground factory, this reflected a serious failure on the part of the govern-
ment’s food safety policies. When the incident broke out, the public found
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Administration & Society 53(4)
that there were many food products made from waste oil, and so they wor-
ried about the health effects of these products and began to question the
government’s capacity to handle the problem. For example, the public
wanted to know how these products made from waste oil could pass gov-
ernment inspection standards? Why did other downstream manufacturers
dare to buy products made from waste oil? Why has the government never
found out that this was a problem? In addition, waste oil is a kind of waste
and is expected to be managed by at least one government agency. How can
waste oil flow into the underground factory without being uncontrolled?
In Taiwan, food safety risks are comanaged by the Taiwan Food and Drug
Administration (TFDA) of the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW), the
Council of Agriculture (COA), and the Taiwan Environmental Protection
Administration (TEPA). The TFDA of MOHW are responsible for the planning
and implementing of food safety policies, including food import control, the
regulation and examination of additives, and the random inspection of food
manufacturers. COA is responsible for the safety of agricultural produce from
its production to the wholesale market. TEPA is responsible for the protection
and supervision of environmental and ecological issues. It also established a
system to guard against toxic chemical substances from being added into food
products. These agencies adopted various BA strategies to switch the responsi-
bility and attention of the media and the public to other agencies. During this
crisis, the heads of MOHW and TFDA resigned (TFDA & MOHW, 2014).
The case analyzed in this study can be categorized into the “presentation
strategy” mentioned by Hood (2002, 2007, 2010) and the “reactive BA strat-
egy” as proposed by Hinterleitner and Sager (2017). In addition, from the
perspective...
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