Birth Legacies and State Failure

• Author: Jeff Carter,Douglas Lemke
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/00220027221111746
• Published date: 01 November 2022
• Date: 01 November 2022
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Journal of Conf‌lict Resolution

2022, Vol. 66(10) 1854–1880

© The Author(s) 2022

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DOI: 10.1177/00220027221111746

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Birth Legacies and State

Failure

Jeff Carter

1

and Douglas Lemke

2

Abstract

We argue patterns of state failure are inf‌luenced by variation in how states emerged as

independent political actors. In particular, states with positive birth legacies, those

whose emergence required relatively high levels of capacity and legitimacy, should be

less likely to experience state failure than countries that experienced less auspicious

births. We assess this claim on the universe of states in the international system

between 1950 and 2002 with multistate duration models that estimate the probabilities

states transition into and out of periods of failure. We f‌ind that states with positive birth

legacies are less likely to experience state failure and that this relationship is driven by

states with positive birth legacies being able to more quickly transition from failure back

to being functioning states. Our f‌indings offer evidence that state failure is usefully

thought of in the context of state-making processes and show that how states emerg e

as independent actors inf‌luences phenomena central to comparative and international

politics.

Keywords

birth legacies, political development, state failure, state making

State failure represents one of the most important issues in the contemporary inter-

national system. Failed and failing states provide fewer essential services and have

diminished economic growth compared to functioning states (Berry et al. 2004;

1

Department of Government and Justice Studies, Appalachian State University, Boone, NC, USA

2

Department of Political Science, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, USA

Corresponding Author:

Jeff Carter, Department of Government and Justice Studies, Appalachian State University, 353K Anne Belk

Hall, Boone, NC 38677, USA.

Email: jtc475@gmail.com

Chauvet and Collier 2004). In terms of international security, failed states are more

likely to host and produce international terrorists (Piazza 2008), and increase the

probability neighbors experience political turmoil, unrest, civil war, and interstate war

(Iqbal and Starr 2008). This is particularly worrisome given that political turmoil,

unrest, civil war, and interstate war increase the risk of state failure (Iqbal and Starr

2016).

Existing research on state failure largely shares two characteristics. First, it con-

cludes that states’economies, conf‌lict experiences, and political institutions are the key

determinants of state failure (e.g. Goldstone et al. 2010;Iqbal and Starr 2016). Low

levels of development, persistent conf‌licts against domestic challengers, and weak

institutions often go together (Fearon and Laitin 2003;Quinn, Mason, and Gurses

2007;Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Moreover, at a theoretical level, state failure and

its determinants are commonly framed in the literature as stemming from low levels of

state capacity, legitimacy, and authority (e.g. Carment et al. 2008;Goldstone et al.

2010). Disappointingly, scholars have not asked whether some underlying factor might

explain both state failure and the factors understood to cause it.

Second, previous research overwhelmingly focuses on state failure onset. Yet, there

are two related but distinct processes that determine whether a state is failed at any point

in time: (1) the state just transitioned from functioning to failed or (2) the state has been

failed for some period of time and has been unable to transition back to being a

functioning state. An accurate understanding of state failure requires considering both

the onset and duration of state failure, especially given that considerable variation exists

in state failure duration (Iqbal and Starr 2016).

We address the larger context in which state failure occurs and consider both the

onset and duration of state failure. We argue state failure is best understood as part of the

larger state-making process. A state-making perspective suggests that how states were

born, develop, persist, fail, or die are related (Tilly 1990). In the state-making

framework, past events matter to the extent that they affect a state’s capacity and

legitimacy (Lemke 2019). Accordingly, the failure to consider the inf‌luence of past

events can threaten the substantive inferences one draws if the phenomenon being

investigated is a function of a state’s capacity and legitimacy.

Our suggestion that state failure should be inf‌luenced by how states were born

ref‌lects that states vary considerably in terms of how much capacity and legitimacy

were required for them to emerge as independent political actors, which inf‌luences their

ability to consolidate control over their territory and population (Lemke and Carter

2016). Existing research argues states are fragile and more likely to fail to the extent

they lack capacity, legitimacy,and/or author ity over their territory (Carment et al. 2008;

Goldstone 2008). States with high levels of capacity and legitimacy should face few

challenges to their authority and be able to defeat those challenges that do arise (Lemke

and Carter 2016;Lemke 2019). It therefore follows that states with positive birth

legacies should be less likely to fail and better able to restore control over their territory

if they do experience a failure than states that had inauspicious births.

Carter and Lemke 1855