Blakely v. Washington: Sixth Amendment Limitation on Judicial Factfinding - Rebecca K. Mckelvey

• Jurisdiction: United States,Federal
• Publication year: 2005
• Citation: Vol. 56 No. 3

Blakely v. Washington: Criminal Sentencing and the Sixth Amendment Limitation on Judicial Factfinding

In Blakely v. Washington, 'the United States Supreme Court held that Washington's state criminal sentencing procedure did not comply with the defendant's Sixth Amendment jury trial guarantee.' A criminal defendant has the right to have a jury decide all facts legally essential to punishment.³ This decision is important for its impact on criminal sentencing procedures, especially regarding its implications for the federal sentencing guidelines.

I. Factual Background

In 1998 Ralph Howard Blakely, Jr. kidnapped his estranged wife Yolanda from their home in Grant County, Washington. He used duct tape to restrain her and forced her, at knifepoint, into a wooden box in the bed of his pickup truck. During the abduction, Blakely pleaded with Yolanda to dismiss her divorce suit and related trust proceedings against him. The couple's thirteen-year-old son, Ralphy, returned home from school, and Blakely ordered him to drive behind the truck in another car. Blakely threatened that he would use a shotgun to harm Yolanda if Ralphy did not comply. Ralphy followed the truck to a gas station. While both vehicles were stopped, Ralphy escaped and sought help. Blakely drove on with Yolanda, still imprisoned in the wooden box, to a friend's house in Montana. The friend called the police who then arrested Blakely.⁴

Blakely was charged with first-degree kidnapping. In a plea agreement, the State of Washington reduced the charge to second-degree kidnapping involving domestic violence and use of a firearm. Blakely later agreed to an additional charge of second-degree assault, involving domestic violence.⁵ He pleaded guilty to the charge of second-degree kidnapping, which is a class B felony, admitting the elements of the charge and the allegations of domestic violence and use of a firearm. Blakely did not admit any other relevant facts.⁶

Washington state sentencing law provided that "[n]o person convicted of a [class B] felony shall be punished by confinement. . . exceeding. . . a term of ten years."⁷ Other provisions of Washington's Sentencing Reform Act⁸ further limited the sentence. Second-degree kidnapping with a firearm bears a standard sentence range of forty-nine to fifty-three months, which is less than ten years.⁹

A judge may, however, impose a sentence that exceeds the standard range if the judge discovers "'substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence."'" When a judge sentences a defendant to a sentence that exceeds the standard range, the judge must support the sentence with findings of fact and conclusions of law.¹¹

The State recommended a sentence within the standard range which was forty-nine to fifty-three months. The facts in Blakely's plea corresponded to the state's guided maximum sentence.¹² The court, however, sentenced him to an additional thirty-seven months after hearing Yolanda's testimony describing the kidnapping and after making a judicial determination that the petitioner acted with "deliberate cruelty."¹³ This determinator gave the court grounds, under state law relating to domestic violence cases, for a departure from the standard sentence.¹⁴

Blakely objected, and the judge held a three-day bench hearing, which included testimony from Blakely, Yolanda, Ralphy, a police officer, and medical experts. Subsequent to the hearing, the judge issued thirty-two findings of fact and concluded that the initial sentence of ninety months should stand.¹⁵

Blakely appealed and contended that the trial judge's sentencing procedure deprived him of his Sixth Amendment constitutional right to have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, all the facts that were legally applicable to his sentence. The Washington State Court of Appeals affirmed, and when Blakely appealed again, the Washington Supreme Court denied discretionary review.¹⁶

The Supreme Court granted certiorari.¹⁷ In its majority opinion, the Court reversed the lower court's ruling, holding that the petitioner's Sixth Amendment right was violated by the imposition of an exceptional sentence based on facts not found by a jury."

11. Legal Background

The Sixth Amendment provides that "the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State . . . and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation."¹⁹ Generally, the Sixth Amendment provides criminal defendants the right to trial by jury. Juries decide the verdict on the charged offenses, and judges impose sentences as punishment.

