The bitter end: Democrats are right to push for an end to the Iraq war. But don't expect the troops to be grateful.

• Author: Ackerman, Spencer

In 2003, an optimist could hope that the United States would establish a liberal democracy in Iraq. Four years into the war in Iraq, an optimist can hope that a "surge" of 30,000 troops will help stabilize an illiberal, Iran-aligned Shiite government. The tactical merits of the surge matter little when set against a simple truth: successes of any sort have become increasingly modest, and the overall strategic picture has become increasingly grim.

At the local level, as with most wars, there are discrete successes. They do not reverse the larger trend. And, as time goes on, even the good news becomes more ambiguous. Sectarian violence in the capital is down by about a third since January, but the overall level of violence in the city, in the form of assassinations and bombings, has remained unchanged, prompting a United Nations report in April to criticize the Iraqi government for withholding casualty statistics that might undermine faith in the security plan. Outside of Baghdad, Anbar Province brings encouraging reports suggesting that al-Qaeda is alienating Sunni insurgents. What's also emerging, however, is that many have turned against al-Qaeda for now in the name of prosecuting a better insurgency against the United States later.

The purpose of the surge, which augments by 30,000 a force of roughly 140,000, is, according to General David Petraeus, the U.S. commander in Iraq, to provide "Iraqi leaders [with] the time and space they need to come to grips with the tough political issues that must be resolved." To help the process along, the United States has pushed measures for sectarian compromise, including a change in distribution of oil revenues, a law permitting low-level Baath Party officials back into government, constitutional reform, and a new provincial elections law. But the Iraqi cabinet and parliament, whose dominant Shiite factions are more interested in pressing sectarian advantage than reconciliation, have either slow-walked them or neutered their substance.

To put all this in context: Defense Secretary Robert Gates admitted candidly in mid-March that without sectarian reconciliation among Iraqis the "strategy won't work." Indeed, the entire point of the surge is to bring such reconciliation about by, in Gates's words, "buy[ing] the Iraqis time." But that's the problem. The United States is ever more dearly buying time, and Iraq is ever more freely spending it. As this article goes to press, the parliament is set to embark on a two-month vacation, during which, if current trends hold, 200 more American troops will be killed.

The Democratic Party, fresh from its wins in the midterm elections, understands this. It has finally united around a position on the war: it must end. This spring, Congress passed legislation for supplemental war funding that mandated withdrawal from Iraq by the spring of 2008. President Bush, as was expected, vetoed it.

On the merits of withdrawal, the Democrats have it right. The politics of it, however, remain complicated. It's become common among Democrats to argue for withdrawing from Iraq in the name of the troops. In January, for instance, New York Congressman Jerrold Nadler introduced a bill titled the Protect the Troops and Bring Them Home Act. In February, Congresswoman Lynne Woolsey sent a letter to Bush arguing that it was "time to truly support our troops--by bringing them home." Fifteen members of Congress signed on. Senators, too, have been willing to support this idea. Senator Barbara Mikulski of Maryland said in...