A. Background: The Sixth Amendment and Criminal Sentencing

In Williams v. New York,²⁰ defendant was convicted of first-degree murder. The trial judge imposed the death sentence despite the jury's recommendation of life imprisonment. The judge explained the sentence enhancement was justified by additional information and was authorized by statute. Specifically, the judge described the shocking details of the crime and spoke about his own belief in defendant's guilt. The judge reasoned that the investigation had uncovered many material details about defendant's background and prior convictions. These facts, although relevant to punishment, could not have been brought before the jury for consideration."

The Supreme Court discussed how there were both historical and practical reasons for the distinction between the rules governing trial and sentencing procedure." Additionally, a sentencing judge has the task of determining the extent of punishment and having the most information possible is essential for setting an appropriate sentence.²³ The Court held that even though the potential for abuse arises when a judge is choosing the appropriate sentence, especially when the choice is between life imprisonment and death, judicial discretion is nevertheless constitutional.²⁴ A judge does not violate the Due Process Clause, which incorporates the Sixth Amendment, merely by considering information that was not put before a jury.²⁵

In In re Winship,²⁶ appellant was a twelve-year-old boy who had stolen money from a woman's purse. The trial judge reasoned that while the evidence might not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, such proof was not required by the Fourteenth Amendment. The judge ordered the boy to be placed in a training school for an initial period of eighteen months.²⁷

The Supreme Court discussed the historical precedence of requiring that a guilty conviction be based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt.²⁸ This "safeguard" reduces the risk of guilty convictions based on errors of fact.²⁹ The Court reversed and expressly held that the Due Process Clause, which incorporates the Sixth Amendment, requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact essential to constitute a crime.³⁰ This rule of law applies to children as well as to adults being charged with crimes.³¹

In United States v. Gaudin³² Gaudin was convicted of making material false statements on federal loan documents.³³ The trial court instructed the jury that a guilty verdict required the government to prove the materiality of the alleged false statements, but that this decision was a matter for the court rather than the jury. The judge ruled that the statements were material.³⁴

Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court in which he reiterated the pedigree of Sixth Amendment precedent.³⁵ The Court reasoned that the jury is not a "mere factfinder" but rather a body that "appl[ies] the law to those facts and draw[s] the ultimate conclusion of guilt or innocence."³⁶ As such, the Court held that the trial judge's act of refusing to let the jury determine the materiality of the false statements infringed on respondent's right to have a jury determine his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.³⁷

In Jones v. United States,³⁸ Nathaniel Jones, along with two other people, robbed and assaulted two men. A grand jury indicted Jones and his accomplices on counts relating to carjacking and using a firearm in a crime of violence. The trial judge's jury instructions referred only to the first paragraph of one of the statutes allegedly violated. The judge did not instruct the jury to consider "serious bodily injury,"³⁹ an element listed in the statute's subsection. The jury returned a guilty verdict on both counts for Jones. The presentence report recommended a sentence of twenty-five years because one of the victims had serious bodily injury. Jones objected to the recommended sentence because "serious bodily injury" had not been considered by the jury. The trial court imposed the twenty-five year sentence, reasoning that a preponderance of evidence supported the allegation of serious bodily injury.⁴⁰

The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court's rationale.⁴¹ The element of serious bodily injury was a fact that required consideration by the jury. A finding of serious bodily injury could result in a much higher sentence, thus making the element more than just a sentencing factor.⁴² The Court reversed and held that while it was not always necessary for every fact having a bearing on sentencing to be put before a jury, in this case, the statute's elements must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and submitted to the jury.⁴³

B. The Modern Apprendi Rule

The United States modeled its criminal law sentencing system after a historical tradition that required jury trials for accusation and sentencing hearings for criminal defendants. The Court acknowledged this rich history of sentencing tradition in Apprendi v. New Jersey.⁴⁴ In Apprendi petitioner Apprendi fired shots into the home of an African-American family, which had recently moved to a neighborhood that had previously been all white. A grand jury indictment charged Apprendi with several offenses, including shooting and unlawful possession of weapons. None of the charges referred to the state's hate crime statute.⁴⁵

Apprendi pled guilty to three counts for which there were statutory sentencing...